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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the social record of popular Jacobitism during the 1745 Rising 
as expressed through its plebeian constituency. Such an assessment fills in the gaps 
largely ignored by scholars of the Jacobite period, who instead tend to concentrate 
upon the elites and the political and doctrinal ideologies espoused by influential 
gentry. Using a purpose-built database to compile and analyse a large number of 
resources including lists of prisoners, trial records, muster rolls, and government 
papers, a prosopographical survey of over 15,000 persona entries is presented. The 
study looks at four thematic aspects of popular Jacobitism, which describe 
motivation, constituency, recruitment, and consequences. These combine to 
provide a social profile of the ‘lesser sort’ of those persons involved in rebellion 
against the Hanoverian government, whether martial or civilian. The results 
suggest that practicality was a major influence in drawing the common people into 
civil war, and that the ideological tenets of Jacobitism, much diluted by 1745, took a 
backseat to issues of necessity. Widespread ambivalence to the political climate 
made harsh recruiting methods necessary, and rampant desertion reinforced that 
need until the army’s defeat at Culloden. The willing and unwilling supporters of 
Charles Edward Stuart’s landing in Scotland represented local, national, and 
international interests and stretched across class divides. Civilians contributed to 
the effort along with the soldiers, but limited martial support both domestic and 
foreign was insufficient to sustain the Stuart-sanctioned coup and the exiled 
dynasty’s hopes for a subsequent restoration. Understanding that weak punitive 
measures after 1715 enabled yet another rising thirty years later, the government’s 
response after Culloden was swift and brutal. Though its campaigns of containment 
and suppression strained the resources of the judicial system, effective punishment 
was seen as a necessity, dominating British policy even as it was involved in a larger 
war on the Continent. This thesis demonstrates that plebeians used by the Jacobite 
elites were ill-equipped to support the strategies of the cause, yet they ultimately 
bore the brunt of the reparations for treasonous expressions, however questionable 
their commitment may have been. 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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
ATAVISM VERSUS PROGRESS  
The premise of this thesis is to provide new insights and interpretations to the 
social record of the Jacobite movement during the Rising of 1745, an historical 
demographic that has never before benefitted from a prosopographical analysis. Its 
goal is to define incontrovertible profiles that reveal both the agency and the 
constituency of popular late-era Jacobitism through the use of a relational database 
purpose-built for a large-scale survey of this information. 
New researchers interested in the study of the Jacobite era face two 
significant obstacles that threaten to inhibit their comprehension of population data 
offered by the subject’s current scholarship. The first obstacle is the vast corpus of 
work flooding a discipline of relatively few scholars, making it difficult to find a 
sober lens through which to view the material. Much of it is powerful, written and 
researched by established academics with sharp yet varying opinions on the 
relevance of the Jacobite movement and its place within wildly contrasting 
historical contexts. Much of it is fairly recent, fuelled by popular interest in the 
years leading up to the 250th anniversary of the final rising in 1995. And much of it 
is viewed from the top-down, trading the granular sources of Jacobite motivation 
and causal minutia for the larger, sweeping arcs of British statecraft during the long 
eighteenth century. As is typical of any historical discipline, repeating maxims and 
criticisms vie for the starring role as the fundamental mainstream consciousness of 
the Jacobite movement, and if it indeed was a movement at all.   1
The second obstacle is the methodology with which the established 
orthodoxy explains what principles and characteristics Jacobitism embodied during 
its near-century of life and, specifically to this study, those near to its death. Most 
antiquarian published sources describing the constituency that have long been 
mined for data are now relegated to little more than shibboleths of common 
knowledge without critical reexamination necessary to further discover new 
 Allan Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism: In Search of a Movement’ in in T.M. Devine and J.R. Young, eds., 1
Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives (East Linton, 1999), pp. 82-85; Allan Macinnes, ‘Jacobitism in 
Scotland: Episodic Cause or National Movement?’, SHR, 86:222 (October 2007), pp. 225-252. See also Colin 
Kidd, ‘The Rehabilitation of Scottish Jacobitism’ in SHR, 77:203 (April 1998), pp. 58-76.
11
evidence within them. Lacking a progressive methodology to harvest and analyse 
large amounts of biographical data, it is difficult to take for granted the infrequent 
assertions that have made about the popular constituency within recent 
scholarship.  Sample sizes of military records are rarely representative of viable 2
populations if plebeian communities are indeed examined at all. 
These obstacles are worsened by the not uncommon precept that everything 
that has ever needed to be known about Jacobitism is already known, and that the 
flame of that lingering, arguably-national romance – at least in Scotland, where the 
Jacobite effort in 1745 commenced and conceded – has long ago burned out.  3
Keeping those mawkish embers warm is a determined cadre of popular historians 
and novelists, as well as re-enactors, secret societies, and legitimist gentlemen’s 
clubs who blithely seek an independent Scotland and the restoration of a Stuart 
king to his modern throne. It follows that interest in historical Jacobitism suffers 
from a degree of ambivalence, and, for example, is appropriated alternately as 
evidence that a Scottish national identity was snuffed out at its most tender, just 
before modernity emerged upon the pre-Union state, and also as proof that 
Scotland is much greater now than it ever could have been without its inclusion 
into Britain.  Yet, seen unfiltered through the lens of the modern, the movement 4
must stand on its own for how it was regarded by the people who took part, and an 
accessible, objective methodology for how to do this has not yet been attained.  
The recent historiography of Jacobite scholarship has largely described the 
deeds and beliefs of high society – the upper echelons and landed elite who 
conspired, organised, and put into action resistance to the Hanoverian state along 
 See, for example, Murray Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 2009), pp. 110-133. 2
 As far back as 1928, Bruce Gordon Seton and Jean Gordon Arnot introduce their seminal, three-volume treatise, 3
The Prisoners of the ’45, with the assertion that ‘The field of Jacobite research has been so thoroughly examined 
by successive generations of enquirers that it might well appear that nothing worthy of further study remained for 
investigation.’ in Seton and Arnot, The Prisoners of the ’45 (i) (Edinburgh, 1928), p. v. Sir James Fergusson of 
Kilkerran likewise states in the foreword to John Gibson’s Ships of the ’45 (London, 1967): ‘For many years now it 
has been my conviction that any further publication of narratives about the ’45 [...] ought to be banned by statute 
under heavy penalties.’ See also William Speck’s introduction to The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the 
Suppression of the ’45 (Caernafon, 1995), p. 1, and for a one-line encapsulation of this historiographical 
agitation, refer to Roger Emerson’s review of Daniel Szechi’s 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven and 
London, 2006), where he begins by asking ‘Does the world need another book on the Jacobites?’ in JBS, 46, No. 
2 (April, 2007), pp. 471-473.
 Pittock explains that both ‘sentimentalists and debunkers alike’ are responsible for distorting and ignoring the 4
Jacobite cause throughout its historiography and beyond. He helpfully breaks them into two camps: primitives and 
romantics, Myth, p. 2.
12
both political and ideological axes.  But Jacobitism must also accurately be defined 5
by the lay personnel who espoused both the tenets of the cause and especially its 
martial and practical apparatuses, whether perceived as transportive wheels of the 
machine or simply as so many cogs. Disappointingly, since the 1930s this latter 
sector has been generally and sometimes deliberately overlooked and underutilised. 
Before then, a few scholars had compiled numerous lists of these constituencies as 
proof of Jacobite support or resistance against it, though these are usually devoid of 
context other than simple biographical details.  Many of these books and 6
documents are stitched together from a variety of primary sources, including rosters 
of prisoners, military muster rolls, court depositions and also transportation, 
execution, and recruitment lists. Yet even the collators of these nonetheless valuable 
compilations admit to the existence of omissions, deletions, and redundancies, all of 
which go some way to obscuring the social record of the Jacobite movement.  As 7
noted earlier, the current format of these sources is, in itself, an obstacle to clear 
study and characterisation of the period. Long lists of names separated by region or 
military unit only describe so much, and that from an inflexible, predetermined 
taxonomy – or many divergent ones. An upgrade of this system of collation and an 
update to the way we access this information is needed to answer the many 
questions about both the Jacobite cause and movement that are still being posited, 
regardless of those who claim there is nothing left to find within. 
During the hundred years of Jacobite activity from the Glorious Revolution 
to the death of Charles Edward Stuart, Britain saw sweeping and systemic change in 
virtually every aspect of the state and how it functioned, as well as how it was 
regarded from within and also its perception by the rest of Europe and the northern 
world. To accept Jacobite aims as static through these successive generations of 
support is illogical. While the Stuarts remained as the icons and fomenters of the 
movement’s inspiration and general momentum, both the conditions of Jacobite 
objectives and the objectives themselves unquestionably changed with the times. 
 For example, Daniel Szechi, ‘Constructing a Jacobite: The Social and Intellectual Origins of George Lockhart of 5
Carnwath’ in Historical Journal, 40 (December 1997), pp. 977-996; J.C.D. Clark and Howard Erskine-Hill, eds., 
Samuel Johnson in Historical Context (Basingstoke, 2001); Eveline Cruickshanks, ‘Lord North, Christopher Layer 
and the Atterbury Plot: 1720-23’ in Eveline Cruickshanks and Jeremy Black, eds., The Jacobite Challenge 
(Edinburgh, 1988), pp. 92-104; Cruickshanks, ‘Charles Spencer, Third Earl of Sunderland and Jacobitism’, EHR, 
113 (1988), pp. 65-76, etc.
 These will be surveyed in the following section on Sources, p. 20.6
 P45 (i), pp. vii, 257; Archibald Philip Primrose, ed., A List of Persons Concerned in the Rebellion (Edinburgh, 7
1890), pp. xiii-xvi; Alexander Mackintosh, ed., The Muster Roll of the Forfarshire or Lord Ogilvy’s Regiment 
(Inverness, 1914), pp. viii-vix.
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This is to say that a self-proclaimed Jacobite loyalist in 1689 and one in 1745 may 
have not agreed on any one aspect of the coveted results of restoring their 
respective Jameses to power, though they both supported the only significant, 
viable alternative to Orange and Hanoverian control of Britain.  Earlier phases of 8
actionable Jacobite doctrine indicate that dynastic right to succession was the 
lodestar of the movement immediately after the Revolution, with concern moving 
more toward contractual support fuelled by a zeitgeist of anti-Unionism after 1707, 
before adapting to encompass and represent a much wider range of disaffection by 
the final years of internal and external conflict.  It is also vital to note that 9
Jacobitism changed along with the context of European statecraft; it spiked in 
popularity and agency when Britain was most mired in instability, transformation, 
and a war upon the Continent.  
Much has also changed within the historiography of the subject since 1994, 
when Daniel Szechi suggested that historians of Jacobitism have ‘a lot of thinking 
and reinterpretation of eighteenth- and nineteenth- century British history to do’.  10
This provocative warning was well-founded, as even with the support of scholars in 
the previous decades like Bruce Lenman, Frank McLynn, and Eveline 
Cruickshanks, Whiggish interpretations of history have insisted in marginalising 
the far-reaching effects of Jacobitism within British party and polity, as well as its 
goals.  Friction between approaches that trivialised or restrained the Jacobite 11
narrative and the scholars who worked to forward the legitimacy of Jacobitism as a 
genuine threat to the British state (as well as a distinct expression of British 
patriotism) seemed to have fomented what could be considered yet another civil 
war, albeit a scholarly one.  Thus the lines were drawn between optimists and 12
 Paul Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688-1788 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5.8
 An overview of the changing nature of Jacobite interest can be found in Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain 9
and Europe 1688-1788 (Manchester, 1994). See also Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 
(Aberdeen, 1995), p. 183.
 Szechi, The Jacobites, pp. 6-7.10
 See, for example, the many works of Geoffrey Holmes; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 11
(London, 1992); Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York, 1965); George Hilton Jones, 
The Main Stream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, MA, 1954); Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig 
Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689-c.1830 (Cambridge and New York, 1993); 
Christopher Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, Towards Industrialisation (Manchester, 
2000). For a survey of Jacobite historiography and its reaction to the Whig interpretation, see Jonathan Clark’s 
‘The Many Restorations of King James: A Short History of Scholarship on Jacobitism, 1688-2006’, in Paul Monod, 
Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi, eds., Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad (Basingstoke, 2010) 
p. 9-56.
 Allan Macinnes, Lesley Graham, and Kieran German, ‘Introduction’ in Allan Macinnes, Lesley Graham, and 12
Kieran German, eds., Living with Jacobitism 1690-1788 (London, 2014), pp. 1-2; Pittock, Myth, pp. 7-11.
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pessimists, atavists and progressives – which somewhat conveniently apes support 
for and resistance to Jacobitism during its life throughout the eighteenth century. 
Despite these alternating dormancies and bloomings of Jacobite 
historiography through the last hundred years, the discipline is currently in an 
encouraging state. Some thanks for this should be directed to the efforts of the 
Jacobite Studies Trust, whose tri-annual colloquia have not only encouraged a 
steady font of new works to be presented, but have provided a critical forum into 
which that material can be tested. Within the published proceedings of the first of 
these conferences, three noted historians of the Jacobite era described the course of 
current study as being at a crossroads and looking at the ways forward for the future 
of the discipline. Perspectives heretofore unspoken were now getting attention with 
renewed energy, and with a new generation of scholars waiting in the wings. A 
number of trends are reviewed, including a recent focus on British identity in a 
Jacobite context, material culture and discourse, Jacobite diasporic studies, and an 
overdue rediscovery of Irish Jacobitism. Most importantly, the authors state, finally 
in the rearview mirror is the critical Whig historiographic tradition which did not 
just argue against the legitimacy of the Jacobite threat as a developed ideological 
alternative, but which wholly ignored it.  13
Other scholars offer their own visions of what progress can still be made. 
Allan Macinnes, for example, warns that future scholars of Jacobitism should 
eschew close examinations into the morale, esprit, and inclination of the individual 
fighting man in lieu of tackling the more relevant issue of systemic motivation: 
While continuing to bear in mind the polemical impact of Jacobitism on the 
national consciousness, research should focus on the elites who may have helped 
shape a movement rather than on the rank and file who drank and died for the 
cause.   14
While there is a good point to be made in this, especially considering the 
proliferation of popular literature available on the subject, to resign further study of 
‘bottom-up’ Jacobite participation to the historical graveyard is a disservice to the 
discipline. In order to establish Jacobitism’s ‘credentials as a movement’ it not only 
falls upon the historian to examine and present ‘dynastic, commercial, and 
ideological networks’, but to ensure that a clear picture is portrayed of how these 
networks were populated, both nationally and internationally, including both the 
 Thoroughly outlined in Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi, ‘Introduction: Loyalty and Identity’ in 13
Monod, et al., Loyalty and Identity, p. 1-8.
 Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 82-85.14
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elite and the rabble.  While its ideological aims are indicative of its status as a 15
political movement and much more, Jacobitism in 1745 was most effective through 
its military representation, and that social (and arguably cultural) acknowledgement 
is of the utmost importance in identifying how and why strains of Jacobitism ran 
through its supporters. The soldiers on the march were obviously not the only 
Jacobite adherents. Outwith the battlefield, in the villages and coffee houses, the 
civilian and commercial logistical networks remain largely unidentified, ceding 
presence in the historical record to those whose names are easily identifiable from 
their capture, death, or ‘rehabilitation’.  
While recruitment into the Jacobite ranks and studies of the army have 
received a good amount of attention, little mention has been made of the 
demographic array of Jacobite support as it relates to age and occupation, and how 
the Scottish mercantile sector was impacted by the shock of civil war in the summer 
of 1745.  Much has been written of Jacobite commercial networks in Britain and 16
Europe, though studies of how the threat of Jacobitism transformed intra-industrial 
social relationships in Scotland are virtually non-existent.  Other than a few well-17
known romantic tales of strong-willed wives of chieftains leading out their clans in 
their husbands’ stead, relatively little research has been done on the plebeian 
women’s contribution to the Jacobite affair, yet many dozens were punished along 
with the hundreds of male prisoners once the government trials were underway.  18
The diaspora effected by the Highland and Lowland Clearances has long been the 
subject of a boom in academic literature, but tracing the routes of the transported, 
 Ibid., p. 84-5.15
 Studies of the Jacobite army will be explored in depth within the following chapters. For Scottish mercantile 16
surveys, see Allan Macinnes, ‘Union, Empire and Global Adventuring with a Jacobite Twist 1707-53’ in Allan 
Macinnes & Douglas Hamilton, eds., Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, 1680-1820 (London, 2014) pp. 
123-140; Kieran German, ‘Aberdeen, Aberdeenshire & Jacobitism in the North-East of Scotland, 1688-1750 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2010). 
 For examples of commercial networks with Europe, see Stuart M. Nisbet, ‘Clearing the Smokescreen of Early 17
Scottish Mercantile Identity: From Leeward Sugar Plantations to Scottish Country Estates c.1680-1730’ in 
Macinnes, et al., Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, pp. 109-122; Siobhan Talbott, ‘Commerce and the 
Jacobite Court: Scottish Migrants in France, 1688-1718’ in Macinnes, et al., Living with Jacobitism, pp. 99-110; 
Steve Murdoch, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe 
1603-1746 (Leiden and Boston, 2006), pp. 127-248; Douglas Cattterall, ‘At Home Abroad: Ethnicity and Enclave 
in the World of Scots Traders in Northern Europe, c. 1600-1800’ in Journal of Early Modern History, 8:3 (2004), 
pp. 319-357.
 See Chapter III: Constituency, p. 115 for more on Jacobite women and existing sources.18
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re-recruited, and forfeited rebels after Culloden has largely been overlooked.  Nor 19
has there been any significant consideration of Jacobitism’s role as a manipulable 
lever used by its opponents to condemn the innocent, taking advantage of the 
unrest for their own aims.  Obviously, there are still many things to learn about the 20
societal influence of the Stuarts’ final attempt to regain the throne, as well as the 
need for a revised assessment of not just the impact that the movement itself had 
upon the Three Kingdoms and the greater world, but the manners in which being 
part of the movement had an impact on its constituents. 
In the selfsame breath as his warning to us, Macinnes paradoxically 
acknowledges the need for a new Jacobite research agenda, at the forefront of 
which is the ‘identification of a body of Jacobites from the risings, from the 
conspiracies, from the parliamentary activity against the Union and from 
membership of the Commission of Jacobite Trustees and and the Scottish Jacobite 
Association.’ He proposes undertaking this using a three-pronged approach: 
extensive archival searches, implementation of technology to assist with 
interpretation of the large amounts of extant data, and a structured analysis that fits 
snugly within the academic precedent.  The core mechanics of Macinnes’ proposal 21
is precisely what this study entails. 
METHODOLOGY AND JDB1745 
The sources described in the previous section are vital to Jacobite studies, 
but the information they offer about the plebeian constituency is both limited in 
scope and restrictive to further analysis. Only very recently has the social history of 
the Jacobite conflict received any discriminating scrutiny other than saccharine 
 For examples of post-Culloden diaspora studies, see Eric Richards, The Highland Clearances (Edinburgh, 2000); 19
Charles W.J. Withers, Urban Highlanders: Highland-Lowland Migration and Urban Gaelic Culture, 1700-1900 
(East Linton, 1998); Douglas J. Hamilton, ‘“Defending the Colonies Against Malicious Attacks of Philanthropy”: 
Scottish Campaigns Against the Abolitions of the Slave Trade and Slavery’ in Macinnes, et al., Jacobitism, 
Enlightenment and Empire, pp. 193-208; Szechi, The Jacobites, pp. 126-135.
 Edward Gregg contributes an article, little of which is focussed on the Forty-five, ‘The Politics of Paranoia’ in 20
Cruickshanks and Black, eds., The Jacobite Challenge, pp. 42-56.
 Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 84-5.21
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monographs, with a few notable exceptions.  While this new attention is 22
movement in the right direction, the conclusions posited from inferential social 
studies of the Jacobite constituency must have some widespread, methodologically-
sound prosopographic analysis rather than the scattered examples currently used as 
a basis for affirmations about Jacobite population statistics.  23
The forms of data available on which to conduct this analysis are varied and 
disjointed from being a cohesive statistical entity, but they are most certainly 
present in the historical record. In addition to the typical information conveyed by 
published lists and muster rolls, which usually include snippets of military records, 
prison transfers, trial results, and limited demographical location data, a wide array 
of further details can be added to this corpus, and should be considered in any 
evaluation of Jacobite support. For example, Treasury Solicitor John Sharpe 
received a list of 170 prisoners confined within Carlisle prison that note each 
person’s age, trade, and stated religion. State Solicitor Philip Carteret Webb 
penned a brief of fifty-four captives in York who pleaded guilty at their trials; each 
person is described with biographical notes and witnesses named against him. The 
Earl of Albemarle named seventy individuals against whom the government holds 
evidence of participating in rebellion, but who were not apprehended by November 
of 1746, and therefore are not included in extant rolls of prisoners. David Bruce, 
Advocate-General of Scotland, provided four discrete lists of rebel prisoners 
confined in the tolbooth of Inverness after Culloden which identify a total of 
ninety-nine persons, their homes of origin, and the engagements at which they 
fought. Mungo Graham of Orchill, factor to the loyalist Duke of Montrose, 
furnished his laird with exacting tallies of his individual tenants, including their rent 
values and known level of involvement in the rebellion. In Aberdeen, a receipt was 
given to Captain Lambert of Fleming’s Regiment of Foot for ninety-six prisoners 
accused of treason before carrying them southward for trial; Keeper of the Gaol of 
Aberdeen William Murdoch further itemised thirty-four of these persons taken by 
the town guard in the days immediately following Culloden, including their places 
of origin, military units, and the day upon which they were captured. Briefs of 269 
 Elements of Jacobite social history have been fed to the public with significant artistic and romantic license 22
since the time of Sir Walter Scott. Categorically, most Victorian-era clan histories represent their subjects as having 
absolute loyalty to Charles Edward Stuart or total conviction in the validity of the Jacobite cause as a nationalist 
endeavour. Some modern social histories have been useful, including Pittock, Myth; Allan Macinnes, Clanship, 
Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996); Monod, Jacobitism and the English People; 
etc.
 A qualified study of mythologised Jacobitism due to anecdotal evidence and popular tradition is explored by 23
Pittock in Myth, pp. 2-25.
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rebels taken at Perth, including pre-trial litigation that on occasion demonstrated 
remarkable leniency, were kept by the sheriff-deputies of Perth. This same bundle 
of ‘proofs’ was later recorded within the Hanoverian government’s Treasury 
Solicitor Papers, categorising each witness who testified by number and reference 
to their deposition. Oaths of allegiance, assurance, and abjuration were signed by 
exonerated rebels and Hanoverian loyalists seeking positions of public office. 
Billeting books name each household in Aberdeen that was charged with the 
housing and quartering of British army troops after the Jacobites were driven out. 
Rental books for the estates of Pearsie and Airlie note the names of each tenant 
residing in 1745-6 and the payments they owed to their landlords.  24
The sampling of the above sources clearly demonstrates their propensity to 
reveal a tremendous amount of data regarding the nature of Jacobite involvement in 
the 1745 Rising. The need to establish a method to catalogue and analyse such 
diverse sets of data is self-evident. Removing the obstacles that inhibit 
comprehension of that data, in the case of this study, means presenting it in a way 
that it can most easily be understood and accessed. This target data in question is 
the large and scattered bulk of factoids relating to Jacobite plebeian adherents 
during the 1745 Rising, and the most useful, manipulable structure with which to 
view this data is a prosopographical database. The database is neither a new nor 
untested tool for the study of historical populations, but it is not one that has yet 
been applied to this subject matter, a sample seemingly tailor-made for such an 
analysis. Using a purpose-built tool for collecting and collating such data, this thesis 
seeks to answer some of the historiographical disputes between established scholars 
about the nature of popular late-era Jacobitism, along the way uncovering some 
previously unknown facets that would be much more difficult to discover using 
traditional analogue research methods.   25
  
 SPD.36/88/33d; 36/88/116; SPS.54/34/29c; 54/32/49d; NRS GD.220/6/1662/11-13; ACA Parcel L/H/1-3; 24
TNA TS.11/760/2361; PKA B59.30/72/2-3, 5-11; B59.33/3; NRS E.379/9-10; ACA Parcel L/P/1; DCA 
Wedderburn of Pearsie Papers, Box 21, Bundles 1-2.
 See Appendix I: Notes on Technical Methodology for details about The Jacobite Database of 1745 (hereafter 25
JDB1745).
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SOURCES 
Instead of the conventional practise of expository review in order to 
demonstrate a working familiarity with a relevant historiography, it is more useful 
to introduce and briefly survey the specific sources used for analysis in this study. A 
three-tier entry scheme furnishes this project with an ‘inverted pyramid’ or ‘funnel’ 
of data, starting with the broadest and most referenced sources before moving to 
smaller or more sequestered material, including those not yet applied to surveys of 
the constituency of the Jacobites. Such a scheme gives priority to the sources that 
will provide the largest number of individual entries with as much biographical data 
as possible. At the wide mouth of this funnel is a trio of published references that 
are drawn from material recorded during and in the direct aftermath of the Forty-
five as well as all the way up to the modern day. The first of these is the Earl of 
Rosebery’s edited publication of the Scottish History Society, A List of Persons 
Concerned in the Rebellion (hereafter Rosebery’s List), which contains 2579 names 
collected from the supervisors of excise just three weeks after Culloden. After 
issuing a general letter to sixteen regional Commissioners of Excise in Scotland on 
7 May 1746, Lord Justice Clerk Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun wrote to the Duke of 
Newcastle describing his appeal to the commissioners to persuade those in their 
employment to come forth and assist the government by providing evidence. These 
orders were then passed down to ‘all the Officers of Excise through the Kingdom’, 
who were persuaded to 
make up lists as full and compleat as they can from their own knowledge or the 
best Information they can obtain of all the persons of whatever rank within their 
respective bounds that have been engaged in this wicked and unnatural Rebellion 
either by carrying Arms or otherways aiding and assisting the Rebels.   26
The fruits of these labours were collected within the Saltoun Papers and form the 
basis for the later publication of Rosebery’s List in 1890.  This provides an 27
excellent basis for identifying Jacobite support by region, though it should be noted 
that many of the excise regions are absent. The second main published source of 
alleged Jacobites is the previously-mentioned compilation by Seton and Arnot, The 
Prisoners of the ’45. These three volumes list 3471 names gathered from the official 
Jail Returns of Scotland, added together with those collected from an incomplete 
 Rosebery’s List, p. 357; Fletcher to Newcastle (7 August, 1746), SPS.54/33/3; NLS MS.17522 ff. 1-3.26
 Note that the lists made out by the Commissioners of Excise are apparently different to the manuscripts used 27
by Rosebery, the latter of which are now likely lost. When comparing entries, there are significant variations 
between the two. Compare with NLS MS.17522 ff. 1-65; 17524; NLS MS.1918.
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scrutiny of the State Papers in London and a number of other pertinent sources.  28
These two published compilations were produced by an industrious network of 
scholars in what should be considered a transformative period for the revitalisation 
of interest in Jacobite studies.   29
When juxtaposing these two sources, there are surely redundancies amidst 
the 6050 names listed between them.  Seton and Arnot in fact used Rosebery’s List 30
as one of their references, though they mention that only 300 names within 
Rosebery’s compilation are unequivocally labeled as being prisoners, a designation 
with which the later three volumes are primarily concerned.  But even if these two 31
lists are perfectly recorded from the original sources with no overlap, this still 
provides an inadequate representation of Jacobite support in 1745-6 when 
compared to the figures commonly cited within the research of the period. Duly 
stated in Murray Pittock’s opus, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans, ‘reputable 
scholarship’ has pushed past the marginalisation of earlier estimates by piecing 
together significantly larger numbers from particular modern studies.  For this 32
purpose, the most valuable of these is Jean McCann’s 1962 thesis, which 
enumerates regional military support during the Forty-five from primary sources 
and suggests the total number in arms was as high as 14,000.  However, no 33
definitive list of soldiers has been compiled that comes close to corroborating these 
numbers, and that figure is the very high end of the estimate. 
Most of what is known about Jacobite army composition is well-covered 
through a number of recent works, but the actual numbers that were mobilised 
 Thankfully the compilers include a short primer on their identification methods for keeping these records 28
organised; it still may be used as a salient guide even with the convenience of technology in modern historical 
scholarship. See their Chapter XII, ‘Identification of Individuals’, P45 (i), pp. 257-68.
 Some established scholars would not agree with this assertion, tacitly claiming no interest in the constituency 29
of the Jacobite movement or what these early researchers brought to the discipline. Jonathan Clark, for example, 
does not mention Seton and Arnot in his review of Jacobite historiography, ‘The Many Restorations of King 
James’, p. 9-56. Neither does he note the massive corpus of relevant contributions by that maven of Scottish 
Humanities, Walter Biggar Blaikie, who offered his papers to Seton and Arnot as the core of their work. As well, 
Clark only makes a too-brief mention of the station of Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, Blaikie’s cousins, both of 
whom should be considered indispensable to the discipline and the latter of whom also contributed sources to The 
Prisoners of the ’45. See pp. 23-24 of this chapter for more on the Taylers.
 In the county of Midlothian alone, for instance, there is a 13.8% probable overlap in personae.30
 P45 (i), pp. vi-vii.31
 Pittock, Myth, pp. 65-81.32
 Jean McCann, ‘The Organisation of the Jacobite Army, 1745-1746’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 33
Edinburgh, 1963) p. xi.
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remain elusive.  The use of muster rolls in this project is therefore also helpful as 34
an aggregation of core data. They are restrictive when referenced alone, however, 
as these lists generally only name Jacobite soldiers - captured, killed, or in hiding - 
who are recorded within an established military unit at some point during the 
conflict or directly afterward. The most often cited of these records is the third 
source in the initial tier of database entry: No Quarter Given: The Muster Roll of 
Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army 1745-46. The latest edition of this roll (2001) is 
an encapsulation of Jacobite army strength throughout the entire campaign, pulling 
names from a large host of other sources and recompiling them into specific 
military units. It can be considered a sort of ‘master muster roll’ as it includes most, 
if not all, of the names of soldiers listed in both Rosebery’s List and The Prisoners of 
the ’45, equating to 5184 persons within. While this was close to the Jacobite army’s 
recorded numbers at Culloden, it is but one-third of its total alleged strength in 
Scotland at the end of January 1746, as cited by Stuart Reid and Christopher Duffy, 
as well as by McCann and Pittock.  A careful count of the listed names in No 35
Quarter Given versus the maximum interpolated sizes of individual units based on 
recent research shows widespread disparities. For example, Christian Aikman’s 
editorial note regarding the Atholl Brigade states that the unit had nearly 1000 
troops at Culloden, yet only 444 names are listed in the book.  Likewise, of the 900 36
men in Glengarry’s regiment cited by Duffy, only 373 are named in the muster 
roll.  Given these disparities, by no means can this list be considered a complete or 37
accurate survey of the army by itself.  However, the above three main sources are 38
obvious choices to form the base population for entry into the database, supplying 
over 11,000 entries and the bulk of what information has been examined.  
 In addition to the recent work of Christopher Duffy in The ’45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of 34
the Jacobite Rising (London, 2003), the sharp military scholarship of Stuart Reid is only now getting proper 
academic recognition, though he has been an authority on the British army, as well as the Battle of Culloden, for 
many years. See 1745: A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising (Kent, 1996) and Like Hungry Wolves: 
Culloden Moor, 16 April, 1746 (London, 1994). Duffy has supported Reid’s ideas since 2003, and Pittock now 
cites him multiple times in the 2nd edition of Myth, pp. 5, 43, 80, 85, 93, 141, 174.
 Reid, 1745, p. 99; Duffy, The ’45, p. 416;  McCann,‘Organisation’, pp. x-xi; Pittock, Myth, pp. 70-86. 35
 Alastair Livingstone, Christian Aikman, and Betty Stuart Hart, eds., No Quarter Given: The Muster Roll of 36
Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745-46 (Glasgow, 1991), pp. 19-31.
 Duffy, The ’45, p. 571; NQG, pp. 155-167.37
 Disappointingly, No Quarter Given is an amateurish effort that should be far more useful for the amount of 38
work put into recompiling the information within. Folio and bundle references are not provided, rendering it 
extremely difficult for checking into stated sources. The organisation of the book is confused, and it is badly in 
need of a copy-editor. As well, many citations are incomplete or insufficient, and most of the relevant biographical 
information regarding the listed Jacobite soldiers has been omitted from the entries.
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The second tier of entry is drawn from a select number of printed sources 
that provide an additional body of names and also serve as a network of checks for 
each of the other sources already included. In this tier are two specific muster rolls, 
two printed lists of rebels from 1746-7, and one voluminous monograph that is 
focussed on the most populous region of Jacobite support during the Forty-five. 
Because The Prisoners of the ’45 and No Quarter Given, themselves being compendia, 
only provide fragments of biographical information about their subjects, a more 
rigorous investigation should be undertaken. To this end, Alexander Mackintosh’s 
The Muster Roll of the Forfarshire Regiment (1914) is included in the results, 
providing the identities of 630 Jacobite fighting men who were definitively known 
to be members of Lord Ogilvy’s unit in 1745-6.  Likewise, the relevant section of 39
the biographical muster Gordons Under Arms (1902) was included to flesh out 
eighty-one Jacobite officers with that surname.  To this corpus of known soldiers 40
are added the contents of two contemporary broadsheets listing many more alleged 
rebels. The first is an account of the Battle of Culloden from 23 April with an 
attached tally of captured prisoners being held in Inverness as well as a register of 
those killed in the battle or otherwise deserted, which amounts to 384 in total.  41
The second is provided by the Deputy Queen’s Remembrancer from 24 September 
1747 and furnishes a list of 243 gentlemen who had been attainted and judged 
guilty of high treason.  42
Rounding out the second tier is a practical monograph that collects and 
describes 1183 suspected rebels specifically from the north-east of Scotland. 
Between 1890 and 1950, a small but prolific dynasty of Jacobite scholars published a 
massive amount of material that is still consistently used as a common staple within 
bibliographies related to Jacobitism. Perhaps the most influential of these scholars 
were Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, who in the first half of the 20th century released 
over forty books of Jacobite research, including translations of numerous 
unpublished manuscripts and, most notably, the first selection of published letters 
 No Quarter Given lists 850 soldiers in Ogilvy’s regiment, as The Muster Roll of the Forfarshire Regiment was 39
only one of the sources used in compiling names for that section, pp. 93-115.
 Constance Oliver Skelton and J.M. Bulloch, eds., Gordons Under Arms: A Biographical Muster Roll of Officers 40
in the Navies and Armies of Britain, Europe, America and in the Jacobite Risings (Aberdeen, 1903-12). This is 
also entitled The House of Gordon (vol. iii).
 NLS MS.2960 ff. 121-122; SPS 54/30/29e. Reid reprints this in Appendix 4 of 1745, pp. 212-221, entitled 41
‘Men and Materials Captured at Culloden’.
 Rosebery mentions this document (p. xiv), stating that there are an additional 203 names recorded by Ashley 42
Cowper, Esq., Clerk of Parliament, but that part of the list was absent from any copies housed in the National 
Library of Scotland, MS.3142 ff. 150-151; Stev.163, etc.
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from the Stuart Papers held at Windsor.  In their regional survey, Jacobites of 43
Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five (published the same year as Seton and 
Arnot’s The Prisoners of the ’45), the Taylers take Rosebery to task for retaining 
from the original manuscripts the many misspellings of north-eastern surnames and 
places that are rampant within his list. A much more relevant point, however, is 
made by the addition of 307 names from those regions to amend Rosebery’s tally, 
which were discovered by the Taylers in both the Public Record Office and the 
British Museum.  This demonstrates the evolving nature of information relating to 44
the Jacobite constituency that is still being uncovered as more sources are 
inspected. As Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire and The Prisoners of the ’45 were 
released concurrently, they do not use each other as sources and therefore represent 
a fortuitous control for this project. 
The third and most varied contribution to the sources for entry into the 
database comes directly from archival references, only some of which have 
previously been investigated by scholars for inclusion into the publications noted 
above. The variety and scope of these materials is vast, and includes personal 
letters, memorials, trial depositions, transportation lists, and prison receipts held at 
numerous libraries and archives throughout Britain. There are too many to 
individually review here, but some warrant special mention. Both the Treasury 
Solicitor Papers and State Papers held at Kew supply troves of documentation 
about alleged and convicted Jacobites in the years following the Forty-five. Many 
hundreds of prisoner and witness depositions and receipts for prisoners were 
surveyed for entry into the database, and many dozens were found pertinent or 
revealing enough to include within this particular study.  The National Library of 45
Scotland holds the Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Albemarle’s manuscript letters, the 
Yule collection, and Walter Blaikie’s enormous Jacobite collection, to name a few 
that were examined.  Select accessions from the National Records of Scotland 46
include the Seafield Papers, miscellaneous papers of George Innes, Clerk of 
Penicuik Papers, Campbell of Stonefield Papers, Irvine Robertson Papers, Gordon 
 Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, The Stuart Papers at Windsor (London, 1939). Bruce Lenman cites the Taylers 43
with having ‘profoundly influenced the modern interpretation of Jacobitism’, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 129.
 Taylers, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire, pp. 417-418.44
 A select list includes (all TNA) TS.11/159-179, 11/1080-1081; TS.20/50-131; SPD.36/67-107, 36/163; SPM.45
41/16-18, 41/37; SPEB.44/82-85, 44/133; SPS.54/25-40. 
 NLS MS.17314-31, 3730-31, 233, 287-289, 488, 2960. Also of considerable value are MS.1918 (Society of 46
Antiquaries of Scotland), 2960 (Jacobite Relics), and 20795 (Fleming of Wigtown Papers).
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Castle Muniments, and Montrose Muniments.  Also of significance there are the 47
warding and liberation books from Edinburgh Tolbooth, records of the High 
Court of Justiciary for Jacobite treason trials, a selection of the Forfeited Estate 
Papers, Records of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and a small 
selection of Kirk Session records.  The MacBean collection at Aberdeen University 48
Library supplied a number of important additions, including a list of prisoners from 
Musselburgh gaol and some personal letters of Alexander Forbes of Pitsligo.  49
Aberdeen City Archives houses a useful bundle of papers from the time of the 
Jacobite occupation, including detailed lists of prisoners held in the tolbooth, their 
statements and those of witnesses against them, and a number of relevant entries in 
both the minute books of the Jacobite government and the governors of the city 
appointed by the Duke of Cumberland.  Burgh council minute books very rarely 50
supply specific names of suspected rebels, though some entries therein lead to 
further identification of those who pledged or refused to take oaths of allegiance to 
George II in order to retain their public office. Numerous minute books were 
nonetheless searched to examine the shifts in local government as Jacobite forces 
passed through or occupied Scottish towns. Perth & Kinross County Archives hold 
nearly a dozen manuscript books filled with examinations and declarations of 
captured Jacobites, precognitions of witnesses, and alphabetical lists of state 
prisoners who were committed to the Perth tolbooth before being sent to England 
for trial.  Several other archive collections were also utilised to search for 51
participants in the rising, including baptism records, oaths of allegiance, 
transportation rosters, and a smattering of newspapers both Scottish and English. 
Finally, of special note is the personal correspondence of Duncan Forbes of 
Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session at the time of the last rising. His 
letters, collected and published as Culloden Papers and More Culloden Papers, are 
significant as they document Forbes’s extreme influence toward the initial reactions 
of numerous clan chiefs upon Charles Edward Stuart’s landing in Scotland, as well 
as their varying allegiances to the government throughout the affair.  These letters, 52
 NRS GD.248, GD.113, GD.18, GD.14, GD.1/53/77-94, GD.44, GD.220/5-6.47
 NRS HH.11/22-23, JC.7/53, E.702-788, CH.1/2/86, CH.2.48
 AUA MS.2273, 2848.49
 ACA Parcel L/H-I, CA1/10.50
 PKA B59.30/72/1-11.51
 H.R. Duff, ed., Culloden Papers (London, 1815) and Duncan Warrand, ed., More Culloden Papers (5 vols., 52
Inverness, 1929-30). See also George Menary, ed., The Life and Letters of Duncan Forbes of Culloden: Lord 
President of the Court of Session 1685-1747 (London, 1936).
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added together with The Albemarle Papers from the Commander-in-Chief of the 
British forces in Scotland and also the two volumes of Historical Papers Relating to 
the Jacobite Period 1699-1750 collected by Colonel James Allardyce, provide a 
wealth of published correspondence from archival holdings.  53
LIMITATIONS 
With the understanding that the quest to discover and catalogue every name 
connected with Jacobitism in 1745-6 is a formidable one and could continue ad 
infititum, concessions of time must be made to fit this study into the space of a 
doctoral thesis. Accordingly, some undoubtedly useful sources were either not 
consulted or consciously omitted. The genealogical small-press monographs 
compiled by Frances McDonnell and David Dobson are little more than printed 
lists of Jacobite names culled from various other sources, both primary and 
secondary. They warrant scrutiny simply for the fact that they are another scholar’s 
attempts to collect this data, albeit in a somewhat spartan form that does not 
provide any real analysis of the information within. Still, the value of McDonnell 
and Dobson’s lists is that they are the only sources of this kind to include archival 
references for transported and New World-exiled Jacobite prisoners after they 
departed British soil.  Though often padded with narrative and at other times 54
mythically celebratory, clan histories are useful accounts of intra-family networks 
(and, inversely, feuds). Elements of oral tradition sometimes overshadow their 
historical value, however, and this must be taken into consideration when validating 
the data they provide.  Likewise, many of the broader histories of the Forty-five 55
from both sides of the conflict were not searched for specific names, owing to their 
nature as overarching surveys provided from the top-down. These are valuable for 
 Charles Sanford Terry, ed., The Albemarle Papers: Being the Correspondence of William Anne, Second Earl of 53
Albemarle, Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1746-1747 (Aberdeen, 1902); Col James Allardyce, ed., Historical 
Papers Relating to the Jacobite Period, 1699-1750 (2 vols., Aberdeen, 1895-6). Select documents from State 
Papers Domestic and Scotland are reprinted within both Albemarle and Allardyce.
 See the bibliographies of Frances McDonnell, Highland Jacobites 1745 (Baltimore, 1999); Jacobites of 54
Perthshire 1745 (Baltimore, 1999); Jacobites of 1745 North East Scotland (St Andrews, 1996); Jacobites of 
Lowland Scotland, England, Ireland, France, and Spain 1745 (Baltimore, 2000); and David Dobson, The Jacobites 
of Angus 1689-1746 Part One and Part Two (Baltimore, 1997). Seton and Arnot explicitly state that no attempt 
has been made to trace the fates of transported Jacobite prisoners once outside of the UK, P45 (i), p. viii.
 A number of clan histories are used as sources both within The Prisoners of the ’45 and also No Quarter Given. 55
While the latter cites many more than the former, they both share Angus and Archibald Macdonald, The Clan 
Donald (2 vols., Inverness, 1896-1904) and Amelia MacGregor, History of the Clan Gregor (Edinburgh, 
1898-1901), for example.
26
topical analysis, however, and many were used to cite persona entries in one or 
more of the published compilations of Jacobites.  Newspapers often contained 56
daily accounts of troop movements both Jacobite and British as well as lists of men 
captured, wounded, and killed at and after the battles and skirmishes through the 
campaign. The most relevant of these are Edinburgh Courant, London Gazette, Scots 
Magazine, Caledonian Mercury, and Gentlemen’s Magazine. These could not all be 
examined simply due to the sheer amount of content available. Thankfully, many of 
the articles that offer pertinent information are either gathered from reports 
preserved within the State Papers or the information within such newspapers are 
already referenced within other published sources used in this study. 
On the archival side, the Court of King’s Bench (Baga de Secretis) and 
Chancery Patent Rolls at the National Archives were generally passed over, owing 
to the fact that both are referenced as sources within The Prisoners of the ’45. These 
collections contain select state trials for treason, further examinations of prisoners, 
and an array of grants and liberties signed and sealed by George II as part of the 
judicial process. Many of these cases are represented within the Treasury Solicitor 
Papers, though further study on this subject should include both collections.  The 57
contents of the Scottish Catholic Archives, currently being held at the University of 
Aberdeen, may yield the names of clergy or records of congregations and donations 
to mission stations in Scotland.  A number of British archives have not been 58
searched due to time constraints, though particularly relevant accessions from these 
should be already be represented in the compiled sources. Of these, the Stuart 
Papers and Cumberland Papers in the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle and 
perhaps the Dewar MSS at Inverary Castle would likely offer the most return, and 
should be included in additional surveys of the constituency. The British Library 
also holds a significant collection of Jacobite manuscripts.  Finally, the 59
international contribution to the Jacobite effort is only examined here insofar as 
such documentation is provided within Scottish and English sources. Extended 
research in French, Spanish, and Irish archives and beyond must be implemented 
 See, for example, James Ray, A Compleat History of the Rebellion (Bristol, 1752); John Marchant, The History 56
of the Present Rebellion (London, 1746); Henry Fielding, A Compleat and Authentick History of the Rise, 
Progress, and Extinction of the Late Rebellion (London, 1747); John Home, The History of the Rebellion in the 
Year 1745 (London, 1802); Robert Chambers, History of the Rebellion of 1745-6 (London, 1869).
 TNA KB.8/69-73, KB.33/2-4, C.66/3566-3669, C.67/86-88.57
 (All SCA) Blair’s Letters, BL/3/83-89; Mission Stations IM/1-47; Scottish Mission Documents SM/4/10-12, 58
Clergy Lists SM/14; Mission Properties (Donations & Wills) PL/8.
 Specifically, Add. MSS.33050, 33954, 39923, and the many bundles of the Hardwicke Papers.59
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for future studies. Included in these with priority is the Loudoun Scottish 
Collection at the Huntington Library in California.  60
The concept of an inconstant and manipulable Jacobite agenda is central to 
the arguments put forth in this thesis, so it is important to briefly characterise the 
expressions of later Jacobite rhetoric within a fixed parameter of time. Rather than 
attempting to describe a social history of such a lengthy and dynamic period, the 
data contained herein is restricted to the years involving open hostilities during the 
final effort and the immediate government reaction to that effort (1745-1749), 
popularly known as ‘the Forty-five’. When considering accuracy of the data 
represented herein, the architecture of JDB1745 and the way that its entries are 
preserved from their stated sources ensures that there are few interpretive liberties 
over which to stumble.  Wherever possible, however, direct conflicts of 61
information as recorded by differing sources are all included without regard to 
‘correctness’. This should be taken into consideration when tabulating certain totals 
or percentages, as the results given here are done so based upon the raw data 
collated from the named sources. Allowances should be made for some persona and 
place-name ambiguity, and some margin of error in totals must also be expected. 
Nonetheless, this should not skew the general thrust of data analysis or devalue the 
prosopographical findings within. 
Finally, though all entered data has been transferred to a machine-readable 
format, the entry process itself was not automated. Some concession must therefore 
also be made for deviance during transcription from primary to secondary source 
(in the case of the authors of the published compendia) and also from primary and 
secondary source to database if information is unreadable, obscured, or otherwise 
absent.  The benefit of implementing a robust data management system, however, 62
includes the ability to survey all entries to determine and eliminate redundancies, as 
well as smooth out errors from one or more layers of transcription. Contrast this 
with Seton and Arnot’s methods of compilation in the 1920s, wherein they used a 
‘History Sheet’ for each of nearly 3500 individuals, transferring ascertainable prison 
histories for each entry as the core of their identification. As the examinations of 
 A limited number of documents from this collection are included in this study.60
 As described in Appendix I: Notes on Technical Methodology.61
 Seton and Arnot repeatedly warn of ‘unavoidable’ errors in identification, citation, or even transcription, the 62
latter of which, has the possibility of occurring numerous times through multiple layers of record-keeping, P45 (i), 
pp. 260-3. It is generally assumed that all entries recorded in secondary sources from original manuscripts are 
correct, but a profusion of errors are found when reviewing the primary sources. The database will allow a 
comprehensive comparison of the secondary-source data with that of the original primary-source data from which 
it was drawn. The idea here is to test that the historiography remains accurate through successive recordings.
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further sources were determined to expand the scope of a given biography, each 
record sheet would receive manual updates with newly discovered citations.  The 63
comparative management process used in JDB1745 can be considered an advanced 
test of accuracy against these earlier methods of collation. 
CONTEXT & ORGANISATION 
With the exception of Pittock, modern scholars have generally hesitated to 
provide detailed social analyses of the Jacobite constituency for a few likely reasons. 
One, the preoccupation with political and intellectual history currently dominating 
the interests of academic historians directly conflicts with the microcosmic view of 
an overly-romanticised and mythologised subject, especially by authors of popular 
history. Quite simply, it may be perceived that there is no room for scholars to look 
at both successfully, and the Jacobite elites currently have the spotlight.  A second 64
reason for such hesitation is skepticism about the veracity of information within 
extant sources; when faced with unthinkable punishment, those standing on trial are 
thought likely to perjure themselves. Everything stated and recorded under oath 
from given name to place of residence to the cause for treasonous behaviour should 
perhaps therefore be taken with a grain of salt.  Taking this caution to the extreme, 65
each Jacobite caught with a loaded weapon surely begged for leniency on account of 
being forced into the ranks, so pleading impressment should not be considered a 
defining factor in recruitment.  With the understanding that captured Jacobite 66
soldiers and civilians accused of supporting the rising would indeed sometimes 
conjure false pretences for their participation, a prosopographical examination of 
deposition and trial records could be carried out to examine this topic more 
completely.  A third cause for such scholarly detachment from Jacobite social 67
studies should thus become self-evident: no one has yet done the work to codify 
 It is an understatement to say that this task of the establishment and curation of such a system, which is 63
relatively eased with the presence of modern IT, was a Herculean accomplishment in the 1920s. Seton and Arnot 
outline the process in P45 (i), pp. vii-ix, 257-268.
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, pp. 12-13.64
 For example, Monod expresses skepticism about Jacobite testimonies in Jacobitism and the English People, p. 65
338.
 See Geoffrey Plank’s note about embellished accounts of violence, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising 66
of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia, 2006) p. 32.
 This is indeed explored in Chapter IV: Recruitment.67
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such a broad base of ‘big’ data, and therefore no analysis of it has been attempted 
until now.  
The context of what this thesis seeks to define can be described concisely by 
a number of motifs that the data bears out within four thematic chapters which are 
explored in the following pages. To begin, Chapter II focuses on identifying the 
causes for Jacobite sympathies or motivation in 1745-6, and therefore defines the 
very nature of popular Jacobitism in its many guises at that time. Not taking for 
granted that the traditional interpretations of static Jacobite ideologies represented 
the needs and desires of the commoners involved, a more pragmatic agenda is 
explored. Supporting this hypothesis of a many-headed Jacobite ‘hydra’, the chapter 
will explore implications of devotion through cultural loyalty, anti-unionism, 
national identity, congregational subscription, governmental disaffection, and other 
facets, all supported by examples and statistics, where available. This will answer 
questions of to what extent the Forty-five was a national movement or a regional 
one to the people who supported it, as well as quantifying the part that was played 
by religion, dynastic adherence, and familial loyalties.  
At the core of this study is how Jacobitism was represented by its plebeian 
population and how that population expressed itself both within the spheres of both 
ideology and actuality. Chapter III therefore deals with the ever-fleeting concept of 
the Jacobite constituency, examining a number of characteristics that go some way 
to offer an updated review of the qualities that define who the Jacobites actually 
were. The social strata of Jacobite military supporters, cursorily touched upon by 
Jean McCann and others, warrants a more thorough investigation using widespread 
demographic information that a database can provide, as does its relation to any 
economic, political, or religious incentives that a reinstated Stuart kingship might 
have availed. To test these theories, characteristics of Jacobite expression will be 
explored through locations of origin, faith, occupation, age, and gender within a full 
demographic analysis, while being held against overall population statistics in 
Scotland during the mid-eighteenth century. Touching on the presence of Jacobite 
initiate networks in exile or otherwise outwith Scotland is also a revealing lens 
through which to view international support for a Stuart restoration, however 
ineffective they would prove to be during the operational life of the rising in 
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1745-6.  Most notably, adding this bottom-up study of the constituency to the 68
body of current political, ecclesiastical, and military analyses of the Forty-five offers 
new focus on the efficacies of the common peoples’ implicit motivations, as well as 
explicitly-stated principles, to be compared with the overarching ideologies of the 
elites. 
How support amongst the military was gathered and sustained is the next 
logical theme to follow, and Chapter IV covers the general concept of recruitment 
both within and outwith the actual army itself. Because Jacobitism was most 
successful when expressed militarily, an examination of methods with which soldiers 
were drawn to the standard deserves sufficient focus. Recruitment tactics obviously 
have direct bearing on motivation, but beyond the actual regiments, the Jacobite 
army’s stream of logistics trickled down through the civilian population with 
demands of foodstuffs, lodging, materiel, and a significant commitment to 
gathering cess from the lands in which the army occupied.  Many non-combatant 69
‘supporters’ (willing or not) were condemned with as much vengeance as any 
soldier who fired a musket on the field of battle. And this, of course, does not 
account for those Jacobite operatives and sympathisers who managed to evade the 
sweeps of search parties and the damning lists of rebel names gathered by 
Presbyterian ministers within the government’s employ. In his introduction to No 
Quarter Given, Bruce Lenman reinforces this by affirming that numbers of total 
participation are far different from the numbers of those unfortunate enough to be 
captured.  Questioning the efficacy of Jacobitism outside of its military apparatus, 70
McLynn speculates that Jacobite sympathisers were assessed by the level of support 
they could enlist, but not in what specific manners this was done.  Whether it be 71
size of estate, donated monies, or actual armed levies, these factors can be evaluated 
 For Jacobite initiate networks, see Murdoch, Network North, p. 329-341; and also Murdoch’s ‘Tilting at 68
Windmills: The Order del Toboso as a Jacobite Social Network’ in Monod, et al., Loyalty and Identity, p. 243-264; 
Robert Collis, ‘To a Fair Meeting on the Green: The Order of Toboso and Jacobite Fraternalism, 1726-c.1739’ in 
Macinnes, et al., Living with Jacobitism, pp. 125-138; Murray Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760 
(Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 93-124. Significant work has also been done on exiled Jacobite communities in Europe. 
Some sharp overviews are Doron Zimmermann, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and Exile, 1749-1759 
(Basingstoke, 2003); Edward Corp, The Jacobites at Urbino: An Exiled Court in Transition (Basingstoke, 2009); 
Rebecca Wills, The Jacobites and Russia, 1715-1750 (East Linton, 2002); Göran Behre, ‘Jacobite Refugees in 
Gothenburg after Culloden’ in SHR, 70:189 (April 1991), pp. 58-65; Daniel Szechi, ‘“Cam Ye O’er Frae France?” 
Exile and the Mind of Scottish Jacobitism, 1716-1727’ in JBS, 37:4 (October, 1998), pp. 357-390.
 This is discussed in some detail within Chapter III: Constituency, p. 90 and Chapter V: Consequences, pp. 69
211-212.
 Lenman in NQG, p. xvii.70
 McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives in the Jacobite Rising of 1745’ in The Eighteenth Century, 23:2 (Spring 1982), p. 71
118.
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and in order to determine how deeply the commitment to the cause ran within its 
constituents, as well as how this reflected back upon the popularity of Jacobite 
sentiment at distinct stages of the Forty-five. Realistic assessments of draconian 
recruiting must also be approached from new angles with much more data than has 
been done before, especially in the context of a Jacobite military and political 
apparatus ostensibly dedicated to freedom from foreign oppression and repressive 
governmental jurisdiction. 
Qualifying differing levels of participation is a very grey area when it comes 
to accusations of treasonable behaviour against the established government, as well 
as reprisals for that participation. Chapter V analyses Hanoverian reaction to the 
fifth attempted Jacobite rising in half a century by looking at the consequences of 
rebellion in the months after open hostilities ceased. Though scholars have written 
much about the execution of post-Culloden depredations upon entire regions of the 
Scottish populace, little has been done in the modern era to examine trial results in 
order to determine relative frequencies of transportation, banishment, and 
execution in the wake of the failed rising.  Likewise, few comparisons have been 72
made between the aftermath of the considerably larger Jacobite revolt in 1715 and 
that of the Forty-five to determine if the legal responses were commensurate to the 
relative perceptions of threat.  Simply scanning Rosebery’s List alone reveals large 73
variations in ‘acts of rebellion’ from a variety of private citizens who never marched 
a step with the Jacobite army in 1745, but allegedly helped the cause in other ways. 
These range from drinking treasonable healths to ‘speaking disrespectfully of His 
Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland’, and far beyond.  Such cases, together 74
with the massive influx of alleged and accused soldiers who were seen in arms, 
posed serious containment and processing problems for the government, with jails 
in both Scotland and England filled to bursting from the start. Weighing the 
effectiveness of judicial policy versus the ability for the penal system itself to carry 
such a load, government officials had their work cut out in attempting to determine 
who was responsible, who should be punished, and to what degrees of both. An 
extensive system of gathering evidence and witnesses was quickly implemented, 
aided by watchful eyes within the Church of Scotland, which was perhaps the 
 The last serious studies were Seton and Arnot’s The Prisoners of the ’45 and Rupert C. Jarvis, Collected Papers 72
on the Jacobite Risings (2 vols., Manchester, 1971). 
 Margaret Sankey provides the template to the Fifteen with Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: 73
Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain (Aldershot, 2005).
 See entry for Charles Blackie, a sailor in Campbeltown, Rosebery’s List, pp. 290-291.74
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Hanoverian government’s most reliable ally. The economic disruptions precipitated 
by the rising affected both loyal citizens and those sympathetic to the Jacobite 
cause, raising the consequential stakes on both sides. And amidst the confusion and 
mania of civil war, unfounded accusations of Jacobitism were used to frame 
innocent people, which caused strain on both commoners in the mercantile trades 
and politicians in the upper echelons of British society. 
Murray Pittock rightly states in the closing of his introduction to The Myth 
of the Jacobite Clans that  
the history of the Jacobite cause has spent so much time on interpretation and so 
little on the research that justifies it that the open-minded reader can scarce avoid 
the conclusion that the Myth has become far more important as story than 
history.   75
It is the hope that this extensive and careful interpretation of population data that 
informs the history of later Jacobitism, aided by the use of purpose-built technology 
and a sound, discriminating methodology of information management, contributes 
toward a body of research that cuts through the myths and casts light upon the 
natures of the cause and movement by looking attentively at the common people 
who supported them both. 
 Pittock, Myth, p. 25.75
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CHAPTER II: MOTIVATION 
YE JACOBITES BY NAME  
Conferring the title of Jacobite on any one of the c.15,000 subjects in this study is 
wholly subjective, however fair or necessary for historical reference. The language 
of accusation has in the past suffused and continues to inform this term, which Paul 
Monod describes as one ripe for ‘superficial judgments’ and defying systemisation: 
‘too vague to grasp, too volatile to define’.  Indeed, the use of the appellation has 1
been leveraged as a trap to weight sentimental politics and bait atavistic cultural 
conceits of both allies and opponents of Jacobitism – military, diplomatic, or 
ideological. Historians often ascribe inspired Jacobite tendencies on some 
characters who likely would not call themselves such (whether in public or behind 
closed doors) and upon others who left behind evidence that should elicit no more 
than a ‘could be’ from their biographers.  The task in question is not as much about 2
finding who was the ‘most Jacobite’ of all from each suspect’s recorded information 
and behaviour, but rather those whose public and private identities reflected or 
espoused any of the many varying levels of Jacobite devotion, intention, or lack of 
alternative. Scrutiny of such motivation helps to describe particular aspects of the 
greater movement in the waning years of its effectiveness. Attending to this task in 
turn helps narrow in on a loose definition, despite its projected volatility, of what 
Jacobitism was to the people who gave it their support in 1745-6. 
In 1982, Frank McLynn contributed an excellent overarching analysis of 
Jacobite motivation during the Forty-five to The Eighteenth Century, dividing 
adherence within the movement amongst seven distinct and sometimes divergent, 
‘imbricated’ categories. All of these, he claims, contributed to the make-up of a 
rebellion with a very ‘unique flavour’ amongst similar phenomena of its time.  3
McLynn defines one of these parcels of motivation as ‘Jacobitism of the Masses’, 
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 1.1
 Numerous works have celebrated or denigrated historical personae as unabashed Jacobites, or at least have 2
inflated such characteristics, despite a lack of compelling evidence to support this. See Marsha Keith Schuchard, 
Emanuel Swedenborg, Secret Agent on Earth and in Heaven (Leiden, 2012) for one example. Also notable are the 
conflation of Jacobite attributes through misinformation or a lack of critical thought. Macinnes explores the 
pointed association between Jacobitism and banditry in Clanship, pp. 164-169.
 McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’, p. 98.3
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which not only furnished a general platform of discontent for the ‘lower sort of 
people’, but also generated a wave of popular misinformation predicated by 
Walpolian feedback and a censored national press.  These two factors tended 4
respectively to confuse and obscure discrete lines of popular Jacobite motivation, 
both in the eyes of Jacobite opponents and in its subsequent historiography. Rather 
than relegate ‘Jacobitism of the Masses’ to a single category within a larger grid of 
motivational factors, however complex and murky, this thesis seeks to prove 
through a significant collection of prosopographical evidence that the Forty-five 
was, in the context of the larger Jacobite era, itself a ‘Rising of the Masses’, actively 
manifesting as anything but concise in terms of motivation and doctrine, and 
therefore extremely accessible, however questionably popular, to people across all 
classes. It was not as populous in military turnout as in the Fifteen, but then the 
relative levels of ideological engagement in 1745 were less defined and definitively 
more scattered than thirty years prior. In a sense, popular Jacobitism can be 
considered as a product of practicality rather than ideology. McLynn is not 
surprised by this, and goes so far as to state that later Jacobitism was doctrinally 
insignificant to the majority of its adherents, the measurement of which he 
considers a ‘fruitless discussion’ in the context of a revolutionary movement that 
‘provided a source of legitimacy for political dissent of all kinds.’  This discussion is 5
perhaps only fruitless to those unconcerned with popular expressions of Jacobitism 
and how its numerous and evasive motivational currents ran through those who 
turned dissatisfaction and unrest into a full-fledged revolt, voluntarily or otherwise. 
William Greenhill, a gardener at Kirktown of Lethendy before 1745, left 
behind some questions about sustained duty and the sometimes protean nature of 
Jacobite loyalty during the rising. Contained within a dozen pre-trial examinations 
of his countrymen from Perthshire during July of 1746, as well as within his own 
deposition upon being captured, is evidence that Greenhill voluntarily joined the 
Jacobite army just after Prestonpans, serving in Inshewan’s company within Lord 
Ogilvy’s regiment. Accordingly, he made the long march to Derby and back again 
to Scotland, retreating with the rest of the army in early December. Greenhill 
never fought in a battle during the rising, but is nonetheless well-remembered and 
notorious in his hometown. Previously, in the months leading up to the invasion of 
 Ibid, pp. 116-117. See also Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, passim and ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, pp. 225-252; 4
Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 39-40.
 McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’ p. 98. He states ‘there is little point in getting entangled in controversy about 5
whether the masses “really” favoured Jacobitism’, yet a study of the motivational factors of those who were 
accused, captured, and processed through the judicial system for treasonous activities hardly seems pointless.
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England when he noted things were ‘going on very well’, Greenhill had been an 
ardent and vocal supporter of the Jacobite effort, drinking public toasts to the 
Stuarts in Coupar Angus and Dunkeld, and encouraging others to join the fight. He 
is remembered to have placed the needs of his family – and the needs of others’ 
families – behind that of what he called the ‘Glorious Cause of putting a Righteous 
King upon the Throne’. Numerous witnesses had seen him shake his sword while at 
the cross of Coupar, threatening that he would ‘Thrust this Into the Heart of any 
man who offers to hurt [the rightful] King’ and that ‘he Should Never Go home till 
he saw the Prince on the throne’. He left with Charles Edward against the wishes of 
his wife, Margaret Bowden, who desperately sought the help of others in Lethendy 
to convince him not to go – or at least to ‘Settle his house and Affairs’ before 
leaving. Upon finally deserting the army in February of 1746 and returning to 
Lethendy, with great dejection he told numerous people that he had had enough of 
the Jacobites. He was done being a rebel in action, however sharp his words and 
their sentiment may have continued on. A few months later, he would be captured 
and set to trial with the help of his neighbours, who had readily observed his 
Jacobite activities. He would thereafter be transported to the colonies, and records 
do not show if he ever again demonstrated any inclinations toward the Stuarts or 
their goals.  6
Greenhill’s vignette is a concise illustration of the divide between Jacobite 
sentiment and action and how the momentum between the two points fluctuated in 
either direction depending on the fortunes and circumstance of both the movement 
(as reflected by its military success or failures) and the individual. This was a model 
repeated thousands of times over with differing results, and is indicative of a 
popular movement with unpopular or at the very least disorganised leadership, as 
well as the lack of a tangible and effective ideology that could hold the attention of 
a non-professional fighting force and the motivated civilian network of logistics 
needed to keep it fortified. 
Taking a sample of alleged Jacobites and testing the questions of causal 
ideological attraction, whether sustained or fleeting, provides a solid framework 
with which to explicate a representative study of popular motivation. McLynn’s 
structure is helpful to reference: dynastic, religious, ideological, and popular 
elements of Jacobitism are surveyed, as well as its questionable attachment to the 
 Various evidence relating to William Greenhill, PKA B59.30/72/2, 5.6
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Tory party and of those Jacobites focussed on the welfare of Scotland as a nation.  7
While calling out the extreme difficulty in labelling ‘serious versus casual’ Jacobites, 
Monod identifies the general tenor of Jacobitism through its language, expressions, 
and behaviour – an aptly-termed ‘system’ of signs that, together, may be taken as an 
indication of a Jacobite subculture, regardless of the severity of its exhibition.  8
Concurrently, Murray Pittock champions the demythologisation of popular 
Highland motivations while giving due consideration to material culture as a 
surrogate language of the movement. Pittock also points out that Jacobite 
engagement was different in each of the British kingdoms – as well as between 
Highland and non-Highland regions – and that ‘almost as much separated the 
Jacobites as united them’.  These scholars provide some important considerations 9
for crafting a narrative of widespread motivation, but the quality and relevance of 
these categories should be tested against large-scale participatory data in addition to 
accounts based on evidence left by the engaged elites. While it is essential to 
question what defines a Jacobite in order to understand martial or political 
incentive, it is perhaps more valuable to analyse the thousands of accounts of 
Jacobite activity to provide a more realistic and definitive primer explaining 
motivation during the Forty-five. 
DEGREES OF LOYALTY  
Each of the alleged Jacobite-connected persons surveyed in this study – 
whether self-described, unwitting, or misrepresented – had a distinct reason or 
reasons for participating in the rising. Some of these motives are ‘factually’ 
recorded while others are implied, and usually there is some modicum of 
misinformation connected to each anecdote no matter how thorough a trial 
deposition, interview, memoir, or character witness is notated. Most explicit 
 McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’, passim.7
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 7-10.8
 Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, pp. 1-31; Pittock, Myth, pp. 42-45; see also Jennifer Novotny, ‘Polite 9
War: Material Culture of the Jacobite Era, 1688-1760’ in Macinnes, et al., Living with Jacobitism, pp. 153-172. 
Monod interestingly states that ‘Jacobite political culture should be interpreted as a language, with its own 
internal logic or grammar, operating as a coherent system’, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 10. Pittock 
furthers this concept in Material Culture and Sedition by noting that communication through Jacobite material 
culture was used as a non-verbal replacement of text to create ‘a framework for shared memory’, p. 3. Even in 
1715, as Daniel Szechi addresses, ‘each of the three kingdoms had its own Jacobite underground’, 1715, pp. 52, 
58. Allan Macinnes states ‘Jacobitism in the three kingdoms had little in the way of a common cause other than a 
wish to restore the Stuarts [...] to their rightful thrones’, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 
1707 (Cambridge, 2007), p. 244.
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motives will continue to remain unknown. For the evidence that does exist, the very 
nature of the description of treasonous activities and rebellious incitements should 
be treated with contextual criticism that considers the objectives of both the 
defendant and the accuser; in this case that of the government representative, loyal 
citizen, reluctant conscript, or revolutionary dissident. With this in mind, a realistic 
and grass-roots typology of plebeian Jacobite motives can be described. 
McLynn’s taxonomy would be suitable for this purpose did it not 
marginalise the great majority of active Jacobite footmen by lumping them into a 
single economically-based category of the ‘lower’ classes. Instead, viewing the 
motivational elements across class divides presents relevant, tangible principles of 
Jacobite belief and, more often than not, of that belief put into action. Most 
commonly cited amongst the sources used in this study are the following motives 
for engagement within the Forty-five: political dynasticism or conditional 
(‘contractual’) Jacobitism; anti-Unionism or patriotic belief; confessional adherence; 
cultural, social, and familial loyalty (including personal and familial financial 
concerns); general governmental disaffection; assignment within foreign service; 
and forced recruitment or impressment. These are simple and broadly-painted 
strokes which offer a useful environment in which to view the constituents in 
question, taken directly from the consulted evidence. It should be acknowledged 
that the lines between these categories are blurry, as well as the fact that specific 
motives are not mutually exclusive.  As William Greenhill and many others 10
demonstrate, loyalty is a transient term that is rarely set in stone, instead changing 
shape and firmness along with the fortunes of the cause and, more vitally, those of 
the individual.  11
FOR KING AND COUNTRY 
The most oft-recognised principles of the Jacobite movement during its 
century of life are undoubtedly those of allegiance to the exiled house of Stuart, 
 For a realistic scenario of multiple (and conflicting) Jacobite loyalties, see Murdoch, Network North, pp. 10
343-345.
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whom ardent Jacobites sought to restore to the throne of Britain, and, after 1707, 
the breaking of the undesirable bonds of Union, usually but not intrinsically 
associated with Scotland’s independence from both the British state and de facto 
monarchy. In fact, these two main goals of Jacobitism in popular memory are 
virtually inextricable, as the establishment of the former might likely have (to some 
Jacobite hopefuls) begotten the latter. But from the start, the promised benefits 
from attaining these goals cast as wide a net as possible to tempt in the very 
broadest base of sympathy and support, and those assurances would only become 
more inclusive as the cause developed through the eighteenth century, ‘impelled 
toward greater and greater political radicalism as time went on’.  Stuart aims and 12
policies were repeatedly called out in manifestos that specifically targeted 
disaffected Scottish subjects, conjuring visions of sovereignty and tolerance: ‘Our 
Ancient Kingdom of Scotland may be restored to its former honour, Liberty, and 
Independency, of which is has been so treacherously deprived’ (1708); ‘to relieve 
our Subjects of Scotland, from the hardships they groan under on account of the 
late unhappy Union’ (1714); and ‘to free our People from the unsupportable 
Burden of the Malt-Tax, and all other Hardships and Impositions, which have been 
the Consequences of the pretended Union’ (1743).  In Ireland, later Jacobitism was 13
largely driven by disdain for the post-Revolution establishment, with hopes 
focussed on a popular mythology of Gaelic-blooded Stuarts and their duty to hand 
out ‘a scattering for the English-speaking band.’  The particular strain of 14
Jacobitism in Scotland, as expected, developed with a powerful and attractive 
national facet, especially after 1707, and many scholars now agree that the earlier 
rising in 1715 congealed so effectively there because of its outwardly independence-
seeking nucleus and the threat that could bring to bear on a perceived stranglehold 
of Union. What is certain is that, despite outward appearances, after 1714 the 
Stuarts took advantage of the popular discontent in Scotland by ‘subsuming’ the 
 Szechi, The Jacobites, pp. 30-31; Macinnes, Clanship, p.194; Pittock, Myth, p. 143.12
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latent patriotism bubbling up against the Hanoverian status quo and using it as a 
lever to strengthen their platform of dynastic sovereignty.  In premeditated design 15
and intended effect, restoring the Stuarts to the throne would be seen as a way to 
begin restoring Scotland to healthfulness.  
Taken as a whole, however, Jacobitism was far too international of a 
phenomenon to be considered a nationalist movement despite its power of popular 
appeal in Scotland, and may have been too long-lived to preserve that zeitgeist at its 
core through successive generations. Dissolving the Union, which was forcefully 
advertised in pro-Stuart propaganda, became less of a popularly-vital issue later in 
its effective life, as Jacobite-expressed (and Jacobite-appropriated) discontents 
became less centralised. By the approach of mid-century, many inhabitants of the 
British nations were settling down and hoping for the promised economic benefits 
of a consolidated government.  Even some prominent Scots saw through the 16
national shine and recognised the schemes of an exiled royal family at the heart of 
Jacobite machinations, laid bare by Charles Edward’s public declaration while in 
Edinburgh. This declaration promised to dismantle the Union to Scotland’s 
advantage while simultaneously insisting that his father be installed as the sole 
monarch of all three kingdoms of Britain and Ireland.  17
The notion of contractual Jacobitism to limit monarchical power was 
explicitly rejected as James’ son operated without sanction of his peers and without 
establishing the Scots Parliament he had promised. Indeed, Jeffrey Stephen alleges 
that the Prince’s decision to invade England was predicated entirely upon his 
family’s constitutionalist self-interests and that his manifesto of 9 October 1745 was 
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‘designed to facilitate Stuart unionist aspirations’, noting that their only real 
objection to the Union was that it excluded them from succession.  While some 18
scholars have cited the entirety of Charles Edward’s Scottish military council as 
being primarily motivated by the goal of an independent Scotland, Lord George 
Murray himself, a veteran of 1715 and 1719 but otherwise removed from politics 
since his pardon in 1725, made it clear that his focus was on a larger context: 
I am as much against Popery and arbitrary power as any person in the island […] 
Upon the whole I am satisfied there is much greater need of a Revolution now to 
secure our liberties and save Britain from utter destruction than there was at the 
last – even if the King’s rights were not in question.   19
As evidenced in part by Murray, Alexander Forbes of Pitsligo, and the sundered but 
recalcitrant doctrine of many Scottish Episcopalians, there was plenty of room to 
welcome the Stuarts back to the throne without conceding to divine rule and the 
suspension of traditional laws and customs. But there was never any guarantee that 
this is what a Jacobite coup under Charles Edward in 1745 would have provided.  20
Daniel Szechi identifies a pattern of political unrest running through the 
British state during the years between risings, featuring elite Jacobite operatives 
who exploited anti-government turmoil by crafting guileful plans to foment 
revolution: the Atterbury Plot in 1721-22, Cornbury affair in 1733-34, and other, 
more prolonged schemes by Gordon of Glenbucket and Lord Sempill from 1737 to 
1743. According to the official record, all of these came to naught largely due to the 
absence of significant French support.  The promise of these revolutionary 21
opportunities was strongly appealing to a number of patriotic or politically 
disaffected elites in Scotland, Wales, and in the north of England – some of them 
with significant diplomatic experience – who with some degrees of variance 
endeavoured to support Charles Edward when he finally arrived in western 
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Scotland in the late summer of 1745. A number of these elites had previously come 
out in the Fifteen and had since been pardoned, while others had served in 
Parliament since Union, comfortably observing the successions of risings from 
underneath a periwig but not providing anything resembling military support to the 
cause.  In Scotland, that covert presence was arguably organised and 22
unquestionably subversive, seeking to manipulate commercial networks through the 
careful establishment of safe ports and private banks.  Rather than Jacobite plotters 23
being the ‘opportunist hi-jackers of national grievances’ that Whig historians have 
sketched, then, the tide of relevant scholarship is shifting in a new direction: one 
that identifies Jacobite operatives tending a sustained opposition movement rather 
than just an explosive and pragmatic succession of attempted coups and military 
actions.  Jacobitism was able to be sustained through a century of political and 24
economic peaks and valleys by its devoted public partly due to the idea of the 
Stuarts, regardless of what they were able to establish in practice. But the disastrous 
reprisals from the collapse of the Fifteen, however limited, still weighed on the 
minds of those who were most likely to mobilise for another attempt.   25
Dynastic loyalty had slowed from being the vital talking point in popular 
circles well before 1745, however still common it was for pro-Stuart exclamations 
to be heard amidst crowds of protest and in witness testimonials.  Demonstrations 26
by plebeian Jacobites continued to be expressed most commonly in the context of 
regal legitimacy, specifically targeting traditional days of commemoration for both 
houses of Stuart and Hanover, and thus outwardly had the appearance of wholesale 
devotion to the ousted dynasty.  McLynn notes that the traditional Stuart 27
doctrines of hereditary succession and divine right no longer held sway with men of 
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stature in England, rather that their frustration regarding corruption within the 
Hanoverian government made up the majority of the ‘ideological content of 
Jacobitism’ at that time.  Arthur Gordon of Carnousie, for example, followed 28
Alexander Forbes of Pitsligo into the rising, but was someone ‘not at all wedded to 
Kingscraft’.  This was mirrored by a significant proportion of the British lay 29
populace, as practical concerns took the place of philosophical ones. Stephen 
Conway posits that local loyalty, rather than national or dynastic, was at the 
forefront of most British minds, claiming that provincial anti-Jacobite associations 
though trumpeted by the ministry as proof of the popularity of the Hanoverian 
regime, were strongly localist in orientation. They saw themselves as local defence 
bodies, not as part of a national force […] they had no interest in exerting 
themselves beyond their locality.  30
This would be paralleled in many places of large-scale recruitment throughout 
Scotland as Jacobite officers struggled to retain their soldiers outside of familiar 
terrain.  31
This is not to say that the motivational efficacy of Jacobite dynastic 
aspirations, even in England, was nonexistent. The non-juring chaplain from 
Manchester Thomas Coppach called out from the scaffold that the very reason he 
took up arms was ‘to restore the royal and illustrious house of Stewart, and banish 
from a free, but inslaved people a foreigner, a tyrant, and an usurper’.  Jeffery 32
Battersby, a shoemaker in Bury, made no bones about his enthusiasm for the 
Stuarts, exclaiming in front of at least three witnesses that ‘King James had the only 
right to the Crown of England’ and that when he attained the throne ‘there will be 
flourishing times’. Another man was heard to have claimed he ‘wod rather be shot 
thro the head then ly at the Mercy of ye Elector of Hanover’.  John Daniel, who 33
joined up with Balmerino’s Life Guards at Lancashire, wrote a fancifully dogmatic 
introduction to his account of travelling with the Prince’s army. In it, he describes 
his first sight of Charles Edward Stuart: 
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Nor was it long before an opportunity presented itself of proving my fidelity to my 
lawful Sovereign […] I felt a paternal ardor pervade my veins, and having before 
my eyes the admonition ‘Serve God and then your King,’ I immediately became 
one of his followers.  34
The depositions against Battersby and others, supported by Daniel’s epic yarn, 
suggest a significant undercurrent of Jacobite sentiment outwith Scotland during 
the years surrounding the Forty-five. Yet most of England’s Jacobites plainly did 
not show up when the rebel army was marching through it.    35
In Scotland, similar evidence of dynastic support and patriotism can be 
found within legal proceedings. Six loyal citizens in Perth deponed they heard 
Thomas Donaldson from Coupar Angus claim that ‘the Prince had a better Right 
to the Crown than King George’. James Warden, a notorious schoolmaster at 
Alyth, was overheard warning that ‘Scotland would be for ever ruined If the 
Rebellion did not Succeed’, and witnesses testified that he had offered to wager 
five-thousand marks that the Jacobites would triumph in their designs.  Amidst the 36
depositions at Perth, however, only four out of 132 prisoners were connected with 
evidence that suggests regnal endorsement of the Stuarts or treasonable words 
toward King George.  This of course does not mean there were no others, but the 37
detailed evidence offered by partisan witnesses generally fails to identify explicit 
dynastic sympathies, even when such charges carried significant weight against 
them. Similarly, a negligible number of plebeian participants in the Forty-five cited 
any aspect of anti-Unionism as a motivation for rising up, though it should be 
noted that the differences between Scottish patriotism and criticism of Union are 
easily conflated due to their similar sphere of concerns and aspirations regarding 
national welfare.  
In the Highlands, it appears that the predilection of the Gàidhealtachd to 
generate a distinctively Scottish rather than local identity through military service 
did not begin in earnest until the commencement of post-Culloden regeneration. 
As once-maligned Highland rebels became integrated into and even exemplars of 
the British military machine, Andrew Mackillop points out that Gaels ‘could fight 
for regiment, king and country in a seamless, mutually reinforcing framework with 
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no inherent contradictions or tensions’.  Until then, however, loyalty to region was 38
paramount, and far more relevant to the common people than notions of national 
identity.  While Macinnes explains that ‘dynastic legitimacy was seen as the source 39
of justice’ in the Highlands, the clan elites were only ever going to be the ones 
benefitting from the changes to national economy or authority.  The dearth of 40
evidence proving vocal constitutional scepticism is unsurprising given the social 
status – and, therefore, social and economic interests – of the majority of active 
Scottish Jacobites. Anti-Union politics was primarily the realm of the monied 
classes, though a pulsing vein of patriotism always figured prominently within the 
Jacobite agenda in Scotland since the Hanoverian ascendency precluded a Scottish 
monarch from ruling the British nation.  It would be too much to claim that most 41
plebeian Jacobites were completely uninterested in or ignorant of the political 
situation in Britain, but to the common tenant farmer both the dynastic right of 
Stuart rule and the disruptive political effects of representation within the Union 
were largely irrelevant issues.   42
By contrast, anti-Unionism in 1715 was a more concentrated, unifying 
agency of Jacobitism, which makes sense due to the contested regnal succession left 
by Anne Stuart’s death as well as its temporal proximity to the Treaty itself and the 
dissolution of the last Parliament in Scotland.  These factors were not as pressing 43
and, therefore, not as structurally relevant in 1745, but only limited compelling 
evidence has been found to suggest that the common Jacobite sympathiser in 1715 
was any more greatly inspired by the potential of breaking with England. The 
mercantile classes were more sensitive to the benefits and restrictions on trade 
implemented pre- and post-Union, however, and this influenced the decision for 
some to embrace or denounce Jacobite ambitions.  During the Forty-five, the 44
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protective powers of the Union were sometimes ironically invoked by what were 
purported to be its very enemies. Alexander Kinloch, one of a number of officers of 
that ilk in Ogilvy’s regiment, defied the English court at his trial by insisting that he 
was, being from Fochabers, only accountable to a Scottish judicial system. Kinloch 
demanded that he be tried by the Scottish Court of Justiciary since the accused 
crime of treason occurred in Scotland: ‘by the 19th Article of the Union between 
the Kingdoms the Cognizance of all offences Committed by Scotchmen in that 
Kingdom was preserved to the Courts of that Kingdom’.  45
Examining the reaction to mandatory loyalty oaths also adds to the story. If 
the oath rolls of Devon and Exeter are any indication, as much as 20% of Britain’s 
population was tested by the government with a series of Acts created to reinforce 
explicit and widespread loyalty to the crown.  The existence of these oaths, as 46
described by Howard Erskine-Hill, was ‘to bind [Hanoverian] supporters to them 
more strongly, and force their enemies into the open more decisively.’  Adherence 47
to oaths of loyalty was demanded by the post-Stuart British government in England 
since 1696 and systemically enforced in 1723 after the discovery of the Atterbury 
Plot, clearly informing a popular awareness of the relentless dynastic struggle – and 
the public’s place in that struggle.  If oaths of allegiance (swearing obedience to 48
George) and abjuration (disowning any loyalty to James) are to be taken as 
legitimate fealty by the undersigned – and they certainly were when pledged in 
favour of the de facto monarch; enough so to prevent capital punishment in many 
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cases – it would follow that these oaths were expected to be maintained.  After 49
making such pledges, the government was trusting (or guileless) enough to let 
thousands of disarmed Highland rebels free in the aftermath of the Fifteen.  The 50
text of similar oaths from 1754 were recently re-discovered and translated from the 
Gàidhlig, which categorised their Highland subscribers based upon their depth of 
willingness to renounce their Jacobite tendencies.  During the American 51
Revolution, a minister in North Carolina provided a cultural explanation for why 
relatively few Gaels joined that rising against their established government:  
The obligation of an oath is one which a conscientious people, like the Scotch, 
especially when left without proper instruction as most of them were at that time, 
cannot be easily induced to violate.  52
Yet some persons refused to take the oaths of loyalty in 1745 and were quickly 
snapped up and prosecuted. Ten men, for instance, were taken into custody and 
held in York Castle for declining to subscribe.  Non-juring ministers were 53
specifically targeted by legislation designed to ensure they qualify themselves by 
registering and renouncing loyalty to the Stuarts.  Cumberland complained that 54
the magistrates of Forfar were especially frustrating (though he called them ‘good 
politicians’) for not taking the oaths while his troops were encamped there in 
March 1746.  However ‘deeply significant’ for some, oaths did not appear to be 55
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enforced for any other reason than to give the government a sense of reassurance 
during a period of extreme internal turmoil.  56
On the Jacobite side, 188 men of the reported 750 soldiers in the Duke of 
Perth’s regiment apparently willingly signed their own oaths of allegiance to James 
VIII in 1745, the text of which states: 
I solemnly promise and swear In the presence of Almighty God That I shall 
faithfully and diligently serve James the Eighth King of Scotland England France 
and Ireland against all his Enemies forreign or domestick And shall not desert or 
leave his service without leave asked and given of my officer And hereby pass 
from all former alledgeance given by me to George—Elector of Hannover So help 
me God.  57
The Perthshire men in this regiment, mostly recruited from the lands around Blair 
Atholl, were specifically noted to possess strong loyalty to ‘the Stuart cause’, yet 
James Drummond, Duke of Perth and commander of his regiment (as well as 
Lieutenant-General in the Prince’s army), found some crucial difficulties with 
recruiting due to the lingering memory of reparations after 1715.  In at least two 58
instances, however, the undersigned ‘faithful’ Jacobites from Perthshire turned 
King’s evidence against others in their regiment and at least fifteen other soldiers 
within Perth’s regiment are recorded as having given damning testimonies to 
procure their own discharges.  While the turning of King’s evidence at Jacobite 59
trials was not an uncommon occurrence for those who were faced with capital 
punishment, the Perthshire regiment displays one of the highest proportions in all 
of the Jacobite army. This is significantly ironic considering it also has proved the 
only recorded instance of numerous company-wide oaths of allegiance and 
abjuration for James VIII.   60
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In contrast, formal oaths to the established government were sometimes 
fabricated by select Jacobite elites looking to enter positions of office. Macinnes 
notes that development of such shrouded loyalties within governmental posts marks 
Jacobitism in Scotland as being uniquely ‘covert but sustained’, further lending 
credence to the idea of a persistent core of dissent between physical risings.  61
Andrew Hay, younger of Rannes, made his oath to King George on 1 June 1742, 
but joined up with Charles Edward when he arrived in Scotland anyway.  So, too, 62
did Jacobite officers sometimes cajole their prisoners into making promises of non-
aggression against the exiled royal family. Christopher Hodgson, a corporal in the 
Westmoreland militia, deponed that rebels in Carlisle informally made him swear 
‘never to take Arms against K. James or his Son Charles’, though no signed oath 
was ever enforced.  The Earl of Loudoun wrote to the Earl of Sutherland 63
expressing his bewilderment that some of his troops from Alexander Mackay’s 
company had taken oaths in favour of the Prince: 
They, that is part of them, took what was called an oath never to serve against 
the Pretender or his airs, directly contrary to the oath they had taken tother day 
when they were attested, and which must bind them against all subsequent 
oathes.  64
Loudoun was willing to accept these men back into his ranks, despite his knowledge 
that the punishment for desertion was death. Thomas Mayotts, a Roman Catholic 
from Essex accused of enlisting men for the Jacobites, testified that he was ‘ready & 
willing to take the Oaths of Allegiance to his Majesty, whenever called upon’.  65
From the evidence presented, it would appear that regardless of expectations for 
loyalty oaths to be upheld once subscribed, they were ultimately unimportant to the 
subscriber in light of personal principles or in the interests of preserving life and 
limb. But perhaps that cynicism is best described by a cleverly descriptive verse in a 
contemporary song: 
Scotland and England must be now 
United in one nation 
And wee must all perjure anew 
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And take the Abjuration  66
There were many crimes of treason for which alleged Jacobites were 
indicted, ranging from outright rebellion, political theatre, printed propaganda, 
and, like the above, seditious poetry and song.  Other than actually being seen in 67
arms by an informer, the most common reason cited for being taken into custody is 
under charges for speaking treasonous words or demonstrating subversive symbolic 
behaviour. Drinking loyal toasts to James and Charles Stuart in defiance to the 
government was commonplace in private and, of course, became more common 
publicly once the rising had begun. Notably, it was not only patrician Jacobites who 
engaged in these activities, though symbolic behaviour appears to generally have 
appealed to the upper echelons of society.  The frequency of cases involving toasts 68
within reports, warrants, and depositions should be considered in the context of 
company and locale before being used to inform degrees of genuine motivation and 
commitment. What did these toasts actually mean to the people who made them? 
Were they a symbolic language of discontent or a literal pledge to the success of the 
Jacobite cause? And vitally, was it an attempt to smear the character of others, 
whether deserving or not? The answers are likely different in every inn or back 
room of a tavern in which it took place, but such actions when observed and 
reported, regardless of their intended effect, were considered treason.  69
Warrants for twelve distinct people appear in the Duke of Newcastle’s letter 
book, suggesting their prosecution on the grounds of ‘Treasonable Words spoke by 
Him against the King’ and similar offences.  Two men being held at York, John 70
Douglass and Abraham Widdon (the latter who was committed as ‘a Dangerous 
Person’), were both to be prosecuted for drinking healths to either James or 
Charles.  A number of witnesses in Dunkeld called out nine people they claim to 71
have seen drinking ‘disloyal healths’ to various Jacobite leaders whilst loitering at 
the mercat cross.  Even in places as far away as Devonshire, citizens were taken 72
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into custody for ‘declaring that the pretender was of the Stuart family and was the 
right heir to the Crown, or words to that effect.’  Importantly, the expression of 73
toasts, cheers, and songs allowed antagonists of the Hanoverian government to vent 
and motivate others to join in protest, whether against specific governmental 
policies or even versus the character of King George, himself.  This would 74
sometimes spill over into social contention as lines of loyalty were drawn and 
crossed between common citizens. Situations like these rarely ended well. Four 
Staffordshire men were incensed that Simon McKensie and John Endsworth rudely 
came into their alehouse and attempted to make them drink to the health of the 
Pretender. Both rebels were shortly thereafter captured and then executed in York 
in November of 1746.  75
Regardless of the specific words chosen, the idea that was conveyed to  the 
loyalist subjects of Hanover through oaths and toasts was that of allegiance to the 
Stuarts and support of their claims, however broad or nebulous those claims were at 
a particular time during the campaign. The loyalist response was clear: ‘you’re 
either for us or against us’. However, the symbolic nature of these actions when 
used as a language of resistance goes some way in obscuring the presence of any 
practical reasons for their protest, if any did indeed exist. Nicholas Rogers makes 
the valuable points that anti-Hanoverian statements were not by their nature pro-
Jacobite ones, and also that the monopolisation of loyalty by the Whig party should 
have been expected to draw ‘seditious outbursts’.  Between the variable gravity and 76
fleeting permanence of oaths in favour or in resistance to the Stuarts, and the usage 
of seditious toasts as a rhetorical pastime in defiance of disappointing governmental 
policies, their true connection with Jacobitism remains difficult to decipher. 
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LOCALITY, INFLUENCE, AND MEMORY 
The commitment to safeguarding locale that Conway identifies in the 
previous section is exemplified by Paul Monod, who states that in the English West 
Midlands, ‘Jacobite allegiance in the area […] often had less to do with restoring 
the Stuarts than with preserving local community’. He is careful not to necessarily 
equate localism with apathy for national affairs, distinguishing that it was important 
for preserving social hierarchy while still providing ‘resistance to centralised 
administrative control’.  The inhabitants of some British towns nonetheless chose 77
to refrain from partisan politics entirely, perhaps in the interests of sustaining the 
relative peace of their local communities, or perhaps just to pragmatically maintain 
a low profile during a time of extreme paranoia. During the British army’s 
occupation of Aberdeen after reclaiming it from Jacobite control, Lord Ancrum 
described his frustration with the reluctance of local residents to help the 
government sniff out rebels: 
I must own to you that it gives me no sort of pleasure to see good natured things 
done to the People of this Country, nothing will make them do their duty but 
starving them or in some other shape forcing them to it. I have quite lost the little 
humanity I had for ‘em, I mean even for those who pretend to be well affected, 
none of them give us the smallest assistance on the Contrary I am persuaded that 
there is hardly one of them that would not rather conceal a Rebel than inform us 
of them.  78
Likewise, John Cope found it extremely difficult to gather intelligence around 
Crieff in the early days of the rising, noting ‘the People in this Country keep every 
thing they know very private’.  Part of this reluctance might very well have to do 79
with the level of risk associated with commitment to one side in support of an 
uncertain enterprise. At least in rural locales, partisan abstinence was more likely a 
case of not wanting to risk abandoning subsistence in the form of crops and farm; 
Highland and Lowland communities alike were largely led by adherence to locality 
and the welfare of agricultural productivity.   80
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Loyalty to political cause in the north of Scotland has been proved time and 
again to be less important than that of practical cause. A century before the final 
Jacobite rising, James Grant of Freuchy, chief of Clan Grant during the 
Covenanting wars, demonstrated that protecting his ancestral lands against both 
sides was his first duty.  John (Lord Gordon), and his brother Lewis (third 81
marquess of Huntly) notably switched sides from Covenanter to Royalist to protect 
his family’s best interests when they saw things going awry for Argyll after the 
Battle of Inverlochy in February 1645.  Much has been made of Montrose’s 82
shifting loyalties through the seventeenth century, and even the Earl of Mar who 
hoisted the Jacobite banner at Braemar in 1715 was renowned for his political 
chicanery, switching allegiances multiple times before finally selling it all for the 
Jacobites in the Great Rising.  Things were no different in 1745, as exemplified by 83
Simon Fraser of Lovat, ‘the Old Fox’ who outwardly demonstrated vacillating 
commitment through the entire campaign. Like Montrose, Lovat’s unwavering 
loyalty to his own personal needs cost him his head after the revolutionary dust had 
settled. Bruce Lenman explains that 
there was a great deal of hedging of bets amongst Jacobites during the ‘45 and 
many a son was sent out to fight with all or part of the family following while his 
father sat unctuously at home.  84
This was most certainly the case with Lovat, who ordered his son to raise Clan 
Fraser in his stead, as it very might well have been with the chiefs of Clanranald and 
Glengarry, as well as the Earl of Airlie’s son, Lord Ogilvy.  85
Personal allegiance to landowners, employers, or provincial political figures 
was also a major motivating influence, and was likely the most significant cause of 
popular Jacobite-driven obedience during the Forty-five.  This was particularly 86
prevalent in the Highlands, a rural and sometimes martial society where ‘memories 
of hospitality and protection were enduring’, and where contracted fealty of tenant 
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to landowner, largely through networks of kinship, meant that hierarchical 
subservience was built into Highland society.  Divided from urban communities by 87
the severity of mountains and moors, there existed a sort of ideological mirror 
between hereditary right of the Stuarts and the traditional authority of the clan 
system, and the conflict between constitutional law and customary right manifested 
with a familiarity that some Highland chiefs could intrinsically get behind.  88
However, regardless of ideological commitment, martial adherence, especially in 
rural areas, could never really be expected to extend beyond local boundaries.  This 89
goes some way toward informing the need for Jacobite army officers to ‘refine’ their 
recruitment practices as the campaign wore on, whether in Highland regions or 
otherwise.  90
As Jean McCann suggests, local authority might have been a catalyst for 
levying troops to march for the Prince, but ideological adherence and morale 
started to slip when those troops strayed from familiar land.  As well, feudal 91
deference to chief and monarch was not a hard and fast rule, indicated by the 
numerous clans and septs who either refused to pick up arms and join the fray or 
who actually organised for the government during the Forty-five.  Coll MacDonell 92
of Barisdale told the Prince’s secretary, John Murray of Broughton, that despite his 
intense recruiting efforts in Inverness-shire he could not depend much upon the 
local men to come along with him – even though many had promised under oath to 
do so.  At least five other clans joined the Jacobite army against the wishes of their 93
hereditary chiefs. Clan loyalties, and therefore clan actions, were also mutable 
characteristics.  Some Highland chiefs, after decades of feuding, had created 94
contracts of mutual alliance that bound their clans together in the event of rebellion 
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from within. In the case of northern neighbours the Earl of Sutherland and Lord 
Reay, their own agreement in July 1745 to ‘bind and oblige’ each other’s resources 
for the mutual defence of George II was a minor example of the ‘firm union and 
confidences’ then being allegedly challenged on the national level, which duly 
endeared them to the Hanoverian administration.  The chief of Glengarry’s 95
alliance with the Grants of Glenmoriston, who in turn ostensibly supported Forbes 
of Culloden and therefore MacLeod of Skye and Macdonald of Sleat, ensured that 
taking clear sides was not a simple thing and there were hidden ramifications as a 
consequence of any decided action no matter its trajectory.  96
While the majority of the Highland clans notionally supported Jacobite aims 
through its century of life, military contribution to either side of the conflict tended 
to decline as more chiefs drifted toward neutrality, mostly for pragmatic reasons 
rather than lack of conviction. Macinnes demonstrates that traditional values alone 
were not enough to pull the clans into all three major campaign eras of Jacobite 
activity, as the political situations both locally and nationally had everything to do 
with specific clan incentives. This is borne out by evidence showing not only 
declining Jacobite loyalties within the fifty major Highland clans, but also by the 
fact that the number of clans riven by ideological tensions increased six-fold 
between 1689 and 1746.  Though traditionally martial by nature, modernisation 97
and the influence of commercialism began to inform the decision of whether or not 
to participate in rebellion as the century wore on. Anti-Jacobite propaganda was 
partially responsible for conveying an ‘accusatory rather than analytical’ Highland-
Jacobite parallel in the minds of many Lowland Scots and other Britons, which was 
reinforced by Charles Edward’s attempts to unify his army with a Highland theme 
as well as the campaign of targeted government retribution in that region after 
Culloden.  Not unlike Scots in the Lowlands and the north-east, however, most 98
established clans refused to be driven by Jacobite ideology alone and were able to 
‘contain’ their frustrations until they decided that ‘force was the only way out’.   99
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Jacobites relied on the prestige of their officers to attract men and materiel, 
and the joining of well-known gentlemen such as Lochiel, Pitsligo, and Lord 
George Murray was regarded as essential by the Prince and his early staff, while 
being seen as detrimental by Whigs who were also aware of their esteem.  Such 100
was the pull of charismatic local leaders that the virtual absence of any in England 
was likely the most pressing reason that significant numbers of Jacobite military 
support never materialised there.  Recruits in Scotland were often beholden to 101
their immediate superiors, ‘be he landlord, clan chief, or the usual ambiguous 
mixture of the two’, and the ubiquitous presence of these leaders in disaffected areas 
drew the kind of support that England could not provide.  McCann explains the 102
relative success of recruitment in the Western Highlands due to the presence of 
‘decisive views of figures of local eminence’, accounting that locales with strong 
leadership displayed the ‘least difficulty’ in drawing support.  Evander McIver, a 103
tenant to Glengarry, confided that he left his wife and children behind and took up 
arms expressly to please his laird.  In the north-east of Scotland, a region 104
containing widespread Jacobite sentiment, tenured rebel officers with local 
influence like Pitsligo were able to quickly raise considerable numbers of men to 
voluntarily join them. Lord Elcho was himself shocked when he learned that James 
Gordon of Cobairdie, an officer from Banffshire, had voluntarily enlisted with 
Pitsligo’s cavalry, describing that it was ‘a great surprise’ for he ‘had no manner of 
tincture that way, but, being a rambling young lad, was determined by comradeship 
and something too by the high regard he had for Lord Pitsligo’.  Peter Campbell, 105
another soldier in Glengarry’s regiment, was noted as having been ‘influenced by 
his superior to rise in arms’, as were Donald Farquharson and William McEvan 
from the respective locales of Aldsay and Invermoriston.  Likewise, Thomas 106
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Gordon served as a captain ‘under the influence of [Gordon of] Glenbucket’. 
Joseph Robertson, a non-juring minister in Haddington, was responsible for 
guiding a number of people to join Charles Edward’s army in the autumn of 1745, 
including his own nephew.  Famously, the wife of the Chief of the Mackintoshes, 107
dubbed ‘Colonel’ Anne, used her high position to bring nearly 300 men into the 
rising, arguably against the wishes of her husband – and likely against those of the 
recruits, themselves.  Evan McDonald and Alexander Ferguson both wrote letters 108
to their wives stating that their high regard for their masters kept them in the field 
during the Jacobite army’s march to England.  The power of personal prestige 109
cannot be underestimated when considered as a motivational factor for the general 
populace, and while Jacobite sensibilities existed in nearly every significant town 
between England and Scotland, it was ultimately strong leadership that made the 
difference in actually securing martial and material support where it was needed.  110
Undoubtedly this is part of why Jacobite elites are seen as such vital figures and 
beacons of favour, whether territorial, political, or otherwise. The question 
remains, however, as to what particular types of influence were exerted to draw 
plebeian assistance, and this will be addressed in Chapter IV: Recruitment. 
So, too, was familial influence a notable incentive within the popular 
constituency of the rising. James Stirling, a veteran of the Fifteen living in Glasgow, 
was likely too infirm to again join the Prince’s army. Instead he travelled to 
Edinburgh, where he presented his two sons directly to Charles Edward for his use 
in Elcho’s troop. Andrew Johnstone claimed that his father ‘with Threats & 
Menaces obliged him to quit the King’s Service’ and join the Jacobite army. Other 
rebels stated they were simply told by their mothers to go out for the cause – a 
formidable ultimatum in any era.  Lord Ancrum recounted to Everard Fawkener 111
the furtive actions of the Jacobite mother of one Mr Mercer near Angus who, upon 
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her son being seized, ‘slipt ten guineas into the Serjeants hand to let him escape, 
but the Serjeant had more honesty than to do it’.  As mentioned previously, the 112
Master of Lovat was sent out against his own political loyalties by his father. Simon 
Fraser the younger would eventually go on to hold the rank of Major-General in 
the British army and to triumphantly reclaim his ancestral lands from the 
Hanoverian government in 1774, but not before doing as his father had 
commanded.  113
The influence of tradition and memory should also not be discounted as a 
strong motivator for some to have participated, as well as the power of the symbolic 
trappings of that tradition. John Sanderson, a captain in the Manchester regiment 
who joined the Prince in Edinburgh, had his striking lace coat remarked upon by 
numerous witnesses. Apparently this was Sanderson’s ‘garb of resistance’, as he 
claimed it had been secreted away since the last rebellion and he had not donned it 
since.  Numerous other physical items make appearances in the hands of Jacobite 114
activists, including locks of hair, glassware and crockery, and even weapons used to 
fight on the field of battle. This demonstrates the ability for Jacobite sentiment to 
survive the span time as a potent belief through seditious objects, even thirty years 
on from the outcome of the Fifteen.  115
CONFESSIONAL FREEDOMS 
Daniel Szechi states that the very foundation of Jacobitism in Britain lay in 
the three main religious institutions outside of the established Churches of England 
and Scotland. Between the Roman Catholic, Anglican non-juring, and Scots 
Episcopalian Churches, all of the conflicts of faith and doctrinal schisms with the 
establishment were essentially accounted for. Much like the fortunes of the Union, 
the question of religious freedoms must be considered in the context of regal 
authority and what tolerances would be imposed by the reigning monarch. The 
concept of a Stuart-imposed divine right of kings appealed to Roman Catholics, as 
well as the fact that the traditional faith of that dynasty happened to match their 
own, and Stuart proclamations explicitly tempted Catholic toleration from as early 
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as 1717.  Whereas Irish Jacobitism was able to be sustained by the broad base of 116
Catholic clergy on an island consisting of a 75% Catholic majority, English and 
Lowland Scottish Catholicism was primarily maintained by the landed gentry and 
was relatively sparse. Evidence of accurate, widespread plebeian Catholic presence 
outwith Ireland is difficult to come by, and its waning constituency was a feature 
across class divides after the failure of the Fifteen, partially due to the imposition of 
anti-Catholic taxes and penal laws.  117
Despite a mythological belief that the Scottish Highland clans were 
primarily Roman Catholic, only a quarter of the clans held more than a divided 
adherence to that church, many of which bifurcated even further by 1745.  But the 118
devotion of the Roman Catholic minority in mainland Britain to the exiled House 
of Stuart was formidable and long-lived. In fact, the exceptional feature of this 
Catholic dedication to Jacobite efforts in Scotland was its endurance, made possible 
due to the geographical remoteness of its Highland constituents.  Meanwhile, 119
Presbyterian polemics equated all agents of ‘popery’ as Jacobite who supported 
successive rebellions and efforts to subvert the government with ‘Zeal, Concurrence 
& private Encouragement from the whole Popish Party’. In response, the 
establishment sought to curtail such activities through imposing the registration of 
Catholic estates (regarded as ‘known Asylums of Priests’) and the prevention of 
gatherings at inns and taverns by denying public licenses.  To the Church of 120
Scotland, the Catholic threat was obstreperous and was seen as the cyclical 
financing of sustained rebellion between Highland clergy and the exiled monarchy. 
As successful as Jacobite recruitment was in traditionally Roman Catholic areas, 
however, the ability of that faith alone to stoke action was questionable. Yet 
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Catholic support of the Jacobite cause, as Lenman calls out, was taken for granted 
by nearly everyone.  121
Scottish Episcopalians saw their church structure enfeebled and replaced at 
the Revolution, and were subsequently barraged for decades by the Williamite and 
Hanoverian governments with the full support of the established Presbyterian 
establishment.  England had witnessed over forty dissenting meeting houses 122
destroyed in 1715 and this would be a common theme across Britain through the 
century, and especially directly after Culloden.  Universities in Scotland were 123
nonetheless seeded with Episcopal sympathies after the Restoration and were 
responsible for churning out educated clergy who spread the belief that the 
established church post-1689 was ‘as illegitimate as the new political regime’.  124
This went some way to ensuring that non-juring doctrine gave Jacobitism perhaps 
its most constant tenets throughout the decades of political jockeying and dynastic 
upheaval, and naturally became a confessional citadel in which the disaffected could 
shelter. To be a non-juror was to denounce the legitimacy of the illegitimate 
monarch (George) in favour of the rightful one (James) who could restore core 
moral values upon the kingdoms of Britain.  As such, non-jurors were viewed with 125
extreme unease and suspicion and their congregations were considered to be 
 Macinnes, ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, pp. 234-235; Macinnes, Clanship, p. 173-177; Szechi, ‘Defending the 121
True Faith: Kirk, State, and Catholic Missioners in Scotland, 1653-1755’ in Catholic Historical Review, 82:3 (July 
1996), p. 400; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, pp. 229, 254; McCann, ‘Organisation’, pp. 109-136. McCann 
demonstrates that out of an estimated Roman Catholic population in Scotland of 19,000 (via the Scottish Catholic 
Archives and Alexander Webster’s Census of 1755), somewhere between 4300 and 5300 troops were raised. This 
represents a rough total of 30% of total Jacobite army numbers but only 22-27% of the total Catholic population 
in Scotland, pp. 123-124. See also Thomas McInally, ‘Missionaries or Soldiers for the Jacobite Cause? The Conflict 
of Loyalties for Scottish Catholic Clergy’ in Macinnes, et al., Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, pp. 43-58. 
Richard Findlay, ‘Keeping the Covenant: Scottish National Identity’ in Devine and Young, eds., Eighteenth Century 
Scotland, p. 122; Colley, Britons, pp. 5, 74. For the marginalisation of anti-Catholic sentiment, see Steve Pincus, 
‘The European Catholic Context of the Revolution of 1688-89: Gallicanism, Innocent XI, and Catholic Opposition’ 
in Allan Macinnes and Arthur Williamson, eds., Shaping the Stuart World, 1603-1714: The Atlantic Connection 
(Boston, 2006), pp. 109-111.
 Macinnes, Union and Empire, p. 245; Macinnes, ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, pp. 234-236; John Parker Lawson, 122
History of the Scottish Episcopal Church: From the Revolution to the Present Time (i, Edinburgh, 1843), passim; 
C.D.A. Leighton, ‘Scottish Jacobitism, Episcopacy, and Counter-Enlightenment’ in History of European Ideas, 35 
(2009) pp. 1-10.
 Nicolas Rogers, ‘Riot and Popular Jacobitism’, pp. 70-88; NLS MS.3044 f. 123; Newcastle to Fletcher (30 123
April, 1746), SPS.54/30/32; Fletcher to Newcastle (13 June, 1746), SPS.54/32/17. See Chapter III: Constituency, 
p. 100 and Chapter V: Consequences, p. 224.
 Lenman, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy’, pp. 38-39; Mark Goldie, ‘The Nonjurors, Episcopacy, and the Origins 124
of the Convocation Controversy’ in Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy, pp. 15-35.
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 42-43. Monod helpfully summarises non-juring principles as 125
‘the importance of monarchical sovereignty, the moral degeneration of illegitimate regimes, the hope of revival 
through a restoration of the rightful King’.
60
‘nurseries of Jacobitism’.  In December 1746, Lord Justice Clerk Andrew Fletcher 126
sent a list of seventeen non-juring ministers in Edinburgh to the Duke of 
Newcastle. Its purpose was to inform the government where their perceived 
enemies were operating, and Fletcher promised to stay vigilant in case any had 
‘attempted to preach or teach and educate children’.  Likewise, the juring clergy 127
were expected to uphold the de facto sovereign’s legitimacy, sounding ‘the Trumpet 
against Popery and the Pretender’.  128
Without doubt, confessional interests are evidenced to be part and parcel of 
Jacobite motivation and were closely aligned through the entire life of the 
movement. Though, as with all of the causal considerations, the issue is similarly a 
complex one with no clearly defined boundaries. Like many scholars, Richard 
Findlay considers that religion was at the very centre of Scottish national identity 
during the eighteenth century, and that the conflict between the established 
Presbyterian and displaced Episcopalian Churches was a ‘national project’.  The 129
non-jurors of the north-east and Lowland Perthshire who made up a significant 
percentage of Jacobite support during the Forty-five were duty-bound to 
reestablishing their religious freedoms and felt that the restoration of the Stuarts 
was the most efficacious way to see it happen.  But in the Highlands, defence or 130
assertion of faith was rarely, if ever, the primary call to action for either chief or 
clan. The importance of this dichotomy in the context of later Jacobitism is that 
shared religious beliefs provided a bond of common sentiment only so far as to 
organise action within a much larger opposition movement.  Though the Jacobite 131
constituency reflected numerous faiths, a feature which debunks the old maxim of 
the Forty-five being a struggle between Catholics and Protestants, it is extremely 
relevant that they were only moderately united under a common actionable cause. 
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Donald Cameron of Lochiel brought three chaplains into his regiment, each one of 
a different denomination: Episcopalian, Catholic, and Presbyterian.  In May 1746, 132
twelve rebel tenants in the parish of Lochlee in Angus were willing to put their 
confessional doctrine aside to make peace with the government. Promising ‘out of 
Gratitude and to Shew a just Sense of our Sin and Folly’ after being released on the 
King’s mercy, they admitted to ‘having imbibed wrong principles’ by attending a 
non-juring meeting-house, and signed a declaration that they and their families 
would from now on attend ‘the established Church where his Majesty and the 
Royall Family are duely preyed for’.  While faith played a prominent role in the 133
motivations of many Jacobites in 1745, the evidence is compellingly clear that it was 
not divided down denominational lines. 
‘THE FETID SOUP OF DISCONTENT’ 
Christopher Whatley spends considerable space in his book Scottish Society, 
1707-1830 describing the slow burn of unrest and discontent within the common 
people of Scotland, otherwise largely skimmed over by historians of the period.  134
His thesis maintains that during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
considerable volatility and violence marked Scottish communities both urban and 
rural – though in a specifically piecemeal manner rather than ‘large-scale outbreaks 
of disorder’.  While the social order, Whatley concedes, was not in any particular 135
danger from the multitude of food, tax, and malt riots in the 1720s, it did cement a 
tradition of protest in both Scotland and England.  Edinburgh’s unpopular 136
political constitution created waves of discontent in the capital of ‘North Britain’, 
with vehement protesters calling attention to the decay of trades as opposed to the 
levying of taxes.  Disaffected plebeians south of the border, meanwhile, were not 137
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inherently politic-minded and generally did not organise their protests around 
overtly-political issues.  Regardless of locale, rioting was a natural way to exercise 138
these frustrations, and Lenman observes that it was completely natural ‘for rioters 
to shout Jacobite slogans, whether they believed them or not’, simply because they 
‘were known to infuriate Whigs’.  The question was not whether a widespread 139
essence of discontent existed in every area of Scotland and Northern England, 
strengthened by the ‘endogamous’ patrician norm of opposition society in 
coffeehouses and inns within both burgh and hamlet. It was more an issue of 
whether that opposition society would see it fit to reign in the toasting and singing 
in favour of funding Jacobite army logistics and picking up arms to join the march 
to London.  To be put concisely, there was a sizeable gulf between practical and 140
ideological Jacobitism, though the two sometimes were expressed in tandem. 
Monod asserts that popular Jacobitism ‘was not a catch-all for discontent; it 
was aroused by particular circumstances, and pursued specific aims […] but had 
little to contribute to the resolution of economic problems’. It makes sense that 
workers involved in labour disputes and protestors who vocally denounced higher 
taxes might not find it in their best interests to appropriate the treasonous 
countenance of Jacobitism, despite its embedded appeal.  This does not preclude 141
the presence of people frustrated enough with government policies to rise in arms 
alongside the most potent agency of potential change, however. While there were 
many outward signs of British irritation through the first half of the eighteenth 
century and only a few relatively small demonstrations to relieve that pressure, 
Jacobitism was surely the elephant in the room.  This is to say that nearly 142
everyone in Britain either had witnessed or knew someone who had witnessed a 
Stuart-sanctioned military attempt at unseating the present establishment. Quite 
simply, no other opposition movements had ever threatened the government so 
greatly, or had come so close to succeeding. Though most Jacobite disturbances 
might not have been directly connected to specific economic, political, or religious 
matters, and though Jacobite elites may have not been interested in rioting as part 
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of their grand strategy, the opportunity for plebeians to take part in the potential 
upheaval might have been too tempting for some.    143
Some enterprising folks saw the brewing rebellion as a chance to take 
advantage of the financial possibilities that it could present, and others were simply 
destitute and had little choice. Richard Morison, an Edinburgh barber, claimed that 
he followed the Jacobite army ‘for no other reason’ than to exercise his trade.  144
John Hamilton, factor to the Duke of Gordon, was thought to have joined the 
enterprise less because of his Jacobite inclinations and more due to ‘the disorder of 
his affairs’, as was the notorious Aberdeenshire recruiter James Moir of 
Stoneywood.  A servant to a linen-draper in Worcester claimed he was left ill in 145
Nairn by his master, whereupon he was robbed by some Jacobites there. Reduced 
to starving, he ‘crawled to Inverness and ironically agreed to serve the Rebells for 
necessary Substinance’.  So, too, did Robert Randall cite starvation for his 146
involvement, confessing to Lt. General Handasyd that he had once worked for the 
government as an excise officer but had been dismissed three years before.  147
Inverness-shire and the Western Highlands had suffered through numerous 
poor harvest seasons in the years before the rising, and McCann comments that 
‘such scarcity provided a certain incentive to unrest to those who had therefore 
little to lose’.  The Malt Tax imposed by the government in 1725 was violently 148
protested in Glasgow, though it was equally onerous in all towns and especially to 
rural farmers in Scotland; an Aberdeenshire minister recorded in 1746 that ‘almost 
all the common people’ in the north-east were inclined toward Jacobitism due to 
the possibility that a revolution might mitigate that financial drain.  While there is 149
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no evidence of serious food shortages in Britain during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, there was indeed a tangible sense of moral outrage at the 
possibility of one manifesting. Stoked by what was seen as unfair financial benefits 
to both food merchants and exporters, the social divide between the merchant and 
common classes deepened and the entire century seethed with intermittent food 
riots in both England and Scotland, which further hampered trade and 
employment.  Four Irish migrants later taken with the Manchester Regiment 150
pleaded destitution as their reason for enlisting in the Jacobite army, either out of 
work because of trade in Manchester being ‘at a Stand’ or not being able to find 
employment due to their status as ‘outsiders’.  By the middle of the century, large 151
ports like Glasgow and Dundee were experiencing an eruption of vigorous trade 
with Europe and the West Indies; it was the threat of an invasion from within that 
did more economic harm than the good which was promised by Charles Edward’s 
manifesto shortly after his landing.  152
Though some segments of Scottish society were settling into some 
economic benefits of the Union by 1745, things were apparently not so in 
Edinburgh. Scotland’s capital instead was torn by some measure of financial and 
political crisis in the years leading up to the rebellion. Numerous broadsheets were 
published between 1725 and 1746 citing the corruption of the capital’s local 
government, which was seen as utterly unethical and self-serving. Accused of acting 
as a degenerate front for mendacious burgesses, magistrates of the town council 
were called out on several occasions for their submissiveness to the Deacons of 
Trade, who held massive influence over both elections and civic policies. The 
council was blamed for enforcing unfair practices by anointing the guilds with 
regulatory powers that were seen as prejudiced, squeezing out competition and 
creating monopolies within numerous trades. These corporations, tacitly 
empowered by the (ostensibly Jacobite-leaning) provost, Archibald Stewart, were 
condemned for colluding with smugglers and hastening Edinburgh into being 
 Whatley, ‘An Uninflammable People?, pp. 64-65. Nicolas Rogers notes that Newcastle keelmen ‘were quite 150
prepared’ to destroy portraits of the Stuarts during the food riots of 1740, but were vocally Jacobite during a 
following strike a decade later, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1998), p. 52, 58-61.
 Testimonies of William Crosbie (TNA TS.11/760/2363 p. 62), Thomas Joy (TNA TS.11/760/2363 p. 63), 151
William Mercer (TNA TS.11/760/2361 p. 32), etc.; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 339. 
 Derek Patrick, ‘Dundee in the ‘45’ in Charles McKean, Bob Harris, and Christopher A. Whatley, eds., Dundee: 152
Renaissance to Enlightenment (Dundee, 2009), pp. 102-104; ‘Tobacco Duties, 1729-1749’ reprinted in The 
Cochrane Correspondence Regarding the Affairs of Glasgow, 1745-6 (Glasgow, 1836), p. 106. See the 
Glenfinnan Manifesto, reprinted in John Scott Keltie, Thomas McLauchlan, and John Wilson, History of the 
Scottish Highlands, Highland Clans and Highland Regiments (i, Edinburgh & London, 1875), pp. 523-525. This 
will be further explored in Chapter V: Consequences, pp. 208-210.
65
‘overwhelmed by Calamity’.  This oligarchical cycle provided for some tense years 153
and finally erupted when Jacobite troops entered and occupied the capital.  154
Citing negative influence by the English councils since Union, an 
Edinburgh citizen called out the ‘weakness or Inattention of almost every Ministry, 
to the general Good of the whole united Kingdom’. This, it was claimed, produced 
‘dislike and Indifference, and could not fail at last to ripen into downright 
Disaffection to the Government’.  Such disaffection was not tantamount to 155
feelings of Jacobitism, it was defended, and the reluctance of loyalist Scots to stand 
against the rebels had little to do with their sympathies to the cause. Rather, the 
‘Goose Chase by a Handful of Highlanders’ was perceived in Edinburgh to be a 
different creature entirely and did not receive a large degree of support, even 
despite the ease with which the Prince was able to take the capital. Yet this did not 
mean that many citizens of Edinburgh were happy with either London rule or the 
local government, both of which some felt were untenable. It also did not 
necessarily mean that the latent distrust and frustration with these authorities would 
not eventually court Jacobite machinations.  In fact, Edinburgh displayed a unique 156
polarity that allowed it to exist without any major public disturbances during 
Charles Edward’s occupation. The burgh had two main banks and two significant 
newspapers; one of each was explicitly known to have Jacobite ties. Blaikie 
comments that the regular citizens of Edinburgh did not let politics get in the way 
of civic friendliness, and that both Whig and Jacobite were able to exist together ‘in 
amity and good-fellowship’ – at least in matters outside of the church.  Few 157
Jacobite soldiers were recruited from the Edinburgh area, though numerous 
regiments from other counties were filled out while the army was in occupation of 
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the capital. Poignantly, Blaikie illustrates that ‘the Edinburgh Jacobites shouted for 
Prince Charles, but would not fight for him’, which further illustrates the gulf 
between ideology and practicality.  Nonetheless, after Culloden the Duke of 158
Cumberland showed his disappointment in Edinburgh’s poor defence by burning 
the captured Jacobite standards at the mercat cross, as well as suggesting to his 
father, King George, that the capital of Scotland be moved to Glasgow.  159
In short, by-the-book Jacobitism did not have to be a catch-all for discontent 
for it to be effective, because it had assistance from those with similar goals who 
might not have been of a refined Jacobite persuasion. It is acceptable to 
acknowledge this and not denude the ideological tenets of the movement, and it is 
logical to surmise that the progression of Jacobite aims – during the Forty-five and 
through the movement’s entire life – took on more diversity as it went along than 
with which it first started. 
FOREIGN SERVICE 
France’s commitment to the Jacobite military effort in Scotland, ever 
threatening but not successfully materialising until the autumn of 1745, bears 
considering in the overall assessment of motivation during the final rising. Louis 
XV’s signature on the treaty cemented at Fontainebleau in late October of that year 
legitimised his intentions to support Charles Edward and formally made the Forty-
five an international affair.  The mostly Scottish and Irish regular troops in 160
French service that were donated to the cause made up no less than 7% of the 
Jacobite army, and likely more based on the differing estimated numbers of total 
rebel soldiers.  These units were divided into three main bodies and, excluding 161
British army deserters absorbed by other units, may have been the only real 
professional troops in the entire Jacobite cohort. Lord John Drummond had raised 
nearly 600 men of the Royal Ecossais by August 1744, its original intention being 
to fight in the War of Austrian Succession as part of the army of France. After 
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with Jacobitism from the Edinburgh area with thirty-nine identified in Port Leith alone, Rosebery’s List, pp. 
244-259; NLS MS.1918 ff. 1-2. See also Memorial for the Town of Edinburgh, NLS MS.17527 ff. 141-144.
 Gibson, Edinburgh in the ’45, pp. 57-58.159
 McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745, pp. 239-240; A.J. Youngson, The Prince and the Pretender 160
(London, 1985), p. 216.
 See, for example, Duffy, The ’45, pp. 576-577; McCann, ‘Organisation’, p. 157; Fletcher to Newcastle (9 161
December, 1745), SPS.54/26/94a, etc.
67
participating in Flanders at numerous sieges, the regiment joined the expeditionary 
force sent to assist the Jacobites in Scotland, landing at Montrose in late November 
1745. Though Drummond was expected to raise another battalion of men in 
Scotland for the under-strength unit, its numbers likely never rose far above 400.  162
A second body of infantry sent to Scotland, the Irish Brigade or ‘Wild 
Geese’, had a long tradition of Jacobite military activity, originally being formed as 
part of a mutual trade between James VII and Louis XIV during the dynastic 
conflicts of the late-seventeenth century.  Populated somewhat clandestinely due 163
to the appearance of Catholics from pro-Jacobite Irish families and deserters from 
the British army, the Brigade fought effectively on the Continent at Fontenoy 
before committing ‘choice detachments’ of its numerous regiments to the Jacobites 
in 1745.  These detachments (called ‘picquets’) of fifty men came from all six Irish 164
Brigade regiments and, like the Royal Ecossais, were deployed to Scotland in late 
November. About half of this donation of soldiers was captured by the British navy 
even before making landfall, thus limiting the operational number of the Irish 
Brigade in Scotland to around 150 before local recruiting was used to supplement 
the unit.  165
The third main body of troops in French service was the cavalry regiment of 
FitzJames’ Horse, technically part of the Irish Brigade and commanded 
independently by Irish officers. Only one of four assigned squadrons actually landed 
in Scotland, and this without actual horses. Christopher Duffy notes that the men 
of Kilmarnock’s cavalry had to hand off some of their mounts to ensure FitzJames’ 
could perform as expected. Like the Wild Geese, FitzJames’ was first raised by 
James VII in 1691, but was eventually passed into France’s authority by 1698.  166
Members from all three of these bodies appear in numerous prison documents and 
were carefully tracked, given that their status as foreign soldiers ostensibly entitled 
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them to certain benefits as prisoners of war. Clear evidence was therefore 
demanded by the British government to prove that these men were not, in fact, 
lawful subjects of King George.  167
Determining the personal motivations for these regular troops is difficult, as 
professional soldiers generally do what they are told to do by their superiors. 
Though their specific incentives could vary greatly, the majority of Scottish soldiers 
in foreign service during the seventeenth century likely ‘did so out of financial 
necessity’, even when considering that Scots ‘at all social levels’ were driven by the 
nation’s deeply-ingrained martial tradition.  The Irish Brigade offers an 168
interesting study, however, as the picquets destined for Scotland were apparently 
formed on an entirely volunteer basis. A rough count of extant numbers shows that 
the quotas of fifty men per regiment were exceeded, though only half of them 
escaped capture before landing. Aspirations of wealth might have had something to 
do with such enthusiasm, hearsay being that the ‘English’ were so rich that ‘every 
man of the corps might make his fortune by plunder’.  169
A document in the State Papers offers much more useful information about 
sixty-nine troopers from a squadron of FitzJames’ regiment captured at sea. While 
not every entry in this list is definitive, the government had been able to record 
some of ‘their Reasons for Listing & for going to France’ before processing them as 
prisoners of war.  Amongst these, the most common citations are of growing up in 170
Ireland and thereafter traveling to the Continent whereupon they enlisted. Some 
were visiting family or going to study; apparently the Irish uncles of FitzJames’ 
soldiers now living in France were quite numerous, as an official’s note reads ‘this is 
a pretence they mostly all make’.  Others claimed they were brought to France by 171
smugglers or otherwise made to enlist forcefully. Only two are recorded as signing 
up to seek their fortunes, and none cite ideologies of dynasty, nationalism, or 
politic. A few are noted as pretending to be Frenchmen, presumably to ensure they 
could claim proper status as prisoners of war. Conversely, numerous others 
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announced their intention not to return to France in any capacity.  Four of the 172
troopers are English (all of which are noted as being Protestant), one is Welsh, one 
Scots, and the rest are Irish. Their average age is just over thirty-one and their 
average length of service at the time of capture is just under twelve years. In all, 
35% of the average lifespans of these men was spent in military employ with 
France. 
The fates of those captured in foreign service will be further explored in 
Chapter V: Consequences. It is fitting to mention here, however, that some of 
those who were born on British soil were willingly repatriated for enlistment into 
the British army. Ten soldiers from FitzJames’ petitioned the government on 22 
November 1746 for pardons in order to escape transportation or death, claiming 
they were ‘taken by the French at sea’ and given no other option than to engage 
‘after a long confinement’. Six more petitioned the same three days later, stating 
their desire to be pardoned for treason ‘and to be allowed to serve in the British 
forces’.  Some of these men were former deserters from British regiments or were 173
captured by the French while fighting against them on the Continent, and some 
simply wanted to get out of the military at any cost and regardless of the 
consequences. Of the five ‘French’ soldiers held in Dumfries jail, two had 
previously deserted from British regiments in Flanders. Incarcerated in Edinburgh, 
James Mouse explained that he enlisted with the French army with the intention to 
come home.  John Reid, a Royal Ecossais trooper made captive in the Marshalsea 174
prison, asked that he ‘may never be sent again to France being forced into that 
Service to save himself from a Lingring death for want of victuals’.  Of the 145 175
prisoners from Bulkeley’s, Clare’s, and Berwick’s picquets, only forty-three are 
listed as having signed up for service voluntarily, specifically going to France for 
that purpose. Seven are noted as deserting from the ‘Scotch Dutch’, with numerous 
others citing that they were sold into Dutch Service from Berwick’s, Rothe’s and 
the Scots Fusiliers.  This goes some way to explaining the detailed notes about the 176
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enlistment of these men, as the government surely either wanted their captured 
troops back or were looking to flag up deserters and other convicted criminals.  177
France, of course, shared the common goals with the Jacobites of wanting to 
see the British army defeated and the Hanoverian government overthrown. Sending 
five vessels and about a thousand troops to Scotland, plus scattered caches of 
money, equipment, and firearms, however, was simply not enough to do any major 
damage to the establishment. France’s real contribution was harbouring the exiled 
Stuart court for so many years, which gave Jacobite schemes a central command of 
sorts safely hidden away from prying Hanoverian eyes. It was in the shadow of this 
court that the tradition of foreign Jacobite recruiting was at its most potent, and 
this had been the case since late 1690. While Scottish soldiers in foreign service had 
previously been used by Stuart monarchs to influence foreign policy, in 1745 
Charles Edward needed them to return home to assist with domestic endeavours.  178
What he received from France, even under formal treaty and despite repeated 
guarantees, was only a shade of what was required. Nevertheless, the promise of a 
more substantial French commitment kept Jacobite hopes alive in Scotland even as 
its absence kept large numbers of ambivalent English Jacobites out of the action 
entirely.  Ironically, it was these men from the regiments in French service, 179
seemingly without much of a doctrinal stake in the conflict, who saved the bacon of 
the Jacobite command as it fled the field at Culloden. The sacrifice of the Irish 
picquets alone was nearly a quarter of their contingent.  180
IMPRESSMENT AND COERCION 
Lastly, a somewhat incongruous category of Jacobite motivation during the 
Forty-five was the presence of forcing used to bring soldiers into arms. It is clearly 
not a doctrinal belief or personal ideology like the others noted in this typology, but 
nonetheless was a significant factor in building up opposition to government forces 
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in preparation for a revolutionary takeover. Despite nearly the whole of Jacobite 
scholarship’s continued marginalisation of forced recruitment as an effective 
method for supplying the Jacobite army with its numbers in 1745-6, a careful 
analysis of the evidence overwhelmingly suggests otherwise. It is easy for both 
Whig-minded revisionists and Jacobite apologists alike to bury the case without 
realistically considering the value of impressment as a motivator of the constituency 
simply because it is detrimental to both agendas. The Whig narrative might benefit 
the most from proof of widespread forcing, demonstrating the ‘barbarous customs 
and maxims’ of the Highland host (as the Jacobite army in 1745 purposefully styled 
itself), but then the hundreds of pleas by captured prisoners would have had to been 
further investigated by the government – a costly and time-intensive prospect that 
had the propensity to rob the British judicial system of its treasonous examples to 
the rest of the kingdom.  The pro-Jacobite record, of course, suffers intrinsically 181
from irony-sickness upon the admission of a significant quantity of forced 
supporters, as it denudes the ideologies traditionally associated with the Jacobite 
goal of fomenting a popular uprising that sought liberation from ‘foreign’ 
oppression. 
Most arguments are made against the inherent value of ‘forcing out’ pleas, 
unilaterally subscribing to the belief that such testimonies were nothing more than 
obvious ploys to escape punishment and were therefore groundless or, at the very 
least, suspect.  One scholar plainly suggests that Bruce Lenman’s consideration of 182
primary-source evidence documenting examples of forcing is taking things ‘too 
much at face value’.  The British government implemented a meticulous process 183
of testing high-value prisoners against claims of impressment, which was designed 
to ensure that every attempt was made by the would-be victims to immediately and 
consistently remove themselves from forced service: 
the Matter of Fact whether Force or No Force, and how long that Force 
continued, with every Circumstance tending to shew the Practicability or 
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Impracticability of an Escape, was left to the Jury on the whole Evidence.  184
Despite the fact that British officials were sceptical of these claims, however, 
hundreds of precognitions from witnesses and transcripts of laborious testimonials 
survive that prove judicial adherence to whatever the evidence actually bore out. 
Justices often expressed anxiety and frustration about collecting enough damning 
material to ensure that guilty parties were punished accordingly, but numerous 
examples exist of open resignation when sufficient witnesses or witness 
corroborations (‘evidences’, as they were termed) were not available to be used at 
trial. As a result, many alleged Jacobite prisoners were dismissed, acquitted, or 
otherwise let go.   185
Some scholars consider the use of force in eighteenth-century recruitment 
no shocking occurrence, citing multiple instances of the British army (and, 
famously, the navy) itself employing such methods to bring people into its ranks.  186
This is decidedly missing the point, however. Press-gangs used to drum up 
numbers for a government-sanctioned and government-supported professional 
military body is very different creature from threats of burning houses and harming 
families by a popular revolutionary movement predicated on moral, national, and 
dynastic right. Perhaps even more ironically relevant is that the British army of the 
eighteenth century was appreciably motivated by its soldiers’ esprit de corps and 
common antipathy for rebels of all stripes, both in North America and at home. It 
is exaggeration to state that British army recruits scrambled to the Union flag when 
recruiting parties ‘beat up’ for volunteers in the years surrounding the Forty-five – 
especially in Scotland – but evidence suggests it is highly doubtful that the numbers 
of pressed Jacobite and British army soldiers were similar, nor were their methods 
of coercion.  In any case, when describing the makeup of Cumberland’s army at 187
 ‘A Narrative of the trials of rebel prisoners, on the King’s Commission of Oyer and Terminer, at the Court-184
House on St Margaret’s Hill, Southwark, 1746’, NLS Yule.25. See also Reid, 1745, pp. 199-200.
 P45 (i) pp. 119-132; Jarvis, Collected Papers (ii), pp. 255-256; SPS.54/32/46, 48, 49c, 50, 55; 54/33/6e, 185
23b; SPD.36/93/123-124; 36/89/272. Jacobite scholarship has not yet assessed the dismissals of alleged rebels 
deemed innocent by the courts or the conditions of their acquittals.
 Pittock, Myth, pp. 86-87; 92-93.186
 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1977), pp. 60-61; Matthew H. Spring, 187
With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (Norman, 
Oklahoma, 2008), pp. 103-137; Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 
1755-1763 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 57-58, 99-100, 112-118, 273-274. See also James Hayes, ‘The Royal House 
of Hanover and the British Army, 1714-1760’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 40:2 (1958), pp. 328-357. 
Houlding describes that British army impressment was specifically used to motivate voluntary recruiting, Fit for 
Service, pp. 116-18. As well, there is a mythological seed to the old maxim that professional loyalist soldiers 
fought with less ideological zeal than their revolutionary counterparts. There is room for a deeper study on the 
numerical comparison of pressed soldiers in both the British and Jacobite armies in 1745-6.
73
Culloden, Stuart Reid, a noted expert on the British army of the eighteenth 
century, definitively states that ‘with certain very clearly defined exceptions, 
enlistment into the ranks of the army was voluntary.’  188
While conceding that there were surely occurrences of Jacobite coercion, 
Murray Pittock appears hard-wired against accepting that force was a significant 
recruitment tactic (and therefore, motivator) used to bring men into arms during 
the Forty-five, summing up his position by stating ‘if there were examples of 
forcing on clan lands [...] there were counter-examples’. This offers little clarity in 
the matter, as does his claim that the feudal obligations of tenants in the Highlands, 
when threatened by fire and sword to rise with their chiefs and tacksmen, ‘can 
hardly be reduced to the name of “forcing”’.  In fact, some scholars claim that 189
impressment was barely present in the Central Highlands, and that in the Western 
Highlands it was categorically not present at all.  But we know there was 190
significant resentment of and resistance to levying activity in the Highlands 
regardless of whether it was Jacobite- or government-sanctioned, as military 
recruitment naturally took manpower away from communities where farming was 
intrinsic to their survival. In this manner, both parties threatened to undermine the 
agrarian economies of these Highland estates, and there are examples in 
Breadalbane, Lochaber, Stratherrick, and Glenmoriston of widespread fallowness in 
the years following the Forty-five due to ‘excessive Jacobite recruitment and a 
consequent lack of agricultural labour’.  With this in mind, it seems questionable 191
that tacksmen would willingly allow their holdings to suffer such financial decay for 
either redcoat or rebel. Business, even in the remoteness of the Highlands, 
continued. 
There can be no doubt that many Jacobite prisoners facing unthinkable 
punishment for their part in the rising claimed coercion with an eye toward saving 
their skins. But it is also prudent and sensible to take for granted that instances of 
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physical threats and blackmail can indeed be considered ‘force’, regardless of the 
context of the relationship between aggressor and victim. Being made to carry arms 
against the will of an individual is the very definition of being ‘forced out’. Vitally, 
it was not just the captured and condemned who noted the prevalence of these 
tactics after the fighting was over. Government intelligence from Atholl and Angus 
at the very beginning of the rising identified the large proportion of impelled 
soldiers.  Alexander McDonald, on the march with the Jacobite army at 192
Musselburgh, wrote to his father in late October 1745 that Lord Lewis Gordon was 
‘putting in to prisson all those that are not willing to Rise’.  Brushing aside these 193
claims as nothing more than indemnifying scapegoats is simply unrealistic. The 
question remains as to how widespread it was and what tactics were used to 
manipulate elements of the Scottish population into supporting the Jacobite 
military apparatus. 
Far from being a limited and negligible method of gathering Jacobite 
recruits, impressment and coercion during the Forty-five was widespread and 
significant. Bruce Lenman soberly considers that threats and force were not only 
the ‘standard methods’ of Jacobite recruiting, but entirely necessary to the 
continued survival of an army hard-pressed to obtain plentiful arms and funding, 
and with little outside support or a strong base of supply.  Whether this great 194
need for impressment and its cognate resistance from potential levies makes more 
of a statement about the inefficacy of the movement itself, or the resistance of the 
clansmen, farmers, and merchants targeted to support it, is debatable. In either 
case, ‘the impressment issue’ can no longer be ignored as a valid motivator when 
considering the Forty-five as a distinct movement or cause.  195
IDEOLOGY VERSUS PRACTICE 
As demonstrated by a great majority of the people who supported it, 
Jacobitism in the mid-eighteenth century was a blurry amalgam of different causes, 
frustrations, projections, and, at times, even excuses – ‘like fog around a lamp-
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post’.  It manifested common threads of protest and disaffection, including the 196
traditional Jacobite ideological causes of dynastic support for the Stuarts and an 
inspired nationalistic current that made it especially potent in Scotland. A majority 
of those who fought for the Jacobite cause in every significant rising were 
Episcopalian, and the non-juring clergy, while small in number, were likely 
responsible for gathering the most active support through the ‘creation and 
transmission of articulate Jacobite ideology’ in 1745.  But like in many theatres of 197
war, these ideologies were less important to the popular constituents who were 
alleged and accused of displaying traits of Jacobitism. 
Even in 1715, in which a decisive majority of the participants were allegedly 
motivated by opposition to the Union, the differing strains of both national and 
confessional incentive critically – and detrimentally – manufactured ‘chronic 
tension’ between them.  By 1745, the temporal distance from Union and the 198
mixed messages transmitted by the very heads of the movement deprived later 
Jacobitism of a consolidated, driving motive. In this way, it helps to think of an 
ideological kaleidoscope rather then a lens; a Jacobite mosaic instead of a portrait.  199
In the Scottish Highlands, where Jacobitism was commonly thought to have been 
bred and sheltered, the decision to come out in the Forty-five was not made along 
lines of religion or those of previous Jacobite sentiment, revealing cracks in the 
continuity of loyal tradition to the Stuarts.  Likewise, the common people did not 200
flock to Charles Edward’s standard in pursuit of the spirit of national ideal.  201
Instead, factors of commercialism and industrialisation, as well as specific 
practicalities germane to each clan’s chiefs and tacksmen were far more influential – 
and even then were not always adhered to by their tenants and family members. 
Agricultural issues were paramount to most who lived in a rural context and 
dictated many decisions to fight or stay home, and often times if the former was 
chosen it would not last beyond boundaries of locality or length of time separated 
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from subsistence.  The covert, sustained movement championed by Allan 202
Macinnes was kept in play by a segment of the Jacobite elite rather than the popular 
base of British citizens, disaffected in their attitude toward the government or not. 
The line between passive and active Jacobitism was one of commitment with known 
risk and Hanoverian criticism did not always equal Jacobite sentiment. 
Paul Monod describes the quality of Samuel Johnson’s Jacobitism, as well as 
that of numerous other elites, as 
a variegated and changing intellectual trait, which rose and fell in intensity. It was 
not simply a fixed or inherited “prejudice” [...] the Jacobite disposition was never 
as uniform or simplistic as its enemies made it out to be. Its characteristics were 
diverse; they might encompass passivity and aggression, strict hierarchalism and 
wild populism, a desire for conformity and an impulse towards radical 
opposition.  203
Charles’ tactic of keeping his cause explicitly open to a wide range of subscribers 
and fluctuating its focus to suit a broader base of support backfired to some extent, 
manifesting in a muddled purpose and some inherent doctrinal weaknesses. 
Significantly, that kaleidoscopic appeal was relevant to a similarly varied base of 
adherents who would finally follow him into war against the British state in 1745, 
willingly or not. This is borne out by the evidence that describes their varying 
motivations. As would be expected, what is seen within the plebeian majority is not 
so much a distinct expression of Jacobite beliefs and ideals than that of the elites, 
but more of an inconsistence of those beliefs and ideals. Of equal importance, the 
Forty-five shows no signs of having been a class-restricted revolt, as it featured both 
plebeian and patricians conspiring together in the name of the causes most relevant 
to them personally. 
Jacobitism had enough drawing power in 1745 to legitimately threaten the 
safety of the British state, however depleted or watered down in was by that time. 
Did an effective and defined Jacobite movement, then, really exist in 1745-6? 
Szechi definitively states that Jacobitism produced ‘a self-sustaining, recognisable 
minority who rejected the social, political and religious order installed after 1688’, 
though being careful to note that its various networks and ‘shifting clouds’ of 
representative opposition were ‘never as resolutely committed as the core group’.  204
If a majority of the participants displayed little doctrinal awareness of the 
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ideological causes of that revolutionary stimulus, instead being moved to arms by 
private economic misfortunes, congregational influence, violent coercion or 
blackmail, familial legacies, and personal loyalties to those with more understanding 
of the European political world and more stake in that world, would any counter-
movement versus the status quo have done the job?  It is not terribly helpful to 205
marginalise the rank-and-file, as do McLynn and Macinnes, by claiming that the 
footmen of a movement rarely reflect the whims of its leaders.  After all, the 206
common soldiers were punished alongside Jacobite elites due to their treasonous 
beliefs above all else, whether enacted themselves or simply through association 
with the real ‘movers and shakers’. If Jacobitism was an ideology of the elite but 
enacted predominantly by the commoners who were largely unaffected by the tides 
of politics and polemics, does that incapacitate the movement’s legitimacy as an 
effective agent of sweeping change?  207
Evidence suggests that to the people on the ground, Jacobite agency was not 
primarily reflected in dynasticism nor promises of dissolving the Union, however 
symbolic those shibboleths had been or how many had previously died ‘in the 
name’ of those causes. Even in his essential study of the Jacobite army, Pittock 
concedes through the film of Jacobitism-as-nationalism that not all Jacobite motives 
were patriotic: 
They did not fight to have the right to have Jacobite clubs, to drink healths, to 
restore the Royal Touch or cast latitudinarian bishops from the bench of the 
Church of England – they did not even fight to keep the Tories in power. The 
Jacobites who wanted these things by and large did not fight.  208
Whether those Jacobites actually fought or not will likely be forever out of reach, 
but they unquestionably suffered for all of these desires and more, just as those who 
were actually in arms. Pittock’s inference that somehow the true Jacobites were the 
only ones who fought, and when they fought, they did for Scotland, against Union, 
for the restoration of a king and the Episcopal religion, does not tell the whole 
story.  Yet it does point out the discrepancies between ideological and practical 209
 Lenman quips: ‘I do think that [...] those who did Jacobite deeds are historically more important than those 205
who only wrote and uttered Jacobite phrases. In fact one of the problems facing anyone who tries to recreate the 
mental values of active Jacobites is that, by and large, those who wrote most did not act, and those who acted 
wrote little, if anything’, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy’, p. 36.
 McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’, p. 122; Macinnes ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, pp. 82-85. See also Findlay, ‘Keeping 206
the Covenant’, p. 122 for a discussion of how elite principles cannot be taken for granted to represent the ‘values 
and ideas’ of the common people.
 Compare this with the French Revolution and its popularity across all social classes.207
 Pittock, Myth, pp. 177.208
 Ibid., pp. 177.209
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Jacobitism and how the two interacted and coexisted. The most critically distinctive 
quality of Jacobitism remains that its sentiments and actions did not always match, 
and that ‘the two were not always products of the same factors’.  If the Whig 210
government was meant to be considered a safe bet to promote the welfare of 
Britain, it can be said that Jacobitism was its ‘currency of resentment’.  211
 McCann, ‘Organisation’, p. xviii.210
 Martin Margulies, The Battle of Prestonpans, 1745 (Stroud, 2007), p. 47.211
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CHAPTER III: CONSTITUENCY 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REPRESENTATION 
Like many political causes and revolutionary movements, Jacobitism was 
demonstrated in varying degrees by its supporters both ideologically and 
practically, in both public and private manners. By 1745, the numerous motivations 
behind Jacobite adherence had been intermittently but actively asserted for over 
half a century across two major risings and one minor military rising – all of them 
either never getting off the ground or failing with disastrous consequences for the 
dissidents. Yet through the eyes of the established government, Jacobitism was the 
prime threat and perpetual bugbear to the safety of the domestic status quo from 
the transfer of power after the Glorious Revolution, past the rocky settlement of 
Union, and into the distracting War of Austrian Succession on the Continent.  1
Though the Jacobites never gained enough military or political momentum to 
derail the standing administrations against which they rallied, the punishments for 
what was plainly considered treason were leveraged accordingly, however 
ineffectively, after the failure of previous risings.   2
When considering how to measure the broad scope of the Jacobite 
constituency in 1745, then, a key factor to include is that a significant proportion of 
opposition ideology was at dire risk simply by being demonstrated.  As is true of 3
any revolution, it is likely that the majority of Jacobite participants in the Forty-five 
understood that there would be serious repercussions if the endeavour were to fail, 
which must have informed the nature of their commitment.  As Monod observes, 4
most of those inclined toward Jacobitism were therefore disinclined to take up 
 Nicholas Rogers states that ‘behind every demonstration Whig spokesmen saw the hidden hand of Jacobitism’, 1
‘Riot and Popular Jacobitism’, p. 72.
 Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, pp. 118-129; Szechi, 1715, pp. 57; 199-229; Lenman, 2
Jacobite Risings in Britain, pp. 155-179; 260-282; Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, pp. 3-4. See also P45 
(i), chapters VII-VIII for a comprehensive, if dated, examination of the judicial process and legal response during 
and after the last rising. Punishment is further explored in Chapter V: Consequences.
 David Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh & London, 2002) p. 51.3
 An anonymous writer noted that an associate might indeed be safer with the army than at home: ‘to tell you ye 4
truth I’m in terrour for ye wild people in our countrey when ye Prince leaves Scotland’ (31 October, 1745), SPS.
54/26/148; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 308.
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arms.  In addition to rendering the constituency in general more difficult to 5
quantify, this also calls attention to the presence of those who expressed their 
sentiment privately amongst trusted friends and family, or even secretly, either 
alone or within clandestine networks both local and international. Those with 
moral, emotional, or historical sympathies who accordingly chose not to act upon 
them publicly, however talking a good game within the safety of the club or pub, 
are difficult to identify due to the absence of their obvious recorded contributions. 
They would not be listed in any muster roll nor would they be found amongst the 
dead and wounded after one of the major battles of the Forty-five. Likewise, they 
would not write any inspiring political treatise nor sermon from the pulpit 
encouraging others to march to London and restore their deposed rightful king. 
Instead, clandestine fraternities and secret societies provided an outlet for seditious 
discussion and disaffection to be expressed amongst like-minded members, which 
‘fostered a sense of shared vision and purpose’, especially to diasporic communities 
abroad.  Such secretive forms of dissension might not have been physically explicit, 6
but these seditious activities if discovered and brought to trial were still punishable 
by death. Many different strains of subversion could be and were condemned as 
high treason, whether overtly ‘Jacobite’ or not.  Even carrying such a risk, however, 7
these commitments to Jacobitism did not indulge the overarching needs of the 
movement’s leaders, which ultimately was martial manpower and materiel.  8
Measurements of the gains furthered by clandestine societies and clubs are 
decidedly nebulous. Nonetheless, active but secretive social networks of political 
dissension and discussion should not be underestimated as a valuable agency to 
spread and carry ideas within what Steve Murdoch terms ‘a community of minds 
and interest’.  Pittock shrewdly maintains that there is tremendous importance to 9
the study of Jacobitism beyond what is preserved in documentary evidence of armed 
 Ibid., p. 308.5
 Collis, ‘To a Fair Meeting on the Green’, p. 130; Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, p. 94.6
 Szechi, 1715, p. 57; Monod, et al., ‘Loyalty and Identity’, p. 4; Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, pp. 4-11; 7
Monod comments that non-rebellious sedition was ‘legally indistinct from other forms of high treason’, Jacobitism 
and the English People, p. 308. See also Anna Battigelli and Laura M. Stevens, ‘Eighteenth-Century Women and 
English Catholicism’ in Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, 31:1-2 (Spring-Fall 2012), pp. 7-32.
 Demonstrations of popular unrest were not likely seen as vital or even attractive to Jacobite strategies due to 8
distrust of ‘the political sympathies of the common people’, Rogers, ‘Riot and Popular Jacobitism’, pp. 72-73.
 Murdoch, Network North, pp. 329-345; Murdoch, ‘Tilting at Windmills’, pp. 243-264; Steve Murdoch, ‘Des 9
réseaux de conspiration dans le Nord? Une étude de la franc-maçonnerie jacobite et hanovrienne en Scandinavie 
et en Russie, 1688-1746’ in Politica Hermetica, 24 (2010), pp. 29-56. See also Pittock, Material Culture and 
Sedition, pp. 93-121; Robert Collis, ‘Jacobite Networks, Freemasonry and Fraternal Sociability and Their Influence 
in Russia, 1714-1740’ in Politica Hermetica, 24 (2010), pp. 89-99; Collis, ‘To a Fair Meeting on the Green’, pp. 
125-138.
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insurrection and exiled correspondence. Rather, he forwards, such study should 
require 
careful exploration of a private, personal and associational world, deliberately 
assembled to minimise the risk of prosecution under constructively extensible 
legislation. There are different dimensions to this exploration: diasporic, 
associational, cultural and memorial.  10
If these dimensions appear to be marginalised here, it is simply due to the fact that 
communication of ideas through the use of Jacobite symbolism and secretive 
meeting houses was largely undertaken in the realm of elite society.  As Monod has 11
proven, however, it was the middling and lower classes that protested in the open 
and who maintained ‘the tradition of Jacobite unrest’, despite its ultimate limpness. 
Likewise, it was those classes who were primarily, but not exclusively, accused and 
convicted of sedition in the first half of the eighteenth century for engaging in such 
activities.  Critically, and despite these expressions of discontent through seditious 12
behaviour and the ‘popular currency’ of ideological polemic, there was no other 
effective institutionalised manifestation of late Jacobitism other than the army of 
Charles Edward Stuart.  The flicker of unofficial political association with the 13
Tory party burned out by 1722 and was never really accessible to plebeian 
dissenters even during its livelier days.  However often cries for a return to Stuart 14
rule stippled popular protests as the century wore on, Jacobitism failed to provide a 
base platform from which riots and organised unrest could be ignited. Rather, it 
was intermittent and disjointed elements of Jacobite ideology that rode the 
 Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, p. 12. See the importance of songs and poems in Ruth Perry, ‘“The 10
Finest Ballads”: Women’s Oral Traditions in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’ in Eighteenth-Century Life, 32:2 (Spring 
2008), pp. 81-97.
 See for example, Murdoch, ‘Tilting at Windmills’, p. 255; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 46, 11
207; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 72.
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 95-96, 244-255; Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, pp. 12
19-20.
 Monod states that the Stuart court was the movement’s only institutional structure, Jacobitism and the English 13
People, p. 95. By 1745, however, the army was a far more effective agency and really the only plausible measure 
of Jacobite success on a grass-roots level. See Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 77 for the idea of polemic as 
popular currency.
 Szechi, The Jacobites, pp. 1-6; Lenman, The Jacobite Cause, pp. 44-46; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, pp. 14
70-72; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ‘Forty-Five: A Note’ in The Historical Journal, 30:4 
(1987) pp. 921-931; Frank McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’ pp. 107-108, 119; Eveline Cruickshanks, Political 
Untouchables: The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979); Daniel Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory Politics 1710-14 
(Edinburgh, 1984); Charles Dudgeon, ‘Were the Tories Jacobites?’ in Conservative History Journal, 7 (Winter 
2008), pp. 10-12; Nicholas Rogers, ‘Popular Jacobitism in Provincial Context’ in Cruickshanks and Black, The 
Jacobite Challenge, p. 132.
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momentum of such disturbances.  Clandestine networks existed but generally 15
remained clandestine and due to their secrecy, size, and composition would not 
efficaciously penetrate the establishment without decisive grass-roots action.  The 16
revolutionary-minded Jacobins may have had up to 8000 lodges throughout France 
by 1799, but the Jacobites in Britain and Europe were nowhere near as organised or 
established at any time during their existence, and especially not by 1745, when the 
cause was most fragmented and when Jacobite political influence was at its nadir.  17
The two movements are not necessarily cognate, but the comparison serves as an 
illustrative juxtaposition of relative opposition constituency during a similar age of 
unrest. 
In contrast, those who publicly demonstrated their Jacobite allegiance 
through open rebellion are easier to survey and calculate. Their names are recorded 
in regimental lists and are revealed by witnesses who claim to have seen them 
recruiting for the rebel army, extracting land taxes from rural farms, or toasting the 
Prince Regent upon the mercat cross. Because openly marching in arms was really 
the only effectual dedication to the cause in 1745-6, participants were generally 
aware of what the consequence of a failed result might bring. Understandably, a 
significant number of soldiers claimed that they either never actually fired their 
weapons in anger or that they were dragged reluctantly into the fray by Jacobite 
recruiters.  Only thirty years before in the aftermath of the Great Rebellion of 18
1715, Szechi notes that most of the records and troop returns of that more 
populous Jacobite army were destroyed to favour anonymity and preserve safety, 
which now presents a troublesome barrier to accurate quantification and extensive 
demographic analyses of that constituency.  This was not the case with the Forty-19
five, though that fact is largely due to the British government’s fastidious and 
potent reaction to yet another Jacobite rising; especially one that was perceived to 
have come very close to spilling out onto the streets of London.  Great efforts were 20
 Whatley, Scottish Society, p. 188; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 229; Monod, Jacobitism and the 15
English People, pp. 122, 202. Monod’s research shows that specifically Jacobite-laced demonstrations and 
commemorations were likely more prevalent in England than in Scotland, ibid., pp. 195-232. 
 Again, the Order del Toboso is instructive. Of the established members who strongly associated with 16
Jacobitism, only a couple actually came out in the Forty-five, Murdoch, ‘Tilting at Windmills’, pp. 255-259; 
Macinnes, ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, pp. 247-249.
 Crane Brinton, The Jacobins: an Essay in the New History, (New York, 1957) pp. 38-40. See also John Brims, 17
‘From Reformers to “Jacobins”: The Scottish Association of the Friends of the People’ in T.M. Devine, ed., Conflict 
and Stability in Scottish Society, pp. 2-50.
 See Chapter IV: Recruitment and Chapter V: Consequences for more detailed information on these claims.18
 Szechi, 1715 p. 120.19
 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, p. 83; Jarvis, Collected Papers (ii), pp. 220-232.20
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taken through the campaign to ferret out those who might have contributed to the 
hostilities, whether marching in the army itself or otherwise supporting it in any 
manner.  Records of these efforts make up the bulk of what informs our knowledge 21
of Jacobite support in 1745-6. As noted in the Introduction, however, the 
directories in which they are published are incomplete and decidedly limited in 
their scope. What hampers these directories most is their inherent focus on 
captured prisoners or soldiers-in-arms from the Jacobite army – the very public 
sector of its expression. To illustrate the larger picture of Jacobite support, these 
sources should therefore be built upon by adding recorded semi-private and private 
expressions of Jacobitism where available, as well as those involved in civilian 
aspects of the cause, moving beyond military ranks and regiments alone. This is of 
course easier said than done, and due to issues of space, this chapter must concern 
itself mostly with public expressions, whether civilian or military. 
Adding to the innate difficulties in cross-referencing differing historical lists 
of persons drawn from the many references that house them, there lies the problem 
of verification. Calculating numbers alone without linking names and 
prosopographical data to those numbers is ultimately unconvincing and offers a 
limited analysis. With these challenges in mind, how can we assess – and reassess – 
the scope of Jacobite support in its last period of effective expression? The logical 
place to start is by reviewing hard numbers. There is currently no precedent for 
population statistics that offer estimates of non-military Jacobite support, either 
within Scotland, the Three Kingdoms of Britain and Ireland, or internationally as a 
whole. Expectedly, the bulk of applicable data comes from and centres on Scotland, 
where the most arduous government ‘bookkeeping’ was done during and after the 
Forty-five. It is also indisputable that Scotland by far contributed the most support 
to the Jacobite cause, both in terms of fighting men and materiel.  With the 22
exception of a very few instances, the trials of incarcerated Scottish Jacobites took 
place in England, away from any potential local favourability, and the fact that 
retribution for Jacobite depredations was specifically leveraged upon Scottish 
 These are explored throughout Chapter V: Consequences.21
 Szechi comments ‘when push came to shove the Stuarts could rely only on the Scots and the Irish’, 1715, p. 22
259; Szechi, ‘Cam Ye O’er Frae France?’, p. 359. Macinnes contentiously states that ‘whereas the English drank 
for Jacobitism and the Irish dreamt of Jacobitism, the Scots died for Jacobitism’, ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, p. 230. It 
should be understood that the Scottish focus of this study neither indicates nor belies a Scottish bias. Indeed it has 
been posited on many occasions that the absence of more international support is, ironically, why the Jacobite 
effort never succeeded. See McLynn, for example, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745, pp. 230-236.
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estates and communities is indicative of government concern about their reach and 
their control of seditious pockets in North Britain. 
MILITARY MIGHT AND CIVILIAN LOGISTICS 
In the sphere of the military, historiographical tallies of the Jacobite army 
show a significant range of variance. Contemporary government accounts often 
overestimated rather than marginalised the size of the forces, both from intelligence 
and after-action reports; following on the heels of significant defeats at Prestonpans 
and Falkirk, this only makes sense. This also had an intended effect created by 
Jacobite strategists who deliberately marched and deployed units in particular 
manners to confuse and inflate the counts of government officials and their civilian 
informants.  Things are made less clear both within existing Jacobite musters and 23
lists of prisoners by the fact that many units were merged through the campaign, 
with some soldiers being listed more than once amidst different units.  Most 24
regimental estimates, both contemporary and modern, are given as clean, rounded 
numbers with very few actual registers of named personnel to support them, and 
numerous companies within certain regiments have been counted twice, if not 
more.  That so many soldiers shared common names – especially within the 25
Gàidhealtachd – complicates things even farther and has historically skewed attempts 
to come up with an accurate count of both army and regiment.  Contemporary 26
muster rolls carried by Jacobite quartermasters did exist, though only some have 
survived.  Despite these many problems, historians have generally come to agree 27
on an estimated size of Jacobite military support in 1745. 
 Duffy, The ’45, pp.109-123, 136-138, 206, 283-288; Reid, 1745, pp. 86-88; Pittock, Myth, pp. 75-76, 98-99. 23
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 Pittock, Myth, p. 80.24
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Jean McCann’s study of the organisation of the Charles Edward Stuart’s 
Jacobite army, subsequently buttressed by Murray Pittock in The Myth of the Jacobite 
Clans, places the total at the army’s apex between roughly 12,500 and 14,000 both 
on and off the field, though its operational strength probably never exceeded 9000 
at any one time.  Scotland’s population on the eve of the Forty-five stood around 28
1.25 million, therefore using the high-end of this estimate as a measure of Jacobite 
support in 1745-6 would result in 1.14% of the total population of Scotland in arms 
against the British government, or around 4.4% of the adult male population.  29
This calculation of population percentage does not take into consideration the 
Manchester Regiment or the number of English, Irish, and Continental nationals in 
French service who were engaged in the affair alongside (and sometimes within) 
Highland and Lowland units. These numbers initially suggest the Forty-five was 
not a particularly popular or populous rising, especially when compared with other 
eighteenth-century revolutionary movements.  30
Thirty years earlier, though the population of Scotland was not significantly 
less, a greater showing of participants rose in arms for the Jacobites – likely between 
8000 and 10,000 more. This amounts to nearly double the adult male population 
percentage of Scotland as assessed by Daniel Szechi in his seminal work on the 
Fifteen.  This was in part due to the wider net of influence cast by a greater 31
number of nobles than during the Forty-five, a less diluted solidarity of projected 
cause, and its temporal proximity to the Union.  Looking backward to the 32
 McCann,‘Organisation’, pp. x-xi; Pittock, Myth, p. 70-86. The figure of 9000 reflects likely numbers before 28
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seventeenth century, Pittock offers the example of the Covenanting movement as a 
statistical gauge that shares a common reading with that of the Forty-five: that both 
respective armies ‘represented the maximum effective fencible force that Scotland 
could field’.  Intended as criticism of the historiographical marginalisation of the 33
Jacobite army’s size, however, it does not create an effective reading of the 
popularity of Jacobite or Covenanting support, especially when Pittock concedes 
that to reach that ‘maximum’ threshold, the numbers of Scottish Covenanters must 
be combined with that of their Royalist foes.  Most importantly, it is known that 34
numbers of Covenanting troops raised in Scotland in 1644 alone far exceeded both 
Jacobite and Hanoverian armies combined respectively in both the Fifteen and the 
Forty-five, however fluctuating across at least twelve different armies with differing 
political agendas.  Perhaps more pressing than the question of relative sizes of the 35
armies raised in Scotland either against (in the 1640s) or for (in the 1740s) the 
Stuarts is querying the ability of Jacobitism to penetrate the imaginations and 
consciousness of those not inclined toward the Hanoverian government, both 
within and outwith its prime battleground.  Yet identifying the composition of the 36
army is not a valueless task, as it bears the proof of how Jacobitism’s various appeals 
took hold of the 1.14% of the population who contributed militarily. Not all 
Jacobites, though, were represented within Charles Edward’s army. Likewise, not 
everyone in the army would necessarily describe themselves as a Jacobite. The 
problem with drawing these variable lines of classification, of course, is that very 
little data has been gathered for numbers of those not directly involved in arms. To 
address this disparity, a reassessment of popularity based upon quantifiable data for 
both military and civilian dedication should be carried out. 
 Pittock, Myth, pp. 55, 65-67, 78.33
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While being more difficult to track, civilian support for Jacobite aims both 
urban and rural was not insignificant, and a picture of how that support was 
manifested can be illustrated. Evidence suggests this was an essential component of 
the last rising’s success (as well as contributing to many of its challenges), and 
therefore a summary will be helpful to weigh the value of civilian Jacobite 
participation.  Speaking about the Fifteen, Szechi estimates that when considering 37
the number of civilian lives touched by rebellion, as much as half of Scotland’s 
population may be legitimately factored in.  This is not difficult to envision when 38
simply thinking about the countless family members left at home while their able-
bodied kin marched away to war. Regardless of ideological basis or the specific 
reason for their loved ones’ enlistment, those on the home front gave what support 
they could, even if it was just a short written response to the rare letter delivered 
while on campaign. Patrick Sharp wrote to his brother William who was on the 
march with the Strathbogie Battalion, confessing that his brother’s absence was 
‘very disagreeable’ to him. Offering William advice not to go into England but to 
remain in a Scottish garrison, Patrick explained the only reason he was not there 
with his sibling was due to his health, and that he hoped to be able to join him ‘if 
we both live till the Spring’. Until then, the family offered to send him anything he 
might need, including a shirt from their sister.  William Sharp did not heed his 39
brother’s advice and was left behind by the Jacobite army at Carlisle, after which 
time he was captured, arraigned, and transported to Antigua in May 1747.  40
Alexander Lawson was arrested for harbouring his brother John in his 
Aberdeenshire home shortly after the Battle of Culloden. Despite not being in arms 
himself and strongly encouraging his brother to surrender himself, Lawson was 
seized by the town guard and imprisoned in the tolbooth of Aberdeen for six weeks. 
He was only released after drawing attestations of his bad health from the local 
minister and surgeon, and was discharged under the pledge of 200 marks for bail.  41
These brief examples of civilian support, taking the form of supplies sent from 
home and the willingness to physically harbour those on the run, are easily picked 
out of documentary evidence. If there is any doubt that this level of aiding and 
 Seton and Arnot state that of the many hundreds without military units represented in their compilation, likely 37
a large number of these were civilians and probably never carried arms, P45 (i), p. 152.
 Szechi terms this a projection of the ‘wider Scots experience’ in the rising, 1715, p. 126.38
 Patrick Sharp to William Sharp (22 October, 1745), SPS.54/26/122/33.39
 P45 (iii), pp. 308-309. 40
 List of Prisoners Presently in the Tolbooth of Aberdeen, ACA Parcel L/H/2; Examination of Alexander Lawson 41
(17 May, 1746), ACA Parcel L/I/17.
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abetting can be considered a demonstration of Jacobite sympathies, we only need 
look at the government response to such actions, which was to consider it 
tantamount to high treason. 
Finding civilians within government lists is also possible, however 
challenging. Only 300 of the 2579 of the names listed by the Commissioners of 
Excise, for example, are explicitly recorded as being prisoners, the rest not yet 
having been charged with a formal connection to the army. The entirety of this 
collection is pre-trial information, showing the magnitude of possible cases being 
thrown out due to lack of evidence or the inability of officials to locate those who 
went into hiding near their homes.  How many of these were actually non-42
combatants accused of seditious behaviour is difficult to determine, but a 
calculation of names without evidence of military involvement indicates about 10% 
of the total.  Extending this to the entire dataset raises the percentage to 40%, but 43
it should be noted that this does not necessarily only represent civilians with 
Jacobite sympathies. Many were simply taken on suspicion of collusion with the 
rebels, and surely many others served in arms but have no military record 
preserved. 
Those that are explicitly identifiable as sympathetic civilians range in their 
contribution and commitment to the cause. Most fall into one or more of a few 
distinct categories: logistics and supply, local administration, or bolstering morale. 
The most numerous of these assisted with the procurement of goods either urban 
or rural, like John Lumsden in Aberdeen, a farmer who ‘Bought & Furnisht Shoes 
for the Rebels’, and William Maxwell of Annandale, who provided horses for 
fleeing Jacobite officers shortly after the capitulation of Carlisle to government 
forces.  Others offered their services either intermittently or for the duration of the 44
campaign. Leith innkeeper James Reid took a commission from Charles Edward to 
provide the army’s horses with hay and stabling during its stay in Edinburgh, and 
William Verly at Alloa used his carpentry skills to build boats that helped the 
Jacobite army cross the Forth on 13 September 1745.  William Stephen helped the 45
army logistically by pointing out the most well-affected citizens of Elgin to be 
billeted upon, while James Ged assisted by printing documents for the use of the 
 In time, it is hoped that each of these cases could be tracked to find the extent of their judicial involvement.42
 This was calculated by excluding those with any indication of military service, having been seen in arms, or 43
otherwise noted as joining the Jacobite army during its march. 
 Rosebery’s List, pp. 12-13; 144-145.44
 Ibid., pp. 148-149, 254-255, 348-349, 340-341.45
89
Jacobite command in Edinburgh.  Other examples range from guiding rebel troops 46
through difficult terrain, helping carry crates of arms brought in from foreign 
vessels, providing intelligence on British army movements, requisitioning carts for 
the transport of goods and materiel, and running general errands. 
While the anaemic civilian administrations (implemented and overseen by 
the military) were anything but ‘comprehensive’, networks of civic officials were 
indeed put into place at strategic towns and burghs both in Scotland and England.  47
Administrative positions (‘governors’) were appointed in Carlisle, Perth, Crieff, 
Montrose, Arbroath, Aberdeen, Brechin, and Dundee. County sheriff officers 
(‘Lord Lieutenants’) were introduced in Angus, Perth, Aberdeenshire, 
Kincardineshire, and Banffshire. Their duties ran from collecting rents to 
overseeing the recruitment of troops, and included dispensing local justice as befit 
the Jacobite occupation of such locales.  In addition to these civic officials, a 48
common description that repeatedly arises within government lists are those who 
held positions of lifting the public cess for the maintenance of the Jacobite army. At 
least sixty-five identifiable persons are noted to have contributed in the raising of 
these taxes in an official capacity, and they are generally labelled as rebel officers of 
the customs and excise. To these may be added six tidesmen or ‘tide waiters’ and at 
least two-dozen salt watchmen from the Haddington area who operated in a similar 
capacity while the army was billeted in Duddingston, just outside of Edinburgh.  49
Because the gathering of these monies would usually be undertaken in parties (both 
in the vicinity of the Jacobite army while on the march and in civilian areas 
established as ‘taken’ territory), there were likely many more actual collectors who 
were mobilised.  While there are distinctions between customs, excise, and cess 50
taxes in the Jacobite lexicon, many of these officers had indeed doubled-up on their 
 Ibid., pp. 126-127; P45 (ii), pp. 222-223. Ged is sometimes listed as being in the Duke of Perth’s regiment, but 46
he clearly also used the skills of his trade during the army’s occupation of Edinburgh. Note that he was sentenced 
to death but this was reduced to transportation due to his father’s printing innovations, SPD.36/99/65-66.
 Pittock, Myth, p. 71 (quoting NRS GD.190/3/294/1); McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England, pp. 29-30; 47
Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 257.
 JDB1745 search on the occupation authorities: Governor; Town Officer, General. German, ‘Jacobitism in the 48
North-East’, pp. 159-163; Patrick, ‘Dundee in the ’45’, pp. 102-104; TNA TS.11/760/2361/82-3; Arbuthnot of 
Findowrie Papers, SPS.54/26/123a.
 JDB1745 search on the occupation authorities: Tax Collector, General; Excise; Customs; Cess. Also included are 49
those with such a description within their Acts of Rebellion. For example, Rosebery’s List, pp. 6-21; P45 (iii), pp. 
354-355.
 John Archibald’s testimony against Alexander Christie, for example, notes that ‘a French Officer and a Party of 50
50 Armed Rebels’ were sent out to impress horses and carts in Perth, TNA TS.11/760/2361/50-1. See also 
Petition of Sir James Kinloch, SPS.54/26/180. Rupert Jarvis provides an excellent chapter on the raising of public 
monies in England, Collected Papers (i), pp. 175-194.
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duties.  Conflicts between Jacobite excisemen, whose backgrounds were often 51
rooted in smuggling and who displayed resentment for post-Union customs laws, 
and those appointed by the government (called ‘King George’s Beagles’ in 
Aberdeen) were common and often incendiary. Disaffected merchants sometimes 
joined the fray as an opportunity to express frustration with unfavourable tax 
demands.   52
Also of significance to civilian Jacobite support were those that openly 
spread advocacy through public displays of seditious behaviour. Over 120 people 
were arraigned for high treason due to being seen or heard uttering treasonable 
words or drinking to the health of the Prince. In Lethendy, William Greenhill 
accused King George of being an adulterer and John Craig of Forfar was heard 
publicly calling him a usurper. Charles Falconer spouted anti-Hanoverian speeches 
at Inverness, and in Fordoun, Thomas Ley forcefully made others drink treasonable 
healths while cursing the name of the king.  At least ten individuals were turned in 53
for having read Jacobite manifestos in public, usually at a town’s mercat cross, and 
this happened in Kendal, Carlisle, Aberdeen, Stonehaven, Montrose, Fordoun, and 
St Andrews.  Several non-juring ministers were accused of preaching seditious 54
sermons ‘to excite His Majesties Subjects to Rebellion’ in Forfar, Haddington, and 
at a number of towns in England.  This last segment of civilian support – those 55
who expressed disaffection verbally rather than martially – would seem to fall in line 
with the earlier assessment regarding the limited potency of Jacobite ideology 
alone. The practicality of their actions, however, was seen as equally subversive as 
that of rebel soldiers known to have been in arms.  Relevant to this, Lenman 56
describes the Scottish Episcopal clergy as an exceptional case of those who not only 
 McCann notes, however, that officers employed in the task of collecting cess were generally of a higher social 51
station than those who gathered excise and customs duties, ‘Organisation’, p. 168. See Chapter V: Consequences, 
p. 211-212.
 See, for example, Certificate for Francis Wilson (17 January, 1747), NLS MS.17530 f. 48; ‘Information Against 52
Andrew Walker and Walter Nicol’ reprinted in Albemarle Papers (i), pp. 109-110; Rosebery’s List, pp. 156-157. 
Pittock touches on the precedent for dissension and smuggling within the customs trades, Myth, pp. 124-125. See 
also German, ‘Jacobitism in the North-East’, p. 151 and Jarvis, Collected Papers (ii), pp. 50-51.
 Testimony of John Gilruith (23 February, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/5; SPS.54/35/5; SPD.36/93/125, 127; 53
Rosebery’s List, pp. 174-175; P45 (ii), pp. 140-141, 180-181. See Chapter II: Motivation, pp. 50-51.
 SPS.54/26/178; 54/32/37; 54/35/5; Rosebery’s List, pp. 14-15, 160-161, 178-179, 192-193; P45 (ii), pp. 54
106-107, 174-175; 274-275.
 SPS.54/35/5; SPD.36/88/34, 58; Rosebery’s List, pp. 138-139, 234-235; Deconink-Brossard, ‘The Churches 55
and the ’45’, pp. 253-262. More on non-juring ministers is discussed later in this chapter and also in Chapter V: 
Consequences, p. 224.
 For ideology versus practicality, see Chapter II: Motivation, pp. 75-79. For government responses to subversive 56
utterances versus responses to those in arms, see Chapter II: Motivation, pp. 50-51.
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‘wrote and uttered Jacobite phrases’ but also transmitted them with ‘political 
militancy’, perhaps navigating the ephemeral gulf between ideological and practical 
Jacobitism. They were not the only ones to manifest an effective balance of the two, 
but they were likely the largest group to do so.  A few of these ministers even 57
picked up weapons and marched along with the rebel army.  58
The willingness of civilians to support a rebellion without actively raising 
arms could perhaps be considered not as felonious to government expectations nor 
as consequential to Jacobite aims as those firing on British army soldiers upon the 
field of battle. This was not the case. Monod describes the adherence of about 
eighty civilians along the march from the Scottish border to Derby, commoners 
who aided the Jacobite army in some manner, though none appeared to have stayed 
with the main body for more than a couple of days.  While few, if any, of these 59
civilians were actually recruited into fighting units, they were still accused of 
treason by the government, brought up on charges, and found guilty after trial.  60
Their actions are as varied as the systems of support described above: ‘voluntarily 
providing [the Jacobites] with information, helping them collect excise taxes, 
fraternising with them or expressing support for them verbally’.  It is therefore 61
erroneous to necessarily equate ideological commitment with inaction or to 
consider it the domain of the elites alone.  As will be explored in the following 62
sections, the military arm of Jacobitism in 1745-6 benefitted from both civilian and 
martial support across class, sector, religion, and locale. Some of it was effective and 
some was less than so. The ways in which that support manifested may have not 
befit what Jacobite commanders expressly needed, or even what they demanded, 
and this is one of the enduring causes of why the Forty-five ultimately failed. 
 Lenman, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy’, pp. 36-37, 47.57
 For example, George Law (Stoneywood’s), P45 (ii), pp. 332-333 and Robert Lyon (Ogilvy’s), Albemarle Papers 58
(ii), pp. 399-400.
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 330-331.59
 List of Prisoners in the Castle of York, SPD.36/81/78-81; Account of Rebel Prisoners in the Several Goals of 60
England, SPD.36/81/69.
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 330-331; SPD.36/86/8; Jarvis, Collected Papers (i), p. 194; 61
P45 (i), pp. 139-143; Pittock, ‘Who were the Jacobites? The Pattern of Jacobite Support in 1745’ in Lynch, 
Jacobitism and the ’45, pp. 66-67.
 Whatley suggests, however, that the Whig government did not fear plebeian Jacobites ‘without patrician 62
leadership and endorsement’, Scottish Society, p. 188.
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SYSTEMS OF QUANTIFICATION 
There are many ways to classify and likewise to chart the demographic data 
that is under analysis in this study. Lines of measurement have been traditionally 
described by region; as microcosmic as by shire and village, and as macrocosmic as 
simply Highland or non-Highland.  Primary-source location records present some 63
problems that instil a few caveats and make additional analysis necessary, however. 
Onomastics is by its very nature a relative science, and the predilection for 
linguistic variance in place-names is significant. Samples of particular places and 
how they are regarded both by local inhabitants and outsiders looking in are often 
times in direct conflict, especially extended over prolonged periods of time. Spread 
out over at least four distinct language groups and liberally doused with folk-
etymologies as well as the common errors of eighteenth-century statesmen 
intending to confer written forms of orally-recognised locales, it only makes sense 
that tracking the origins and whereabouts of rurally-distributed Jacobites is a messy 
affair at best.  To contend with this, place-names in this study are nested at the 64
macro-level by country, county, and parish, where known. As the notations 
regarding locales of alleged Jacobites become more granular, the margin of error 
regarding accuracy increases. Therefore, individual farm-towns, steadings, and 
buildings will not be assessed in this study. Authority structures for place-name data 
have been undertaken by consulting contemporary maps and parish gazetteers 
surveyed in the years after the rising, buttressed by contextual information for each 
persona record where available.  65
Jacobite demographic data has also been assessed by faith as its major 
demarcation, with the popular understanding of eighteenth-century religious 
 Both Macinnes’ Clanship and Pittock’s Myth are instructive accounts that break down traditional barriers of 63
classification.
 David Dorward, Scotland’s Place-Names (Edinburgh, 1995), pp. 1-10. See also W.J. Watson, The History of 64
Celtic Place-Names of Scotland (Blackwood, 1926) and F.H. Nicolaisen, Scottish Place Names (Batsford, 1976). 
Of immense help in sorting out all of these variables is the ScotlandsPlaces project <http://
www.scotlandsplaces.gov.uk>, a collaborative, crowd-sourced codification of Scottish geographical data from 
historical documents.
 For examples of parish records and similar texts, see Francis H. Groome, Ordnance Gazetteer of Scotland: A 65
Survey of Scottish Topography (6 vols., Edinburgh, 1883); Anon., The Topographical, Statistical, and Historical 
Gazetteer of Scotland (2 vols., Edinburgh, et al., 1848); Samuel Lewis, A Topographical Dictionary of Scotland, 
Comprising the Several Counties, Islands, Cities, Burgh and Market Towns, Parishes, and Principal Villages 
(London, 1846). For examples of maps, see Herman Moll, Scotland divided into its Shires (London, 1745), NLS 
EMS.b.2.1/2; Anon., New mapp of Scotland or North Britain with considerable improvements according to the 
newest observations (London, 1746), NLS EMS.s.838; William Roy, Military Survey of Scotland, 1747-1755, 
K.Top.48.25-1.a.f.
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conflict falling into the unhelpful categories of either Catholic or Protestant. The 
discipline, however, has long ago firmly dispelled that myth in favour of a more 
precise assessment of Jacobitism being supported by Catholic and Episcopalian 
doctrine and clashing with the established Presbyterian Church of Scotland.  Faith 66
is understandably a difficult characteristic to track, and therefore prognosticated 
tallies of participating religious denominations are less revealing than is ideal. Due 
to the fact that such a large proportion of Jacobite support in 1745-6 was 
Episcopalian (and of that, mostly non-juring) and such great pains were taken to 
disperse unregistered Episcopal congregations in order to snuff out ‘nurseries and 
schools of Jacobitism’ within them, it makes sense that captured Jacobites of 
dissenting faith would not want to make the crime any worse by revealing it to the 
authorities.  Withholding confessional allegiances hardly mattered, though, as the 67
connection between Jacobitism, popery, and the non-jurors had been firmly 
cemented long before 1745.  Still, a modern assessment of Jacobite faith using 68
granular data has not yet been undertaken, and despite the paucity of evidence, 
contributions to this area should be welcomed. 
Though the Old Statistical Accounts have addressed the vocational trends of 
individual parishes in 1791, occupational data have not been closely examined by 
scholars of the Jacobite period, no doubt a product of historiography’s 
preoccupation with the subject’s elite culture. There are exceptions to this: a brief 
tally of the stated occupations present in Rosebery’s List which is also touched 
upon in passing by McCann, and a few pages specifically on doctors, lawyers, 
ministers, and seamen within The Prisoners of the ’45.  Murray Pittock contributes 69
with a number of publications that include some irregular surveys regarding the 
‘cross-class nature’ of Jacobite support.  While this is a productive start, there is far 70
more data available to be added into the sample and this optimally should be done 
 See Ian E. Butterworth’s ‘Episcopalians in Scotland 1689-1745’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 66
Aberdeen, 1978); Tristram Clarke’s ‘The Scottish Episcopalians, 1689-1720’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1987); Raffe, The Culture of Controversy; Roberts, ‘Roman Catholicism in the Highlands’; Macinnes, 
Clanship, etc.
 Fletcher to Newcastle (26 April, 1746), SPS.54/30/29a; ‘Some hints anent disarming the Highlands and 67
suppressing the Jacobites’ meeting houses’, SPS.54/30/30f; Act about the Nonjurant Meetings (8 June, 1746), 
NLS MS.17526 f. 230.
 Lenman, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy’, pp. 36, 39-40. Lenman dismisses previous attempts to measure 68
popular support of confessional populations during the Jacobite era, mostly due to lack of evidence, p. 39; Jones, 
The Main Stream of Jacobitism, p. 245; Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite Culture’, pp. 95-96.
 Rosebery’s List, pp. 361-362; McCann, ‘Organisation’, pp. 75-76, 95-97; P45 (i), pp. 217-228.69
 Pittock, Myth, p. 83-84, 113-114; ‘Who were the Jacobites?’, pp. 67-69; ‘The Social Composition of the 70
Jacobite Army in Scotland in the Forty Five’ in Royal Stuart Papers, 48 (1997), passim. McLynn also skims the 
topic in The Jacobite Army in England, p. 27-28, but he only uses Rosebery’s List for a snapshot of occupations.
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in a systematic manner. Occupation statistics were obviously deemed important 
enough by government officers to track within a large majority of their lists and 
records; in fact job descriptions are the most common kernel of notated 
information after name and location, more so than age or any other biographical 
detail. Though this was likely done for purposes of identification alone, it benefits 
historians by offering a chance to use that information in a variety of ways. At the 
very least, presenting a broad survey of these vocations comments upon social and 
economic patterns of Jacobite support and can address and challenge old maxims 
that characterise the Forty-five as an affair devoid of mercantile endorsement.  71
Due to the army’s primacy as the mouthpiece of the Jacobite cause in 
1745-6, a review of its organisation by regiment can be useful to measuring the 
scope of committed martial support. Extensive work on the Jacobite order-of-battle 
has been carried out and is reviewed in virtually every worthy military history of the 
campaign.  Critically, all of these reviews are presented from the top-down based 72
upon government intelligence and the post-conflict memorials of Jacobite 
commanders, as well as some participants and bystanders on both sides. The 
following section on the constituency by regiment is meant to reverse the view of 
Jacobite martial participation and test the military data collected at the persona 
level to measure it against traditional assessments of army composition and 
strength. 
Lastly, age and gender are briefly surveyed from the existing data; two of the 
prosopographical variables with the best recorded coverage. Therefore, one of the 
fortunate consequences of having such a large corpus of prisoners and detainees is 
that it provides a telling snapshot of the maturity of disaffected society in the mid-
eighteenth century. While the ages of Jacobite supporters both within and outwith 
the army are quite diverse, comparing trends of age with those of other eighteenth-
century military forces reveals much about the parameters of what was needed by – 
and what was provided to – Jacobite leadership. Though in 1745 it is a given that 
the overwhelming majority of rebel soldiers in arms were male, direct support of 
the army was undertaken by many women traveling along with the regiments, and 
those who were captured were incarcerated and treated as traitors with little 
deference to their gender. As will be seen, documentary evidence proves that the 
 Pittock, ‘Who were the Jacobites?’, p. 67; Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite Culture’, p. 100; George Pratt Insh, The 71
Scottish Jacobite Movement: A Study in Economic and Social Forces (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 89-90, 137; Richard 
Miller, ‘The Jacobite Mind’ in Modern Age, 23:1 (Winter 1979), p. 72; McLynn, ‘Issues and Motives’, pp. 
129-130.
 Reid, 1745; Duffy, The ’45, McCann, ‘Organisation’; Pittock, Myth, etc.72
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Jacobite effort undoubtedly benefitted from the support of plebeian women on the 
home front, whether that be a matter of logistics, supply, or simply morale.  
  
REGIONAL 
When possible, captured prisoners and those accused of treasonous activities 
had their locations recorded for purposes of individual identification, but it also 
conveniently pointed out areas of intransigence to the government where additional 
vigilance and reprisals could later be enacted. Though traditional assessments of 
Jacobite adherence have generally been tinted toward the Gàidhealtachd as having 
the deepest commitment, more recent scholarship has identified a majority of 
support as coming from the north-eastern Lowlands of Scotland, as well as Central 
Perthshire and Angus.  Indeed, even the published lists from the Commissioners of 73
Excise show a clear majority of 69.3% of the persons identified as coming from 
Aberdeenshire, Banffshire, Morayshire, and Angus.  Of worthy note regarding this 74
series of lists, however, is a lack of returns from the Gàidhealtachd (Argyll offering 
under 5% and Ross a little over the same amount), which obviously skews the 
results well away from a Highland primacy. As well, these lists are returns from 
officers based at high-traffic areas of the country, which means that the broad 
locational regions in which they are presented do not necessarily represent the 
actual residences of the persons described within. Notably, scholars generally have 
used such data as an indication of Jacobite military strength, but it is again worth 
mentioning that a significant quantity of government lists contain non-martial 
subjects, and this is rarely explained in such regional assessments.  Instead, a more 75
granular and systemic methodology should be assessed using a much wider sample 
of grass-roots data rather than trying to stretch to fit existing reports of regimental 
contribution or quantities of potential support.  
 Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 253; Pittock, Myth, pp. 78-81; Duffy, The ’45, p. 80. Macinnes notes 73
that 7000 clansmen mobilised for the Jacobites in 1745-6, about 48% of the total potential of serviceable men in 
the Highlands. Conversely, Whig support from the clans was never more than one-third of this number, Clanship, 
p. 182. See also McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England, p. 27. The Taylers stated as early as 1928 that 
Aberdeenshire and Banffshire alone provided the army with as much as one-sixth of all Jacobite soldiers, Jacobites 
of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire, p. 418.
 Rosebery’s List, passim. It is worth noting that the distinction between Highland and Lowland in the north-74
eastern counties was often relative in the eighteenth century. Indeed, there were large tracts populated by 
Gàidhlig-speaking peoples, but for the purposes of this modern survey the counties are considered north-eastern. 
See Macinnes’ maps of clan territory in Clanship, pp. 242-246.
 Pittock, McCann, Duffy, and McLynn’s works, noted above, are specifically all analyses of the Jacobite army, 75
yet their sources most certainly also contain data for civilians.
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Some 62.6% of the included records are explicitly marked with location data 
(usually by government officials), though the accuracy naturally lessens as finer 
locales are measured. Some variance must also be allowed for those of a particular 
nationality that is different from their recorded country or locale. With these 
caveats stated, at the national level just over 90% of the measured Jacobite 
constituency is registered as coming from Scotland, 4.7% from England, 3.6% 
from France, and 1.3% from Ireland. To this are added a scattering of Spanish, 
Welsh, Flemish, and at least one Italian supporter.  Approximate county locations 76
can be found for 92.7% of this total. In Scotland, just over half of all constituents 
arises from the north-east (53% including Angus and Kincardine). The 
Gàidhealtachd provides no more than 30%, with the Lowland counties contributing 
the remaining 17%. These numbers differ from existing military analyses, showing 
considerably less support from the Western Highlands than is usually attributed.  77
This makes sense, however, as it was much easier for the King’s troops to 
apprehend suspected Jacobites in the north-east and the Lowlands, and no doubt a 
larger number of civilian cases are recorded in larger urban areas, very few of which 
are located north of the Highland line. The regions of Edinburgh and Montrose, 
for example, each provide over 300 cases, with nearly twice as many from the 
Dundee area. The towns and surroundings of Aberdeen and Inverness each host 
around 150. In England, Lancashire contributed an overwhelming 61.5% of 
English support, most of which would have been from the Manchester area. 
Northumberland, Cheshire, Cumberland, and Derbyshire combine to make up 
around 18%. Jacobite sympathies in Ireland are evenly distributed through a 
number of counties, however small their recorded numbers. Galway, Kildare, 
Meath, and Westmeath are popular origins for transplanted and captured Jacobites. 
Records that furnish finer location details may also be surveyed for a closer 
look at regional adherence. In the case of Angus, which was not only one of the 
most populous counties of Jacobite activity but also one of the most well-
documented, the constituency by parish can be mapped. Of the 2087 records from 
Forfarshire, 83% of these can be further reckoned by parish. Montrose, Brechin, 
Dundee, and Kirriemuir each provided around 10% of all Angus cases, followed 
 Compare the French and Irish segments here with the 7% of the Jacobite army cited in Chapter II: Motivation, 76
p. 67. See Appendix II: Jacobite Constituency by Nation 1745-6, fig. 1.
 See Appendix III: Jacobite Constituency in Scotland 1745-6, figs. 1-2. Note that this figure could be 77
moderately affected by the large numbers of Highlanders killed at Culloden, though sources made out before the 
battle are also consulted. For the purposes of this study, Perthshire is considered a split of 50% Highland and 50% 
Lowland. See Macinnes, Clanship, p. 163; Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie, pp. 21-22.
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closely behind by Arbroath, Lintrathen, Forfar, and Glamis. Kingoldrum and Airlie 
also contribute significantly, with an average of 5% each.  For Inverness-shire, 78
only about 37% of parishes are known from government records, with Urquhart 
and Glenmoriston furnishing over half of Jacobite support in that county. 
Kilmorack provides over 11% with the Isles producing around 13% of known 
rebels within Inverness-shire. Moidart, where the rising began, shows records for 
only 5% of the county, with Daviot at around 7%.  While this may cursorily be 79
undertaken for other regions both British and Continental, more data would need 
to be collected and more time would need to be devoted to such a project in order 
to yield substantive results. The larger numbers by Scottish county presented here 
are revealing, however, and ultimately show that while the Forty-five can be 
considered a national rising in terms of martial and non-martial contributions 
across Scotland – though definitively not with a Highland primacy – the 
constituency of popular support was indisputably international.  80
CONFESSIONAL 
Determining the faith of those involved in the Forty-five is by no means 
exact and only broad estimates may be made with any certainty. The doctrines of 
particular congregations and their alliance with or enmity toward the houses of 
Stuart and Hanover, however, are critically telling and offer empirical evidences of 
attachment and, therefore, possible incentives from taking part in rebellion or 
aiding the government in attempting to stop it. Few congregation lists from the 
period appear to survive, but a closer look at baptism records and minutes of the 
Episcopal Church and Kirk Sessions might go some way toward revealing 
confessional interests of those involved in the rising. In gathering data for the 
purposes of this study, explicit individual records of faith have proven to be the 
most slippery of attributes, therefore only a cursory survey can be presented at this 
time.  Still, it is enough to address (and perhaps, to some degree, challenge) the 81
usual endorsements of Jacobite adherence within the churches.  
 See Appendix IV: Jacobite Constituency in Angus and Inverness-shire 1745-6, fig. 1.78
 See Appendix IV: Jacobite Constituency in Angus and Inverness-shire 1745-6, fig. 2.79
 Pittock, ‘Who Were the Jacobites?’, p. 66; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 72.80
 Notably, only a handful of Episcopal and Roman Catholic clergy are addressed within P45 (i), pp. 221-224. The 81
faiths of the common soldiers and even of the other elites are not analysed.
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It is of course inaccurate to consider that ‘the Non-jurant Episcopalians 
were Jacobites to a man’, despite the inextricable link between the two institutions 
and the connectedness of ideological Jacobitism’s political and ecclesiastical goals.  82
A good test of this is put forth when examining the extant list of subscribers for a 
non-juring congregation on the eve of the Forty-five. Thomas Rattray’s Liturgy of 
St James, published in 1744 for a pro-usages Episcopalian audience, was written 
specifically to distinguish his service and the congregation’s ceremonies from that 
of the similar practices set out in the English Book of Common Prayer.  Rattray’s list 83
contains the names of 327 subscribers and one separate congregation, mostly from 
the north-east of Scotland, but also having sizeable representation in Fife and 
Perthshire; in England the subscribers were largely concentrated around 
Lancashire/Westmoreland, Cambridge, and Bedford.  While the demographic 84
data from this list does tend to reflect common patterns of regional support for 
Jacobitism, the two should not be conflated. Only thirty-three of Rattray’s 
subscribers (c.10%) are known to have actually come out in the rising the year after 
it was published, most of these from Perthshire and Aberdeenshire. The somewhat 
incongruent turnout can be explained by the fact that almost every subscriber to a 
person was from the elite, whereas the majority of military support during the 
Forty-five was composed of the middle and lower classes.  To further expound, the 85
large presence of peers, academics, and clergy does not represent what might be 
expected of a non-juring Episcopalian congregation hailing largely from 
traditionally Jacobite locales. Non-subscribing elites like Pitsligo and James Moir of 
Stoneywood were powerfully effective in raising troops in the same area of the 
country, but this does not seem to be the case for the persons on Rattray’s list, even 
with the presence of well-known men like James Drummond (Duke of Perth), 
 J.G. Fyfe, ‘Robert Forbes’ in Scottish Diaries and Memoirs 1746-1843 (Stirling, 1942), p. 19. Pittock suggests 82
that more than 70% of the principal clans were committed to Episcopalianism, Myth, p. 45; Macinnes, Clanship, 
pp. 76-80; German, ‘Jacobitism in the North-East’, pp. 180-182. Macinnes also identifies that in the Jacobite era 
less than 2% of all Scots were Catholic with the Highlands being 2/3 of that percentage; only five of the principal 
fifty Jacobite clans were Catholic, less than 20% of the total forces raised in the Forty-five being of that religion 
while over 75% were non-juring Episcopalians, from Clanship, pp. 174-176. Sankey and Szechi cite Lenman and 
Pittock’s earlier assessments that 30-40% of Episcopalian Scots lived either in the north-east or the Highlands, 
with the the north-east being half-composed of that faith, ‘Elite Culture’, p. 95.
 German, ‘Jacobitism in the North-East’, p. 86. In this context, pro-usage signifies the support of meaningful 83
confessional practices that were in accord with Rattray’s idea of a ‘primitive’ church. See ibid., pp. 82-83.
 Thomas Rattray, The Ancient Liturgy of the Church of Jerusalem, being the Liturgy of St. James (London, 84
1744).
 See Szechi, The Jacobites, pp. 19-20; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 270. Monod estimates 85
that only 1% of the elites in England were non-juring. There is no current estimate for like numbers in Scotland. 
See the following section on the occupational constituency, pp. 103.
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Viscount Strathallan, and John Arbuthnot. Kieran German explains that this might 
be partly defined by the fact that the debate over usages in non-juring Episcopal 
practices is largely the domain of the educated and clergy, and that the Jacobite 
support of non-juring usagers ‘was always conditional upon James surrendering 
prerogative powers’.  86
At least forty-nine Catholic and non-juring Episcopalian ministers, three 
bishops, and one precentor of a non-juring congregation were actively involved in 
the final rising.  As with Rattray’s subscribers, the majority of these ministers were 87
from the north-east, with significant representation also in Inverness-shire and 
Edinburgh. These include some recognisable names, such as the devoted minister 
Robert Forbes, who painstakingly collected for posterity heaps of documents and 
Jacobite ephemera during and after the campaign. The aforementioned English 
Episcopal minister Thomas Coppach became the chaplain for the Manchester 
Regiment and was executed as a traitor in October 1746, as was the Scottish 
Episcopal Robert Lyon for marching with Lord Ogilvy’s regiment and officiating 
dissenting public services in Perth.  The Reverend James Taylor, a non-juring 88
minister in Thurso, was taken prisoner after Culloden for allegedly collecting arms 
for the Jacobite army in his meeting house. After nearly dying in captivity, he was 
eventually released upon the favourable recommendations of no less than five 
Justices of the Peace.  The effects of the enduring link between the non-jurors and 89
Jacobitism is exemplified by Taylor’s capture, and government ire was squarely 
levelled at dissenting congregations after Culloden. Non-juring congregations were 
sought out and sundered, with twenty-seven meeting houses being destroyed in the 
counties of Angus, Aberdeen, and Moray alone. Many more throughout the 
country were chained and padlocked so they could not be used as houses of 
worship.  Significantly, Episcopal ministers were treated with a greater degree of 90
 German, ‘Jacobitism in the North-East’, pp. 112-113; Macinnes, ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, p. 233.86
 JDB search results. 59% were Episcopalian, 15% Catholic, 6% Jesuit, and 20% unknown. Compare this with 87
ten Episcopal and fifteen Roman Catholic clerics identified within P45 (i), pp. 221-224.
 Forbes’ collection was published as The Lyon in Mourning. For Coppach and Lyon, see Monod, Jacobitism and 88
the English People, pp. 333-336 and Mackintosh, The Muster Roll of Forfarshire, pp. 115-116, respectively.
 Petition of James Taylor (11 October, 1746), SPD.36/88/191; Certificate in favour of James Taylor (30 89
September, 1746), SPS.54/33/33.
 Edward Luscombe, Steps to Freedom: Laurencekirk, 1804 (Edinburgh, 2004), pp. 28-29; Memorandum 90
Concerning the Act Anent the Nonjurant Meeting Houses, 1746, NLS MS.17527 f. 123; Fletcher to Newcastle (13 
June, 1746), SPS.54/32/17; Letter from Humphrey Bland (14 December, 1747), NLS MS.3044 f. 123.
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harshness than their Roman Catholic counterparts, and this is borne out by the lack 
of any recorded executions of the latter in prison and trial records.  91
Evidence regarding the faiths of plebeian Jacobites is more difficult to find. 
Coll Macdonell of Barisdale wrote to Alexander Mackenzie of Dachmaluack in 
Ross-shire before the rebellion that he could raise five-hundred Roman Catholics 
from the estates of Glenmoriston, but those numbers cannot be verified, nor did 
they follow him in the autumn of 1745.  Most of the Irish soldiers in French 92
service were likely Catholic, though the four English troopers mentioned in the 
returns of FitzJames’ regiment are specifically noted as being Protestants.  Gilbert 93
Purdon of the Royal Ecossais is described as speaking ‘as good English as can be 
expected from an Irish papist’.  Mentions of religion in testimonies and 94
examinations are sometimes made, but the sparse frequency of this makes larger 
assessments impossible.  An exceptional list of Jacobite prisoners who were taken 95
in Carlisle during the waning days of 1745, however, provides an unexpected study. 
Out of 170 inmates, the majority (116 or 68.2%) are expressly noted as being 
affiliated with the Church of Scotland. Only thirty-eight are recorded as following 
Church of England (likely Episcopalian or Anglican), while thirteen are Roman 
Catholics, one is a Quaker, and two remaining names do not provide any religious 
detail.  If taken as a typical indication of faith within Jacobite ranks, this particular 96
list of prisoners does not scale with the greater evidence of the overwhelming 
Episcopalian constituency put forth as fact in most scholarly circles.  In order to 97
prevent the skewing of this analysis, however, further information should be 
included. By finding possible known locations of origin for these prisoners and 
cross-referencing it with their recruitment and regimental data, we find that the 
majority of those identified (59.3%) come from Aberdeenshire, Angus, and 
Perthshire – as would be expected based upon the known regional constituency of 
 See, for example, P45 (i), p. 224.91
 Barisdale to Mackenzie of Dachmaluack (21 March, 1744), NLS MS.7078 f. 1.92
 SPD.36/88/336-338.93
 P45 (iii), pp. 258-259. Hanoverian officials were conflicted whether Purdon was French or Irish, SPS.36/88/60.94
 See, for example, SPD.36/84/9-11 (Thomas Mayotts); PKA B59.30/72/1 (Edward Shower); SPD.36/81/73-75, 95
78-81; TNA TS.11/1080/5533. Only seven plebeians can be identified as ‘papists’ from JDB1745 searches. 
 Gildart to Sharpe (26 October 1746), SPD.36/88/33d. See Appendix V: Jacobite Constituency by Faith 96
1745-6, fig. 1.
 Macinnes comments that Scottish Presbyterians were ‘rarely participants in the Jacobite cause’ (Clanship, p. 97
173) and ‘no more than passive sympathisers with Jacobitism’ (‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 76). Harry Dickinson 
measures the Jacobite army of 1745 as 70% Episcopalian and 30% Catholic, leaving no room at all for followers 
of the Church of Scotland, ‘The Jacobite Challenge’ in Lynch, Jacobitism and the ’45, p. 21.
101
the Jacobite army. Yet at least 7% of the Presbyterians from this list are from 
distinctly Highland locales (Inverness, Argyll, Ross-shire), with the same 
percentage from other Lowland regions.  One of the reasons for the predominance 98
of these prisoners hailing from the north-east and Lowland Perthshire simply could 
be that relatively few Highlanders were left behind in the garrison of Carlisle, as 
they were considered to be the elite troops of the Jacobite army.  Still, the fact that 99
the clear majority of Jacobites taken there cited allegiance to the Church of 
Scotland is unexpected given the traditional association between the north-east and 
the Episcopal Church. 
Other evidence of Presbyterian Jacobites appear in examinations and 
petitions to the crown, and some of these are corroborated by their parish 
ministers. Walter Mitchell, who was kidnapped into the rising by Pitsligo’s 
recruiters, swore that he was ‘educated in the principles of the Church of Scotland’ 
and provided a certificate by the minister of the parish in which he was born.  100
William Cargill, a brewer in Montrose, declared that he had always attended public 
worship ‘with the Ministers of the Established Presbyterian Church having been 
educated that way’.  Apprehended by the King’s troops in Atholl for carrying 101
papers ‘with treasonable verses’, Daniel McLean claimed in his defence that he was 
the servant to the Reverend James Stewart, a Presbyterian minister in Argyll.  The 102
fervently pro-government John Bisset, minister at Aberdeen’s Presbyterian Church 
of St Nicholas, described in his journal a sermon he gave in early February 1746 in 
which numerous Jacobite soldiers attended, including many ‘common Highlanders 
[…] severals of the French, and not a few of their officers’.  Despite the 103
Hanoverian and Kirk propaganda that equated Jacobitism with popery while 
declaring the Church of Scotland as ‘the only true Friends to the King’, the 
government’s own evidence does not necessarily bear this out.  Whether these 104
 See Appendix VI: Jacobite Constituency, Faith by County 1745-6, figs. 1-3.98
 Szechi, 1715, p. 130; Duffy, The ’45, p. 105.99
 Petition of Walter Mitchell, SPD.36/88/66.100
 Examination of William Cargill (11 February, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/1.101
 Examination of Daniel McLean (13 February, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/1; P45 (iii), pp. 146-147.102
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Aberdeen, 1841), pp. 378-379.
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people were using the good graces of the Kirk as a shield against further 
repercussions or maintaining overt ties with parish ministers while covertly 
engaging with dissenting congregations is unknown. Like many points of conflict 
during the Forty-five, the lines of confessional interest are not completely opaque. 
A wider study of faith within explicitly Jacobite-leaning communities should 
therefore be open to the presence of significant pockets of Presbyterianism, 
regardless of its ideological incompatibilities with doctrinal Jacobitism. 
OCCUPATIONAL 
Vocational evidence is one of the more common attributes recorded by the 
government, and therefore an extensive collation of these can reveal a great deal 
about the social classes of the Jacobite constituency. Despite historiographic views 
that the risings were considered nothing but interruptions to all those concerned in 
the commercial trades, Pittock has cursorily shown that this is definitively not the 
case (at least in the north-east), with a strong showing of support from the 
mercantile sectors.  Further work can be done, however, across the most 105
committed regions of Britain. Not only does this inform the nature of participation, 
but it has the added benefit of describing popular economies in specific areas based 
upon the frequency of occupational appearance. The presence of twenty-four salt 
watchmen employed by the rebels in the Haddington area, for example, very plainly 
informs the strength of that local economy in East Lothian during the middle of 
the century.  Vocations have been recorded for around 63% of the total dataset 106
and it is therefore possible to illustrate a number of revelatory trends.  107
As expected, the largest sector represented within the Jacobite constituency 
is that of the rural farmer. Over 26% of recorded vocations are those relating to 
agricultural or otherwise agrarian duties. The large majority of these are either 
farm tenants or labourers (87.3%), with the remaining number made up of fishing, 
 Pittock, Myth, pp. 83-84; McCann, ‘Organisation’, pp. 95-96. Conversely, plenty of evidence exists that the 105
rising absolutely interrupted trade on both sides of the conflict. See, for example, Diary of Alexander Smith, UAL 
MS.3831/1 p. 122. See also Chapter V: Consequences, pp. 208-218.
 George Buchan-Hepburn, General View of the Agriculture and Rural Economy of East Lothian (Edinburgh, 106
1794), pp. 27-28, 72, 87-88.
 See Appendix VII: Jacobite Constituency by Occupation 1745-6, fig. 1. Though it was not undertaken for the 107
purposes of this study, it would be instructional to further compare Jacobite engagement against the total 
workforce percentages in each of the following occupational categories.
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herding, droving, or agricultural specialty trades.  In addition, forty persons are 108
specifically associated with being factors or grieves, and to this category tacksmen 
could be added. These are seen in large concentrations through Aberdeenshire, 
Angus, and Inverness-shire (which together make up around 54.7% of the total), 
with Perthshire and Ross also contributing a sizeable amount (13.4%).  To view 109
this in terms of even broader regions, of the known occupations of the alleged 
Jacobite constituency both military and civilian, the north-east contributed just 
under half of the total in the agricultural sector. The Highlands, in this case 
including half of the numbers from Perthshire, represents 27.8%, while the rest of 
the Lowlands make up around 5%. The remaining percentage come from England, 
with the highest concentration in Lancashire – which is fitting due to the sizeable 
regiment raised in the Manchester environs. A brief analysis of this sector suggests 
what is widely known: that large numbers of farm tenants and labourers were 
recruited into Jacobite regiments as the mainstay of the army, both in the 
Highlands and in the north-eastern Lowlands. Evidence of non-martial assistance is 
also available. Munro of Culcairn, for example, complained to Loudoun of the 
intransigent herds in Gairloch who repeatedly alerted hiding rebels to the presence 
of approaching government troops.  Of the twenty-four herdsmen found in 110
records, nearly a third were from Inverness-shire and at least half were north of the 
Highland line. 
The trades are also strongly represented, with manufacturers of goods 
representing 21.5% of the total of those known to be employed, with other traders 
or dealers consisting of an additional 10%.  Of the former, weavers are the most 111
populous (25.5%), followed by shoemakers (14.8%), tailors (11.8%), and brewers 
(10%). Significant numbers of coopers, clothing dyers, and smiths of various metals 
also make common appearances. Well over two-hundred generic merchants are 
accounted for, with specialist dealers like butchers, vintners, and innkeepers adding 
another hundred to that count. Itinerant tinkers and peddlers make up 14% of the 
total numbers in trading and dealing, mostly across the north-east and Perthshire, 
where terrain was more suitable for mobile sales. Merchants with fixed premises 
were concentrated in Aberdeenshire, Angus, and Midlothian, with large segments 
 Farm tenancy includes crofters, cottars, and husbandmen. Agricultural specialty trades in this case would 108
include foresting, falconing, horse-hiring, etc. See Appendix VIII: Jacobite Occupation by Sector 1745-6, fig. 1.
 Kincardine, Banff, and Argyll are represented with 8.5%109
 Munro of Culcairn to Loudoun (28 July, 1746), HL Box 38/LO 12337.110
 See Appendix VIII: Jacobite Occupation by Sector 1745-6, figs. 2-3.111
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also present in Kincardine, Moray, and Perthshire. Burghs were naturally the most 
populous residences for merchants of all trades, with towns like Edinburgh, 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Montrose, and Perth being commonly indicated. Exceptions 
are plentiful, of course: Ewen Cameron sold ale in Lochaber, Archibald Campbell 
owned a pub in Falkirk, and Alexander McKenzie provided snuff and tobacco for 
the small community of Logie in Ross, for example.  112
One of the more significant sectors of the constituency not always directly 
deployed in the field consisted of those in servitude to the soldiers and officers who 
were so. Those who were employed in service to others make up nearly 20% of all 
tallied Jacobite support. Most were most likely either labouring farm servants or 
those attending to particular trades as menial assistants.  Many others were in the 113
domestic service sector, following their masters on campaign as part of their 
contract or by compulsion. Over 600 servants are recorded in the first-tier sources 
alone including 240 domestic servants likely employed on farm estates or within the 
households of gentry.  From service at home to servitude on the march, the tasks 114
expected of them vary slightly but generally can be depicted by an array of duties, 
including baggage handling, caring for horses, stewarding, cooking, and gardening. 
Some used their skills and personal or occupational resources to help the Jacobite 
effort without actually rising in arms. Within the precognitions at Perth, for 
instance, numerous witnesses testified against the servants of known Jacobite 
combatants, physically seeing them assist their masters while billeting in private 
houses or directly before and after specific battles, though perhaps not taking the 
field themselves. John Crichton, assistant to gardener John Kennedy in Drummond 
and imprisoned in Perth Tolbooth by July of 1746, was sworn against by his fellow 
servant gardener Ann McGrigor. Though never seeing him in arms, she noticed 
that he was dressed in Highland clothing and taking orders from a rebel officer 
 P45 (ii), pp. 80-81, 88-89; ibid. (iii), pp. 114-115.112
 It is difficult to confidently separate the term ‘servant’ as used in the eighteenth-century from persons under 113
contract of tenancy to those of superior social rank. For the purposes of charting occupational sectors in this 
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with farm servitude rather than labour, T.M. Devine, ‘Scottish Farm Service in the Agricultural Revolution’ in T.M. 
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Leneman, Living in Atholl, pp. 60-62.
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when the Jacobites were drawn up in the courtyard of Drummond Castle.  Robert 115
Menzies, a merchant in Perth, recalls that he observed John Dow and John Kempie, 
servants to Lords Nairn and Gask, respectively, ‘attending their Masters Kempie 
wearing a white Cockade and done in Highland habit but did not See any of them 
bearing Arms’.  John Olton of Shropshire was captured by the King’s Dragoons 116
just a few miles outside of Perth before testifying on his own behalf that he did not 
carry arms, though he admittedly was engaged as a menial servant to a Scotsman 
called Mr Rollo whom he met on the way to London. Olton followed his new 
master northward on the retreat of the Jacobite army and stayed with him until 
Culloden, where Rollo, a captain in Elcho’s Lifeguards, was killed: ‘when he 
observed his Master fall he the Declarant fled and brought his masters horse and 
Clock bag with him […] Declares he did not Carry arms in the Rebel army.’  117
Personal servants, especially to officers, would no doubt be present at battles 
even if not in arms, as with John Olton, and many would be treated as full-fledged 
combatants once captured. Young David Morison (15) confessed that he served a 
Jacobite officer under duress and was discharged on bail on 17 June 1747. The 
aforementioned John Crichton was released under the General Pardon of 1747, 
John Dow and John Kempie were both transported, and Olton, listed as ‘a servant’ 
to Elcho in No Quarter Given, was delivered to Carlisle for trial before disappearing 
from record.  Each of these men has been counted as a soldier within estimates of 118
the fighting strength of the Jacobite army, but there is no evidence to show that any 
were in combat. Evan McDonald and Alexander Ferguson, however, did indeed 
march with Glengarry’s regiment, writing their wives from Musselburgh in late 
October 1745. In their letters, both men describe the importance of fulfilling their 
responsibilities to their respective masters; McDonald tells his wife ‘I think it both 
my duty and Interest to keep by my master’, and Ferguson explains ‘as we have at 
all times Stood by him our heart can not allow us to Leave him in the greatest 
Danger’.  119
As this again stresses, personal loyalties to those with prestige and station 
accounted for a significant number of martial and civilian recruits to the Jacobite 
cause – both within and outwith the Highlands. Around 15% of all recorded 
 Precognition of Ann McGrigor (26 July, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/5.115
 Deposition of Robert Menzies (14 July, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/4.116
 Examination of John Olton (21 April, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/2.117
 SPD.36/89/272 (prisoner #94); P45 (ii), pp. 134-135, 162-163, 212-213, 312-313; (iii), pp. 242-243.118
 SPS.54/26/122/19-20.119
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servants came from the Highlands and roughly the same amount from the 
Lowlands, with over half the total hailing from the north-east. This is buttressed 
when looking at the number of personal servants in Pitsligo’s regiment alone, 
where at least seventeen men attended to landed elites like Irvine of Drum, Menzies 
of Pitfodles, Hay of Rannes, and Gordons of Park and Carnousie.  Significantly, 120
some were already established in proprietary occupations before the conflict, like 
the Stonehaven merchant William Gibbon, who followed Pitfodels into the field at 
the age of 44. Alexander Forbes, a stabler in Peterhead, attended to William Scott 
of Auchtydonald from October of 1745, and Fraserburgh surgeon John 
Cruickshanks served as Pitsligo’s personal physician after joining the Jacobite army 
at Edinburgh. John Mitchell kept an ale-house in the Canongate before attending 
to Lord Elcho until the end of the Forty-five.  While it is not known what kind of 121
wages Dr Cruickshanks drew from his service to Elcho, it is unlikely that it would 
have eclipsed the income made from continuing to offer his services at home, and it 
can only be surmised that other proprietors with their own businesses would have 
failed to obtain any particular windfall from leaving their shops, inns, and alehouses 
behind. Nonetheless, the personal draw of popular elites appears to have been 
powerful enough to pull some away from their day-to-days, trading them in for a 
life on campaign, however short that might have been. Very few of these men were 
brought up on charges after their trials, either being pardoned or discharged with 
little evidence of punishment or transportation, which usually indicates they were 
not proven to be in arms during the rising. Alexander Gatt, for example, is present 
in the excise list from Banffshire as a servant to Carnousie, but there is no further 
documentation to show he was taken prisoner or punished for his part in the 
affair.  Whether ‘obliged to respect’ their masters through contract or 122
compulsion, or following their superiors from a sense of duty, those labeled 
‘servants’ by the government were at least as populous as 20% of total Jacobite 
support.  123
REGIMENTAL 
 NQG, pp. 60-62; James Mair, a chapman, also confessed to serving Carnousie but is not listed as being a part 120
of any military unit and was discharged after the rising, P45 (iii), pp. 6-7; SPD.36/89/272. 
 Based upon JDB persona searches. TNA TS.11/179/784; Rosebery’s List, pp. 88-91, 252-253, 340-341.121
 Taylers, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire, p. 199; Rosebery’s List, pp. 30-31.122
 Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite Culture’, pp. 93-95.123
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Excluding the obvious muster rolls within the dataset, only about 40% of 
collected records has distinct regimental information available for the subjects 
within. When including secondary sources specifically intended to cite regiments, 
that total rises to just under 70%. This indicates that while we have a competent 
measure of samples across Jacobite units as well as nearly-complete compositions of 
a few specific regiments, there is still a large proportion of those named that is 
either devoid of accurate military backgrounds or instead refers to civilians accused 
of treasonous activities. An example of this in the martial case suggests that the 
Chisholms of Strathglass in Glenmoriston under Roderick Og came to the field 
with between eighty and 150 men, though only nineteen of their names have been 
identified (12-23%). Even if the thirty noted as dying at Culloden are nameless 
(some of which are actually known) the great majority still lies unidentified.  124
Information about Lord Ogilvy’s Angus regiment, on the other hand, is much more 
complete. Of a rough peak of 900 soldiers at Falkirk, as many as 751 (83%) are 
named.  While it is not reasonable to expect to identify 100% of Jacobite 125
regimental rosters, it is hoped that the collection of primary sources will reveal 
more than is currently known about the makeup of these units. 
Government records regarding Jacobite regiments were generally accurate 
through the campaign. Though intelligence networks were troubled by a 
combination of misinformation and a lack of participation by the natives, official 
reports measuring the compositions of rebel units were more or less realistic.  126
With the capture of Jacobite soldiers and other non-combatants who served 
alongside the army, some records of regimental service survive. This was often 
guesswork in initial reports, as assessments from customs and excise officers show a 
distinct paucity of details. These usually provided what little information was 
known at the time about alleged rebels, including name, occupation, and rank, if 
available. Intermittent notes describe obvious regimental affiliations, like the 
Prince’s Life Guards, many of whom wore distinctive uniforms that were difficult 
to miss.  Early jail returns containing large numbers of prisoners held on suspicion 127
suffered from the same lack of intelligence, as some never took part in the rising 
 NQG, pp. 63-64; Duffy, The ’45, p. 571.124
 Mackintosh, The Muster Roll of Forfarshire, passim; NQG, pp. 93-115; Duffy, The ’45, p. 573.125
 See, for example, Return of the Jacobite Army (29 October, 1745), SPS.54/26/67 and 54/26/72b. More 126
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 See Rosebery’s List for the absence of regimental information. For primary sources, see Scottish Customs 127
Officers’ Lists of Persons Engaged in Rebellion, NLS MS.1918; MS.17522 ff. 1-34, 55, 83-87; 17524, etc. For the 
uniforms of the Life Guards, see Duffy, The ’45, pp. 574-575.
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and would therefore have no regimental connection to the army.  It was not until 128
the prisoners were interrogated and witnesses gave testimonies against them that 
more detailed information was filled in. Lists made up later during the judicial 
process are far more complete and attempt to connect each prisoner with a unit, if 
at all possible.  Occasionally significant segments or remnants of some entire 129
regiments surrendered in unison, giving the government an opportunity to record a 
snapshot of the Jacobite army’s constituency, rather than having to chase down the 
fleeing soldiers and relying on accrued testimony after long bouts of processing.  130
This could be especially useful as Jacobite fighting units were often malleable, 
blending together or breaking apart depending on the tactical or strategic needs of 
the moment. Smaller companies and even battalions sometimes oscillated between 
regiments and numerous soldiers also served in more than one unit at different 
times during the campaign.  131
Dedicated works focussed on military history have surveyed the rough 
composition of Jacobite army regiments, so the information presented here is 
largely concerned with the regimental composition of the included data rather than 
potential numbers. The largest regiments represented by lists of prisoners and 
those on suspicion of treason are Ogilvy’s (north-east/Lowland), Cromartie’s 
(Highland), Glengarry’s (Highland), Duke of Perth’s (Highland/Lowland mix), and 
the Manchester Regiment (England). Together these account for a little over 40% 
of all records appointed with regimental data.  Also of considerable size are Lord 132
Lewis Gordon’s regiment and the French and Irish regulars, including those 
captured at sea. The prevalence of these units in government records tend to signify 
either a sizeable body; significant numbers of captured, surrendered, or killed; or a 
combination thereof. Ogilvy’s and Glengarry’s for instance, were two of the larger 
regiments in the army (each around 900 at Falkirk), and therefore offered a larger 
propensity for capture and recording by government officers. In the case of the 
Irish picquets and the Manchester Regiment, their prominence is a symptom of 
widespread capture rather than size. Likewise, the Earl of Cromartie and most of 
 For instance, SPD.36/81/70-81; 36/88/50; TNA TS.20/52, 56, 60; etc., especially SPD.36/92/38.128
 For example, SPD.36/84/8-13, 100; 36/86/6-7; 36/88/60, etc.129
 List of the McGregors Surrendered to Mr Colquhoun, NLS MS.17523 f. 30; List of the Men in Kilmarnock’s 130
Troop of Horse, SPD.36/84/38; List of Mackintosh’s People, SPD.36/84/58; Return of FitzJames’ Regiment, SPD.
36/88/90-95.
 Pittock, Myth, p. 77; Duffy, The ’45, pp. 570-577; Reid, 1745, p. 202; Adam Hay served in Pitsligo’s Horse 131
before transferring to Stoneywood’s battalion of Lord Lewis Gordon’s Regiment, for example, P45 (ii), pp. 
278-279.
 See Appendix IX: Jacobite Constituency by Regiment 1745-6, fig. 4.132
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his unit surrendered at Dunrobin Castle the day before Culloden, though never 
eclipsing a total size of 300 men.  Cameron of Lochiel also had one of the largest 133
turnouts to the rising, yet relatively few have been identified probably because his 
men dissolved into the rough terrain of Lochaber after Culloden, with orders to 
retain their arms for a possible regrouping.  Glengarry’s, on the other hand, was 134
‘hit very hard’ on the left wing at Culloden, and large chunks of the regiment 
surrendered their arms shortly thereafter. It therefore makes sense that they would 
be strongly represented within government dossiers.  Like the other sections of 135
this study, more records can and should be added to the appraisal given more time 
and a larger scope of primary source material. 
Further benefit from regimental surveys can inform patterns of recruitment, 
as with the case of Lord Ogilvy’s, commonly called the Forfarshire Regiment. Of 
the 630 persons identified within the unit, the distinct majority come from Angus, 
with sixty-five in Dundee, fifty-eight in Brechin, fifty-seven in Kirriemuir, and 
forty-eight in Lintrathen parishes. Slightly fewer are from Forfar and Glamis, with 
forty-one and forty-two recruits, respectively.  But at least 5% of Ogilvy’s recruits 136
were obtained in Perthshire, mostly from the parishes of Alyth and Meigle, as well 
as a few men from Banffshire, Fife, and Kincardine. Likewise, the Atholl Brigade, 
thought to have largely recruited from Perthshire, contains a sizeable contingent of 
Argyll men and at least seven recruits from Tiree. The Duke of Perth’s regiment 
included men from Perthshire, but also large numbers from the shires of Aberdeen 
and Banff, as well as small contributions scattered across Moray, Fife, the Southern 
Lowlands, and England.  Lochiel’s Camerons, of course, contained far more than 137
only Camerons, and they hailed mostly from Inverness-shire and Argyll, with 
strong showings from Lochaber and Ardnamurchan, as well as a handful from 
Ballachulish.  138
 The Manchester Regiment was wholly taken at Carlisle after being left behind by the Jacobite army in 133
December 1745, Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 317-341. For Cromartie’s, see Duffy, The ’45, 
pp. 552, 570.
 Alexander Mackenzie, History of the Camerons (Inverness, 1884), pp. 233-235.134
 Duffy, The ’45, p. 571; SPD.36/83/270-274; Lochiel to chiefs (26 May, 1746) reprinted in Mackenzie, 135
History of the Camerons, pp. 235-236; Mackay, Urquhart and Glenmoriston, pp. 494-498. 87 of Glengarry’s men 
turned in their arms between 5-10 May, while 77 others surrendered on the 15th.
 Information taken from Mackintosh, The Muster Roll of Forfarshire, passim. See Appendix IV.136
 Monod identifies ‘at least two dozen Englishmen’ who were recruited into mostly-Scottish units during the 137
Forty-five, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 331. That number is likely considerably higher.
 See Chapter IV: Recruitment, pp. 159-161 for more on patterns of recruitment.138
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As seen in Appendix IX, the included compiled data relating to regiment is 
often quite divergent from the accepted source used by most scholars and numerous 
family historians and genealogists when citing numbers relating to the Jacobite 
army.  This is expected when considering the differing sources and methodology 139
of calculation used in these respective studies, but it still provides a useful 
comparison of tallied percentages. Figure 2 illustrates the differential between 
stated regiment sizes and the actual numbers of records provided in No Quarter 
Given. Figure 3 offers calculations of compiled (non-muster roll) primary sources 
used in this study and contrasts them with the muster roll. Figure 4 then compares 
the relative sizes of Jacobite units between quantifications by the most significant 
modern historiographical sources. The results show some significant gaps in 
tracking numbers within the muster roll. For instance, muster roll data for the Irish 
regiments serving in the Jacobite army lists ninety-nine names across all units, plus 
twenty-two in FitzJames’ Horse. Yet at least 266 soldiers from specific Irish 
regiments are easily found amidst primary sources, plus seventy-nine troopers of 
FitzJames’ in one document alone.  Though both studies use Seton and Arnot’s 140
The Prisoners of the ’45 as a source, the muster roll inexplicably notes only eight 
from Berwick’s regiment, when ninety-seven are plainly listed as belonging to that 
unit. A number of other omissions, errors, and inconsistencies hamper the value of 
No Quarter Given, and therefore demonstrates the need for a revised standard work 
on the subject, especially if it continues to be used by scholars of the period.  141
AGE 
Numerous sources have recorded the age of Jacobite prisoners, and we may 
gain some insight as to the maturity of the Forty-five’s supporters from a brief 
survey of these numbers. The most populated source for this is The Prisoners of the 
’45, which features age data for 31.7% of its listed persons.  Adding in the most 142
 Reid, Like Hungry Wolves, p. 128; Pittock, Myth, p. 72-73; Duffy, The ’45, pp. 416, 604; Murdoch, Network 139
North, pp. 344-345; Edward Spiers, et al, eds., A Military History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 2012), p. 378; Maggie 
Craig, Bare-Arsed Banditti: The Men of the ’45 (Edinburgh and London, 2010), p. 141.
 NQG pp. 40-42, 139-144. The muster roll states that FitzJames’ strength at Culloden was probably around 140
70. SPD.36/88/90-95; 36/89/106; 36/92/3-7, 13, 56-57, 61, 63, 69, 102, 104.
 Note that further details regarding the Irish picquets may possibly be found at Centre Historique des Archives 141
at Vincennes, which is part of the Service Historique de la Défense.
 Analysis of age in this source alone can be found in P45 (i), p. 232. This collects 329 records with age data, 142
while JDB collects 3017.
111
prominent lists of alleged rebels that feature ages and also the compiled muster roll 
of the army, the average age of the typical captured Jacobite proves to be thirty-
two.  The youngest recorded age in these sources is two months and the oldest is 143
eighty.  Webster states in the introduction to his census of 1755 that Scotland 144
could raise approximately 25% of its total population as Fighting Men (between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty-six).  Of the persons included in this study of alleged 145
Jacobites, 6.8% were over the age of fifty-six and 6.4% were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of their recording. This leaves 86.7% of the total within the 
bounds of what can be considered ‘fighting age’. The largest segment of the tallied 
population lay between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four (31.5%), closely 
followed by that in the range of twenty-five and thirty (20%). The next highest 
segment then jumps to ages forty to forty-nine (15.6%).  To put this into 146
perspective, Webster’s census notes that only one-quarter of the Scottish 
population in 1755 lived to see their forty-eighth year.  This puts 15% of the 147
included Jacobites above that stated life expectancy. 
Kindred statistics for the British army vary, and more is known about length 
of service than raw ages. Individual regiments often had their own criteria for 
recruitment specifications, such as Loudoun’s 1757 instructions which encouraged 
soldiers between the ages of eighteen and forty.  Cumberland’s orders a month 148
after Culloden required recruits between the ages of seventeen and thirty, though 
criminals apparently had a bit more leeway, raising their age allowance to forty-
five.  Duffy asserts that the optimum age for a professional soldier in the 149
 For reference, this figure reflects what would be around 21% of the total number of estimated participants in 143
the Jacobite army, using McCann’s high-end tally of 14,000 as a gauge. The sources used in this computation are 
P45, NQG, McDonnell’s ‘Irish Brigade Documents’, J. Macbeth Forbes, Jacobite Gleanings from State Manuscripts 
(Edinburgh and London, 1903); SPD.36/88/33d (Prisoners in Carlisle Goal), SPD.36/86/6 (List of Prisoners Sent to 
Tilbury), and SPD.36/88/60 (Stratford Eyre’s Tilbury and Transport Lists).
 At least ten babies who remained with their accused parents through imprisonment and transportation are are 144
referenced within government records. See SPD.36/93/129; 36/81/73-75; etc.
 Webster notes that this calculation of 25% includes those unable to bear arms due to blindness, lameness, or 145
otherwise not being fit to fight, relegating the actual calculation more along the lines of 20%, reprinted in Kyd, 
Scottish Population Statistics, p. 9. Macinnes calculates approximately 22,000 fighting men amongst the clans ‘in 
the Jacobite period’ with only about 20% of that number actually mobilising in support of Jacobitism, Clanship, p. 
176. This is corroborated by ‘Memoriall Anent the True State of the Highlands as to their Chieftenries, Followings 
and Dependances Before the Late Rebellion’, reprinted in Allardyce, Historical Papers (i), pp. 166-176.
 See Appendix X: Jacobite Constituency by Age 1745-6, fig. 1.146
 Kyd, Scottish Population Statistics, p. 79.147
 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 58. Similar instructions from the 54th Foot in Boston during the same year specify 148
ages sixteen to thirty-five, ibid, p. 59.  
 Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, p. 55. Cope had employed a quartet of superannuated invalids to 149
man the few government guns at Prestonpans, A Report of the Proceedings [...] of Lieutenant-General Sir John 
Cope, etc. (Dublin, 1749), pp. 53-54. See also Blakeney to Pelham (6 September, 1745), SPS.54/26/9.
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eighteenth century was early-middle age, citing that ‘a well-set-up man in his 
thirties or forties had the advantage in endurance and health’ over a younger soldier 
in his early twenties.  Projecting this upon our figures reveals that around 31% of 150
the sampled Jacobites fit into this category.   151
Despite this sizeable portion of those in their vital years, informants often 
described the widespread presence of the unfit amidst Jacobite camps and those 
who followed the army. Many children appear in lists of captured rebels along with 
their older counterparts, like John Campbell and Alexander Grant, two twelve-
year-olds who tagged along with the army train in November 1745.  This was not 152
uncommon, as Captain John Vere wrote one week before Prestonpans that ‘there 
were a great number of boys & old men amongst ym who had noe weapons and 
attended baggage’.  Of at least sixty individuals who can be identified as being 153
involved with looking after the Jacobite baggage train, only a few have their ages 
recorded; the ones who do are aged fifteen and younger.  In Edinburgh, Patrick 154
Crichton speculated that it might have been the army’s strategy ‘to make us think 
they were a rabbell’ by hiding the most effective soldiers amidst ‘a great many old 
men and boys’ while on parade.  Similarly, an eyewitness in Manchester 155
commented fancifully that the army contained as many as 3000 ‘boys of 10, 12 or 
14 years old’, some of them ‘not as long as the Swords they carried’.  Meanwhile, 156
those who were not deemed able to contribute were either passed over by Jacobite 
recruiters or left behind when the army’s provisions could no longer support them. 
Dougall Campbell, for example, witnessed a rebel party in Stirlingshire enter the 
house of Duncan and Robert Macfarlane, insisting that the son join them but 
leaving the father behind, ‘being an old man was not fit for service and therefore 
was not desired to go’.  When the Jacobites left their ill-fated garrison in Carlisle 157
before retreating from England in December 1745, they also left behind a small 
community of women and children who had traveled with them until that time. Of 
 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London, 1987), p. 95.150
 Ages 30-45 (31.09%).151
 Declarations of Rebel Prisoners (9 November, 1745), SPS.54/26/152.152
 Vere’s Intelligence (13 September, 1745), SPS.54/26/20; P45 (i), p. 232.153
 JDB query on occupation and age relationship.154
 Patrick Crichton, Woodhouselee MS (Edinburgh and London, 1907, p. 27. Crichton reports that in the lead-155
up to Prestonpans the Jacobite army consisted of over half ‘good for nothing old men, shepherds, and boys’, p. 
33.
 Reprinted in Jarvis, Collected Papers (ii), p. 299. Jarvis explains that this estimate might have been the result 156
of observing servant lads carrying the weapons of their masters.
 Declaration of Dougall Campbell (11 July, 1746), NLS GD.220/6/1661/1.157
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thirty prisoners transferred from Carlisle to Chester Castle for engaging in treason 
or treasonable practices, thirteen were young children between the ages of three 
and fifteen. The oldest was the servant of a lieutenant in Lochiel’s regiment, but the 
great majority were left behind by their fathers after decamping from Carlisle, 
including 12-year-old Clementine McDonald, whose father was later held at 
Lincoln Castle.    158
On the extremes of the ages involved, we see a significant number of 
prisoners being recommended to mercy due to their youth and also similar cases of 
invalids and the elderly. Alexander Davidson, a venerable shoemaker in the 
Canongate of Edinburgh, was set to be executed on 15 November 1746. In his 
petition, Davidson described that his extreme poverty had caused him to apply for 
enlistment in the Scots Greys, but he was denied on account of his age, and 
therefore joined the rebels out of necessity. Other certificates corroborated his 
plight, and his sentence was reduced to transportation in March 1747.  Robert 159
Forbes, a boy of eighteen who was ‘seduced’ into the rebellion, was petitioned for 
by members of the Synod of Aberdeen to reduce his sentence of death. Despite 
Forbes serving for some time as a captain in Lord Lewis Gordon’s regiment, the 
minister in Aberdeen urged that they had ‘good Ground to think That if this poor 
Boys Life were spared He will never again Relapse into such a wicked and hainous 
crime’.  Eighteen prisoners under the age of twenty who were sentenced to death 160
at York begged for mercy on account of their ‘folly and giddiness of Youth’. Their 
petition described that only those traits could have ‘Enduced them to give Ear to 
the crafty and delusive Sollicitations of those by whom they were Seduced from 
their duty and Allegiance’.  Royal clemency was apparently invoked, as it appears 161
that most of the boys, some as young as fifteen, were pardoned on the condition 
that they subsequently enlisted into British regiments abroad. At least three had 
their sentences lessened to transportation, and the nineteen-year-old sergeant 
Benjamin Mason was executed in November 1746, proving that Jacobite officers 
 List of Persons in Chester Castle (31 January, 1747), SPD.36/93/129. It had apparently been Charles 158
Edward’s intention to return to Carlisle after a rendezvous with the Jacobites under John Drummond in the north-
east of Scotland, Reid, 1745, p. 78. See also P45 (i), p. 214. Seton and Arnot suggest that it might have been 
thought too difficult to navigate the untrained camp followers across the then-swollen Esk.
 Petition of Alexander Davidson, etc. (11 October, 1746), SPD.36/88/193-195; Petition of Gavin Hamilton (1 159
November, 1746), SPS.54/34/14; Account of the Prisoners Condemned at Carlisle (10 October, 1746), SPD.
36/88/58.
 Petition of Synod of Aberdeen (8 October, 1746), SPD.36/88/64; P45 (ii), pp. 200-201.160
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were more likely to be capitally punished for their crimes, no matter their age.  162
Crown solicitor Philip Carteret Webb recommended six prisoners at Carlisle for 
mercy, all on account of their youth. Some of these were subsequently found guilty, 
but the records suggest that most were dismissed, even with the absence of formal 
petitions.  Everard Fawkener himself meekly sought clemency for two young men 163
from the Manchester Regiment on account of his close and long friendship with a 
mutual acquaintance, but was ultimately unsuccessful in doing so, as one was 
executed and the other transported.  It appears that the majority of the young 164
children held in Chester Castle for the treasonous activities of their parents were all 
released due to lack of evidence against them.  165
GENDER 
It is not surprising that the large majority of Jacobite support in the mid-
eighteenth century was men in arms, but the numerous roles that women 
contributed to the effort deserve their own overview. Keen scholarship focussed on 
women in the Forty-five has recently been undertaken in works from the robustly 
academic (Carine Martin, Nicola Cowmeadow) to the unreferenced and popular 
(Maggie Craig), though even contemporarily attempts were made to cover some of 
the more famous female characters involved the rising, however satirically.  With 166
the exception of a brief lull during the reign of Anne Stuart, Whig treatises 
throughout the Jacobite era were particularly harsh on women demonstrating any 
connection to Jacobitism. The misogynistic propaganda furthered by these sources 
denounced the cause as an affair so desperate that it drew support from a sex seen as 
 P45 (i), pp. 198-200.162
 Webb’s List of Prisoners (6 October, 1746), SPD.36/88/29-33; Account of the Condemned at Carlisle (10 163
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 Carine Martin, ‘“Female Rebels”: The Female Figure in Anti-Jacobite Propaganda’ in Macinnes, et al., Living 166
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patently unsuited to political activity.  As these tracts went, not only were women 167
generally incapable of contributing to proper political discourse, some who were 
exceptionally burlesque chose to offer their ‘Petticoat Patronage’ to the 
contemporary equivalent of a terrorist organisation.  The point of this 168
propaganda, of course, was to delegitimise and debase Jacobitism by associating it 
with the lewd and bawdy, not unlike the inflammatory disinformation used to 
pillory the sins of popery and non-juring confessional principles.  Carine Martin 169
argues that limited scholarship has been undertaken demonstrating women had a 
legitimate role in the ‘transmission of Jacobite values’ due to the fact that only 
Hanoverian-biased sources currently survive in print. Rachel Carnell, however, 
cites a number of pro-Jacobite printings that inverse the rhetoric by calling out 
such misogyny through the use of hyperbolic wit.  170
Not all attempts to identify sympathetic Jacobite women were specifically 
intended to debase. Earlier in the century, anti-Jacobite propaganda set the British 
lady and the sanctity of her family as innocent but ‘naturally dependent’ victims 
menaced by Stuart whims.  By 1745, though, the throngs of otherwise loyalist 171
women who flocked to gaze upon Charles Edward in the High Street of Edinburgh 
could not be explained away but by describing their ‘irrational zeal’ and passion 
over reason.  Shortly after things had quieted down, a list was written up 172
quantifying many of the ladies of higher status in the capital and whether their 
allegiances were to the Whig government or to the ‘Jacobite Partie’. The intention 
of this well-perused document was clearly to save face in light of the public 
perception that female sympathies in Edinburgh leaned toward rebel ideals. The 
roll’s subtitle bears this out, stating that it was 
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Taken in hand Merely to show that the common Acusation and Slander, Rashly 
Thrown on The Female Sex As To Their being all Jacobites is False and Groundless 
As upon A Calculation the Whigs are Far Superior in Number and Not inferior 
either in Rank Beauty or Sollidity.  173
The great majority of the 134 women outed as Jacobites, if they indeed were so, 
apparently did nothing of consequence to further the cause in a practical manner. 
Their alleged zeal for the Stuarts likely was expressed socially, but we now know 
that the venture required more. 
Conversely, Seton and Arnot find eighteen elite women ‘who took a 
prominent part’ in the affair, which they define as either being active in raising 
troops or having some other treasonable interactions with the Jacobite leadership.  174
The biographical details of many of these persons have been well-covered, and it is 
safe to say that a few of these elite women were nothing less than instrumental in 
contributing to the Jacobite war effort, especially when it was in defiance of their 
husbands who were the chiefs of their clans. In addition to the famously dogged 
recruiting efforts of Anne Mackintosh and Charlotte Robertson of Lude, there is 
evidence that other prominent Jacobite ladies were involved in whipping up 
sentiment on their estates. Duncan Cameron, for example, swore that he was forced 
into joining up by Lady Glenmoriston shortly after Prestonpans.  She 175
subsequently was instructed by her husband to punish their tenants who had 
deserted the army by doubling their rents and to ‘Lay all stress and Inconveniences 
possible on such as have gone home and Left me to make for my Self’.   176
Narrowing down on the plebeians, however, provides a much larger pool of 
cases to observe. To the fifty-six ‘regimental’ women identified in The Prisoners of 
the ’45, at least twelve others can be added who were taken up with or near the 
Jacobite army while on campaign.  An observer in Edinburgh spied the Jacobite 177
baggage train in the Braid Hills a few days before the Battle of Prestonpans, and 
noted that ‘all of the Highland wives’ were accompanying it.  Notwithstanding the 178
‘weak Heads and warm Hearts’ ascribed to females of the period, Martin makes the 
excellent point that while high society women might be officers’ wives, the lower 
 ‘An Impartial and Genuine List of the Ladys on the Whig or Jacobite Partie’ (1747), SLE MS.293.173
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classes featured the wives of the common soldiers who undertook a wide variety of 
essential tasks for the army while on the march.  As well, letters written to wives, 179
mothers, and sisters from men on campaign reveal that ‘Jacobite’ women on the 
home front carried on day-to-day work while the men were away. Anne Cameron 
in Fort Augustus, for example, was lauded upon the news that the family’s ‘smal 
affairs at home is on good footing’, and was further instructed to keep her 
husband’s papers in order and not to disperse any further funds for work on their 
home. Elspeth Grant in Livicie was promised by her husband that any work she 
could not undertake herself could be hired out, and another Grant of the same 
name in Bhlaraidh was asked to handle the sale of a neighbour’s cow. Mrs Rattray 
of Wester Ennoch likewise received some gentle encouragement to ‘do the best ye 
can wt all our business and provide your self in a servant’.  180
It is not unusual that a train of non-combatants would follow their husbands 
and fathers on the march, though orders disallowing the presence of unmarried 
women during the invasion of England make appearances in rebel orderly books.  181
Repeated directives from Charles Edward to the officers of Lord Ogilvy’s regiment 
between October 1745 and January 1746 explicitly forbade the unwed from 
following, holding the colonels accountable if any were found within the units 
which they commanded.  It is assumed that some still followed, and the Chester 182
list proves that the decision was made to leave at least eighteen wives, nieces, and 
sisters behind at Carlisle upon the retreat from England.  Other than 183
abandonment, Rupert Jarvis illustrates that pregnancy was likely most common 
cause of separation of women from the army’s main body, both Jacobite and 
government, citing the baptism at Lancaster on 8 September 1746 of one Mary 
 Female Rebels, p. 5. Martin rightfully states that the term ‘camp followers’ likely does not do them justice, 179
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Macpherson, daughter of her rebel father John.  This may go some way in 184
explaining the disinclination by the Jacobite command to allow unmarried women 
along with the army. 
Despite reports that upwards of 150 women were seen in arms, there is no 
convincing evidence that this occurred at any points of battle during the 
campaign.  A curious letter, ostensibly written by Oliphant of Gask to his sister, 185
however, takes on this myth in a compelling manner. Printed in France for 
distribution through Europe to raise the hopes of Jacobite sympathisers outwith 
Britain, this missive offers a detailed account of the army’s progress in Scotland and 
boasts the unwavering loyalty of the country people.  The core of the letter is 186
taken up by the description of a combat-ready unit of women that amassed for the 
Prince, outwardly espousing all the explicit virtues of the Jacobite agenda: 
The women of this part of Scotland [Inverness-shire], who dress so like men one 
can hardly distinguish them, have formed a company of 112 women, of whom 
the eldest is not over forty. This troop of modern Amazons is led by a girl between 
27 and 30, who has plenty of spirit and sufficient beauty to attract an honest 
man.  187
This is followed by a grandiose description of their uniforms and weaponry, and a 
fanciful tale of the first meeting between Charles Edward and the company’s leader. 
The heroine commander is educated and sharp of wit, and takes the Hanoverian 
polemicists to task by inverting their position of loyalty and shaming their 
marginalisation of women: 
The whole of my company declare they will never forsake you, but defend you 
under the greatest dangers, and shame those men who, born your subjects, serve 
against you […] for ourselves, illustrious Prince, we have no engagement other 
than to serve you. Men are nothing to us; we are free and at your service from 
this moment […] our wishes will be more than accomplished if we can show by 
their effects how deeply we are attached to you.  188
The purpose of this tale is likely designed to highlight the contributions made by 
infamous Jacobite women like Anne Mackintosh and Jenny Cameron, however 
inflated and embellished the examples have been made. At the same time, it 
 Lancaster Parish Register Soc., 81:200 as cited in Jarvis, Collected Papers (i), p. 253. Again, this was also a 184
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provides a formidable narrative that attempts to counter the typical anti-Jacobite 
propaganda. Like so many internal reports of French assistance being just a few 
days away, the Prince is assured by these martial matrons that ‘all the Scottish ladies 
were determined to follow their example, and that many of the English were not far 
from doing likewise’.  It is a message of hope written at a particularly desperate 189
point in the campaign, and the adherence and duty of the Jacobite valkyrie is the 
harbinger of victory.  190
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
While there will never be enough evidence to present an accurate 
sociological study of Jacobite demographics across all parishes of Scotland and 
beyond, this chapter demonstrates that feasible, large-scale samples of the popular 
Jacobite constituency from existing records is certainly possible. This will only 
become more informative as more effective systems of collation are utilised in lieu 
of poor and outdated transcriptions of secondary sources and otherwise specious 
anecdotal evidence. Few shocking revelations here have been unearthed that 
contradict the mores of recent, high-quality Jacobite scholarship. But the number 
of records and manner in which they are tested contribute to the social history of 
the Forty-five by weighing their veracity using a qualitative prosopographical 
methodology hitherto unexplored within the field of Jacobite studies. 
In measuring the popular constituency, it is vital to consider the dichotomy 
of Jacobitism in the way it was expressed both publicly and privately, just as we 
consider the confluence (and sometimes conflict) of ideological and practical 
expression. While the truly effective sector of Jacobitism by 1745 was the military, 
large numbers of civilians contributed to the effort through a variety of ways. As 
well, loyal civilians were caught up in the environment of suspicion, fattening lists 
of the accused in the early days of the rising before government justices could 
confirm that no evidence stood against them. Though measures of the army have 
been universally accepted as presenting a near parity between Highland and 
Lowland support in Scotland, the civilian population in the north-eastern Lowlands 
had a decisively larger role in the affair, underscoring the importance of that region 
to the Jacobite cause. 
 Ibid., p. 227.189
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It would follow, then, that the religious constituency of the north-east and 
the largely-Episcopalian Highlands should inform a parallel turnout in what is 
known of participants from those areas. Initial evidence, however, shows a 
considerable Presbyterian contingent of Jacobite support, even in the traditional 
regions of non-juring activity. As attested by its absence in current scholarly 
assessments of the movement, exploring confessional lines of adherence at the 
grass-roots level should be a priority for continuing studies. Similarly, existing 
economic surveys of non-elites are distinctly lacking, and the brief mentions of 
occupations within the middling and lower classes seem to rely upon the 
presumption that lists of ‘Jacobite’ prisoners are all captured soldiers. While there is 
now sufficient feedback to derail the Whiggish assertion that there was no 
mercantile contribution within the Jacobite constituency, more can still be done to 
describe the participation of those commercial classes – and what they risked by 
sticking with the rebels. Likewise, there is little scholarship available on plebeian 
Jacobite women, of which several dozens were taken up and incarcerated alongside 
the men. Though correspondence from the rebel home front is scarce, surviving 
letters show a distinct transfer of responsibility for the welfare of farms and estates, 
handed over to wives, mothers, and sisters once the men had marched off with the 
army. In the case of those that never came back, the implications of how estate 
management was carried on are enticing and also warrant further study.  
Bruce Lenman states that ‘the ‘15 was a broad-based national rising, while 
the ‘45 was an attempted coup d’état by a small minority’.  This study of the 191
popular Jacobite constituency has shown that the Forty-five was in fact a broad-
based national rising with international contributions, both segments of which were 
a very small minority of the total population of their respective countries. This 
minority was further divided by the lines of elite and plebeian, public and private, 
ideological and practical, civilian and martial. The many facets of this Jacobite 
prism would cast shadows of difficulty upon the integration and uniformity of cause 
and would likewise hamper recruitment into the military during a time when 
Charles Edward Stuart needed it most. 
 Lenman, Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p. 157.191
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CHAPTER IV: RECRUITMENT 
CHARACTER OF THE ARMY  
As shown in the previous chapters, those in allegiance with the Jacobites were 
motivated by a variety of causes and represented a diverse constituency. This body 
of dissidents represented only part of the greater zeitgeist of disaffection in Britain 
during the Forty-five. Yet the army proved to be the only really effective measure 
of anti-governmental expression and equated to the sole meter of Jacobite success 
or failure throughout the conflict for the crown. Despite the covert embedding of 
anti-Hanoverian elites within positions of political power through the inter-rising 
years, and notwithstanding the sanguine networks and secretive allegiances 
schemed by the few of those patricians with great ideological stakes, it was always 
going to be boots on the ground that really mattered.   1
By 1745, the hopes of the Stuart court under exile in Rome and of those 
tangibly supporting their aims in Britain all hinged on the efficacy of the Jacobite 
army to undertake a military coup and establish a provisional government, first in 
Edinburgh and later in London. This was certainly Charles Edward’s ultimate goal, 
and he could not consider the possibility of doing so without an effective combat 
force that would outfight and outmanoeuvre the trained, regular soldiers sent to 
defend the government of George II.  To manage this successfully, the Prince 2
would have to attempt to fashion a regular army out of an irregular collection of 
would-be supporters, including those from many disparate areas and across 
numerous societal and economic backgrounds – from the landed Lowland elite 
accompanied by their stables of house servants, to the cottars and farm tenants of 
the Highland peasantry. His soldiers would be comprised of all ages, from eight to 
eighty and beyond, and they would represent numerous specific motivational 
factors that were fluid through the trials of the campaign.  Aside from the small 3
 Macinnes, ‘Union, Empire and Global Adventuring’, pp. 123-139; Daniel Szechi, ‘Jamie the Soldier and the 1
Jacobite Military Threat, 1706-27’ in Macinnes, et al., Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, pp. 13-28.
 Charles Edward to Louis XV (6 August, 1745) reprinted in Robert Fitzroy Bell, ed., Memorials of John Murray of 2
Broughton, Sometime Secretary to Prince Charles Edward 1740-1747 (Edinburgh, 1898), pp. 507-508; Stephen, 
‘Scottish Nationalism and Stuart Unionism, p. 47.
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units of French and Irish regulars, there was no consistent experience of military 
training amongst the Jacobite regiments, and their weapons were as varied a 
collection of arms as of those who held them. Supplies were a constant, nagging 
problem and the army’s welfare depended largely on the ‘charity’ of the localities 
upon which they were billeted.  With all of these things considered, it appears that 4
getting as far as they did was a remarkable accomplishment.  
In spite of the largely unconventional composition of the Jacobite army 
during the Forty-five, it is important to underline the fact that it was initially 
treated by its officers as a professional military force of both liberation and 
occupation in varying degrees. Evidence shows that it was operated and 
administered with many of the systems and characteristics of most eighteenth-
century armies, including order books, duty rosters, pay grades, and military courts-
martial.  This was likely owing to the fact that numerous regiments were 5
commanded by former officers with previous military experience, but also due to a 
rigorous scheme devised by Charles Edward and his commanders to infuse some 
measure of uniformity into such a varied base of adherents.  Accordingly, great 6
pains were devised to keep discipline in check and to work against the stereotypical 
prejudices heaped upon the Prince’s followers, even today often misrepresented as a 
thieving mob of Highland bandits, sorely out-of-touch with anything happening 
within civilised society.  This presents some interesting paradoxes regarding the 7
issues of recruitment and the varying degrees of success and failure that Jacobite 
officers faced. The steps that were taken to maintain the army in a professional 
manner, however, were not sustained and ultimately did not hold when applied to a 
majority of constituents with either no military experience whatsoever, ambivalence 
or even reluctance to remain in arms, or a mixture of both of these qualities.  8
Comprehensive works have been written on the military prowess of the Jacobites 
during the Forty-five, and we learn from these that the army’s eventual collapse and 
failure does not necessarily deprecate its tactical successes or overall threat to the 
 As will be seen throughout this chapter.4
 Duffy, The ’45, p. 100; Lenman, Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p. 26; Pittock, Myth, pp. 58, 93. See Orderly 5
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British state.  All the more, it highlights both the unpreparedness of the 9
Hanoverian government to militarily contend with an explosive, internal rising and 
the remarkable ability of Jacobite commanders to take advantage of that lack of 
preparation whether on the field or on the march.  10
This chapter in part describes the differing categories of recruitment within 
the Jacobite army, helping to reiterate the broad-based but ultimately limited 
support of the rising while examining the degrees of the willingness or zeal of that 
support to remain in arms. The motivations of individual soldiers, as presented in 
detail within Chapter II, were often directly affected by the recruitment practices 
employed to draw them into service, and in some instances obscured personal 
motives in the escalation to establish the strategic ones espoused by their leaders. As 
such, the interplay between motivation and recruitment is essential and the two 
should be considered inextricable. Once identifiable categories of recruitment are 
described and generalised types of recruits are surveyed, locational patterns of 
where these practices played out will briefly be discussed to provide an empirical 
scheme of which respective parts of Britain contributed accordingly to the army. 
Competent studies of Jacobite military recruitment have previously been 
undertaken, so this chapter is careful to explore those areas which have been either 
underutilised or left without proper treatment.  Specifically, while methods and 11
patterns of recruitment have been mentioned in these works and though estimates 
are liberally scattered within many others, only McCann approaches the topic with 
some quantitative substance.  Pittock devotes a few pages to recruitment without 12
much qualitative analysis in The Myth of the Jacobite Clans, but his focus is much 
more on attempting to refute the marginalisation of Jacobite participation than to 
chart the distinct levying practices across different areas of Britain.  No scholar has 13
put the emphasis on impressment that a discriminating and comprehensive study of 
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the subject deserves, and none make more than little mention of foreign units or 
how they came to join the army. Likewise, few of these sources discuss British army 
deserters in any detail, with only Seton and Arnot addressing their presence with 
some measure of scrutiny.  14
Brief mention must also be made of the behaviour of the army, which was in 
itself a vital and unsung non-combat tactic. Jacobite leaders tried desperately to stir 
support within the areas that the army occupied and those through which it 
marched. As noted above, the Jacobite’s ‘second war’ was against that of public 
perception, which was in part crafted detrimentally by Hanoverian propaganda. 
This campaign of opinion was of course designed to stimulate the public into 
resisting insurgency by branding all Jacobites as ‘a horde of savages or bandits’ in 
order to ‘mobilize racial prejudice and frighten social conservatism on behalf of the 
status quo’.  In other words, the government attempted to portray all Jacobites as 15
Highlanders, hoping the foreign quality of both would cyclically perpetuate fear 
and keep British citizens loyally inclined.  Whether this was actually believed by 16
either the government or its citizens is open to speculation, but both the national 
and international political aspects of the rising were also acknowledged during the 
event itself.  Bob Harris states that clanship was essentially seen by many ‘as a 17
structure of oppression’ plagued by poverty and fuelled by violence, wholly 
unindustrialised and unmotivated by progressive commerce.  This is obviously a 18
propagandised view, but it was nonetheless effective in forming prejudices in those 
with no personal experience of distant localities. It thus ultimately fell upon Charles 
Edward to decide how to work with what he had, and his landing in the West 
Highlands was calculated to attract the support of sympathetic clan chiefs who 
would bring their many tenants into battle. Though their initial response was 
lukewarm at best, the Jacobite army’s identification with the Highlands – and, 
inversely, government propaganda portraying the Highlands as entirely rebellious – 
would be enduring.  19
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 Lenman in the Introduction to NQG, pp. xix-xx.15
 The same might also be said of English popular opinion of all Scots as Jacobites, see George Innes’ copy of the 16
Newcastle Journal (2 November, 1745), NRS GD.113/3/1006/14. 
 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, p. 4-9.17
 Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation, (Oxford, 2002), pp. 172-173; Some Thoughts Concerning the State of the 18
Highlands in Scotland (3 Oct, 1746), SPS.54/34/4g; Fletcher to Newcastle (15 Nov, 1746) SPS.54/34/22a.
 Macinnes, Clanship, p. 169.19
125
CATEGORIES OF RECRUITS 
There are six identifiable categories of soldiers within the Jacobite army of 
1745-6, for the purposes of this study divided by lines representing a combination 
of both recruitment method and military status. In brief, these classes are 
volunteers, those under feudal jurisdiction, fencibles or ‘purchased’ soldiers, foreign 
regulars, deserters from the British army, and those who were forced or pressed 
into service by Jacobite recruiters. Once again, the lines can sometimes be blurred 
but these categories are nonetheless presented to describe most efficiently the 
prevalence of particular recruitment methods and their relative efficacy. Most, if 
not all, of the following types of recruiting occurred variably throughout different 
regions of Scotland and during different phases of the campaign. With few 
exceptions, all are representative of varied demographic recruitment patterns for 
line officers and common soldiers which include tenants and farmers, local societal 
administrators such as bailies and factors, and middle-class tradesmen and 
professionals both in urban and rural areas. The higher ranked officers and 
regimental leaders are exempt from this categorisation because they usually were 
the agents who carried out the recruiting, or at least who appointed subsidiaries to 
do so. Their reasons for joining the army are manifold and are better suited to 
examination in a more focussed study of political, dynastic, and economic 
motivation as it pertains to Jacobite leadership and elites. Their active role in 
encouraging or enforcing recruitment, however, is vital to the context of this thesis. 
It is worthy of note that other scholars in the field are at most willing to 
concede only three or four general categories of Jacobite recruits. Seton and Arnot 
choose to separate feudal levies and tenants under heritable jurisdictions from those 
raised within the clan system when in fact they are virtually identical, though 
generally coming from different geographical areas. Their discussion of forced men 
as well as those who were hired out in lieu of others is ultimately unsatisfying and 
far too brief, though a bit more work has been done on the latter of these groups by 
Stuart Reid.  Ultimately it is not as important to pigeon-hole specific types of 20
recruits as it is to identify how they were brought into the army, but both angles 
can indeed be helpful to the overall survey. 
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VOLUNTEERS 
As the Forty-five kicked off and spread across Scotland in a very short span 
of time, Hanoverian officials scrambled to gather intelligence about what parts of 
the country were more or less inclined to rise based upon traditional affections or 
obstinance toward government policies.  So, too, did the Prince and his chiefs and 21
officers who landed with him, hoping that the pledges they had received reflected 
the actual support of those ready to join the venture.  While extensive, their 22
Jacobite contacts in Britain were shadowy, under constant scrutiny from the 
government, and invariably unreliable. In October 1743 Charles was sent a list of 
260 sympathetic peers and gentry in Northern England, who were waiting 
hopefully for another opportunity to challenge the Hanoverian regime, as well as 
affirmations of Jacobite support in Wales under Sir Watkin Williams Wynn. None 
of these volunteers in fact turned out when Charles was south of the Esk in late 
1745.  A bold proposal from north-western Scotland in 1741 was still on the 23
Prince’s mind that had promised 20,000 loyal Highlanders who ‘will without fail 
keep their engagements’.  Such numbers, according to General Wade’s report on 24
potential Highland recruits tallied in 1724, would have included nearly every man 
north of the Grampians, half of whom he reckoned were then well-inclined toward 
the government.  Far from being met with thousands of ready troops, there were 25
only hundreds present during the first few weeks of the campaign. This would of 
course change as the word spread that a Stuart once again stood on British soil. 
Willing volunteers are expected to have made up the large majority of 
recruits in any eighteenth-century army, and this is typically thought to have been 
no different for the Jacobites.  These numbers fluctuated depending on the stage 26
of the campaign, especially just after battles and during the harvest, but they likely 
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provided a solid core of dedicated support for the army and allowed it to enjoy 
appreciable success.  Despite the incredulous reaction of many to the Prince’s 27
arrival without substantial numbers, there were considerable pockets of those in 
Scotland who earnestly believed in indefeasible hereditary succession, or who were 
otherwise opposed to the oppressive tactics of the Hanoverian regime. Others held 
firm convictions of faith that were incompatible with that of the Presbyterian 
ascendancy, leading them to favour the Jacobite cause as an agent of change and 
perceived toleration.  Some were ‘gentleman’ soldiers choosing to support 28
regimental leaders or political figures of considerable local influence; many within 
the Jacobite army’s five cavalry units, including Pitsligo’s, and nearly the whole of 
the Manchester Regiment, for example, were known to be voluntary recruits.  29
Regardless of specific motivations, what these soldiers all had in common was their 
willingness to risk their own lives and fortunes (and, in some cases, the safety of 
their families) to join the military effort.  
It makes sense that within the context of such upheaval, a rising with so 
broad a scope of cause would draw a large percentage of enthusiastic recruits. 
Despite narratives that depict the great majority of common soldiers seeing 
themselves as volunteers who were ‘freeing the country people from the eternal 
dread’, however, it is extremely difficult to verify the authenticity of enthusiasm 
from the bulk of Jacobite numbers captured during and after the campaign.  The 30
main difficulty in identifying volunteers from existing muster rolls and lists of 
prisoners lies in the government’s tendency to consider many feudal levies and 
clansmen under the command of their superiors as willing and voluntary soldiers. 
While many of those in question are listed as ‘volunteers’ upon cursory 
examination, they cannot be regarded as showing the consent or proactivity of true 
army volunteers, as many simply had little choice in the matter.  Furthermore, 31
there is simply not enough information contained within the published lists to 
establish anything resembling an accurate framework of voluntary support. A little 
over 200 alleged Jacobites in Rosebery’s List, for example, are explicitly noted as 
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being volunteers, though undoubtedly the actual number was higher. The Prisoners 
of the ’45 identifies only a fifth of that number, and No Quarter Given cites fifty-one 
persons with ‘volunteer’ bafflingly appearing as their collective rank. To glean more 
information, cross-referencing of contextual evidence exhibited in the statements of 
prisoners and in the depositions of witnesses should be carried out. This is possible 
at present with the implementation of case studies, but the large-scale application of 
such a methodology is still waiting to be undertaken. 
For example, the Manchester Regiment is said by numerous sources to be 
mostly formed on a volunteer basis.  Accordingly, and also surely because they 32
were the only Jacobite regiment almost entirely composed of Englishmen, this unit 
was punished terribly after the rising, with most of the officer corps being executed 
between July and November of 1746.  Of the 167 names recorded as being in the 33
Manchester Regiment, No Quarter Given lists nine who gave evidence against 
others in the unit. When exploring the depositions of these men with more 
scrutiny, however, many others had actually come out with information refuting 
that they had participated in anything akin to voluntary enlistment. In fact, fourteen 
others from the regiment also gave evidence against their former comrades, as did 
at least six additional witnesses from other regiments or not involved in the 
rebellion.  Evidence was lodged against sixteen of the officers (from ensign to 34
colonel), mostly by servants, common soldiers and a few low-ranking non-
commissioned officers. Many of them provide exacting details of harassment or 
‘inveigling’ as opposed to voluntarily enlisting. 
Monod calls out similar depositions of this kind as ‘full of fabrications about 
the examinants’ motives’, instead choosing to focus more on the ‘patriot ideals’ of 
the officers.  While it makes sense that some of these prisoners would have made 35
up stories to save their own skins, a number of the depositions corroborate each 
other, suggesting that some of the narratives are more than just fancy. As well, 
nearly half of those who gave themselves in as witnesses were still either executed or 
transported despite their explicative information, which proves that providing 
evidence – whether truthful or not – was no sure exoneration from punishment. 
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Sergeant James Dawson was heard by Samuel Maddock to have promised that any 
volunteers no longer wishing to serve would be granted full discharges. Testimony 
by Maddock against the colonel of the Manchester Regiment, however, states that 
Francis Townley had ordered the gates of the town shut and had posted guards 
there to prevent recruits from escaping, threatening them with hanging if they were 
to try.  Townley’s servant, John Burne, claimed he had no idea what regiment his 36
master commanded, but only that he followed along with him carrying a fowling 
piece like he had done so many times before when shooting for sport.  Some of the 37
witnesses made no attempt to dispute that numerous officers willingly joined up 
shortly after the Jacobites first arrived in Manchester, and Monod’s expert analysis 
of the regiment’s leaders supports this by revealing a deep genetic vein of 
ideologically-passionate Jacobitism in their structures of belief. But the general 
consensus of the officers was that the recruitment parties of which they were at the 
head did not enjoy long lines of volunteers seeking to enlist. The small size of the 
regiment bears this out, especially in a booming town of 20,000 where ‘the power 
of Westminster was not much felt’.  Lord Elcho recalled he was ‘astonished’ that 38
the arrival of the Jacobite army in Manchester did not attract more recruits, despite 
the warm reception given by the inhabitants. Likewise, Townley was in fact relieved 
when Dawson and others showed up with less than two hundred men, noted as 
saying ‘I was almost in despair, not being able to find fifty volunteers myself’.   39
In contrast to the difficulty of obtaining volunteers even in a politically-
charged bastion of Jacobite tradition like Manchester, an unnamed government 
agent observed that ‘the Gentlemen and Commons’ of 260 soldiers from the Appin 
Regiment under Charles Stewart of Ardshiel ‘rose almost to a man with a very 
uncommon zeal’.  This seems to be corroborated by the evidence regarding most 40
Appin prisoners, though many of them did apparently not join up until after the 
Battle of Falkirk, presumably as replacements for those who deserted or were 
casualties. Only a limited few claim that they were compelled to fight, although 
Lord Glenorchy noted in October 1745 that some of them were forced by Menzies 
 Testimonies of Samuel Maddock, TNA TS.11/760/2363 p. 4, 62.36
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of Shian ‘much against their will’.  Dougal Stewart, the laird of Appin, might very 41
well have been playing to both sides by claiming that his tenants involved 
themselves in the rising against his wishes, but the Appin men would not be the 
only ones who disobeyed orders from their clan chief if that were true.  Several 42
men from Urquhart and Glenmoriston joined Evan McDonald in attending the 
army out of a sense of duty; McDonald wrote to his wife that ‘this times Invites all 
honest men to act what they can’.  At least 200 recruits in and around Aberdeen 43
joined up voluntarily with James Moir of Stoneywood, the town and region being 
long-established reservoirs of Jacobite sentiment.  McCann also notes that a large 44
proportion of tradesmen from the central belt of Scotland felt little economic or 
hereditary pressure, and therefore likely contributed voluntarily.  45
To counter the uneven successes in drawing willing recruits early in the 
campaign, Jacobite commanders despatched groups of men specifically to search for 
volunteers in the towns and villages through which they passed. A resident of 
Prestonpans watched an English Jacobite officer ‘with a white Cocade upon his hatt 
beating up by drum for Volunteers for the Pretender in the puplick streets of 
Edinburgh’.  Elcho was impressed with crowds of people there filling the air ‘with 46
their Acclamations of joy’, but he later fretted that not one of ‘the Mob’ voluntarily 
joined the Prince’s cause.  A local paper recorded that recruiting parties were sent 47
out looking for volunteers while the Jacobites were at Derby ‘but met with very 
little Success; only two or three Fellows entertained, who served their new Master 
but a short Time’.  The volunteers that did enlist, however, proved their zeal to 48
the Jacobite leadership. The commander of the Farquharsons noted in the hours 
before Culloden that it was specifically the volunteers who ‘were all very keen to 
 See, for example, the entry for Dougal Stewart, a shoemaker in Edinburgh, P45 (iii), pp. 340-341. Glenorchy to 41
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march’ on Cumberland’s camp at Auldearn, to which he wrote that ‘this opinion 
showed abundance of courage, for these Gentlemen would have been in the first 
ranks had their been any attack’.  49
Finding specific instances and names of volunteers amidst the middling and 
lower classes in the Jacobite army is possible, and there is a measure of defiant 
honesty in some of their examinations that are a welcome break from the often-
fabricated stories of innocence by those attempting simply to cover their tracks. 
Alexander Barclay from Coupar Angus plainly told Alexander Buchan that he was 
an unpaid volunteer in the rebel army.  David Row of Anstruther candidly declared 50
that he ‘as a Volunteer Joined the Rebel Army at Perth’, marching with Glengarry’s 
men and receiving his pay of one shilling per day before being taken prisoner at 
Penrith.  John Masson and John Duncan, both of them Footdee fishermen in 51
Aberdeen, acknowledged under oath that they ‘inlisted themselves as Soldiers in the 
Rebellion with Crichton of Achingoul’.  Henry Cheap was known by four 52
witnesses in Perth to have been paid twelve crowns for freely joining, some of 
which he used to purchase ‘a Highland habit’ as part of his uniform.  James 53
Lindsey, an ensign in Strathallan’s cavalry, is specifically noted as being a volunteer 
in numerous documents connected with his capture and processing, providing a 
consistency of information which seems to be the exception rather than the rule.   54
Being considered a volunteer could also be imposed on others in contentious 
situations. The steward at Cullen House received a missive from William Tayler 
describing how sixty of Lord Lewis Gordon’s men had quartered upon them at 
Keith in December 1745. Gordon of Avochie had demanded from Keith sixteen 
men for service in the rebel army, which was negotiated down to ‘Eight men fully 
mounted volunteers & it was to great Difficulty we gott him to accept of that 
number’.  Ironically, the rest of the demanded quota of ‘volunteers’ was still 55
expected by Avochie, lest they be carried off as prisoners for service.  A list of 56
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rebels from Fraserburgh specifically distinguishes those who were thought to be 
recruits versus others who freely volunteered.  The language used both by 57
government officials and by the prisoners themselves is integral to understanding 
the identities of Jacobite adherents of the Forty-five, as it brings into focus the 
systems of belief and of duty that the term ‘volunteer’ conveys. What is sure is that 
this term was used in many ways to communicate a wealth of meanings as befitted 
both the institution and the individual, and this is demonstrated in the evidence that 
remains. 
FEUS AND JURISDICTIONS 
The first and most common source of early Jacobite support was attributed 
to those Highland tenants sent out by their clan chiefs or landlords. Because the 
Forty-five was launched from the Western Highlands, it gained its initial 
momentum from the feudalistic clan structure so prevalent in that part of the 
country. A large portion of the Jacobite army before its arrival in Edinburgh on 17 
September was made up of regiments led by a hereditary chief who expected his 
tenants to gather and fight as part of their contract of landholding and subsistence.  58
Part of the reason for Charles Edward’s decision to first set foot in the Macdonald 
lands was in assumption of the traditional strains of Jacobitism and firm 
Catholicism running through that region of the Highlands. He would likely have 
been aware of the meaningful authority over great numbers of men that clan chiefs 
sympathetic to his cause could exercise.  While the size of the forces mobilised in 59
this manner and their terms of service fluctuated and were not always reliable, this 
had been a familiar channel of Scottish military strength for hundreds of years 
before the Prince’s landing.  The effectiveness of this method in mobilising 60
Jacobite numbers in 1715 and again in 1745, which was simultaneously seen as 
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atavistic but also thoroughly potent, is reflected within government measures after 
Culloden to terminate the legal hereditary control of clan chiefs in the Highlands.   61
As described in Chapter II: Motivation, the decisions of particular chiefs to 
either support or reject the rising was predicated on numerous specific factors and 
formed a complex web of alliances that is extremely difficult to iron out. This is 
especially the case due to the frequency with which some clan leaders vacillated 
depending upon the fortunes of the army and also upon the overall progress of the 
Jacobite campaign. Speaking to the importance of personal loyalty in matters of 
Highland recruiting, Lenman describes the key event of Ewan Macpherson the 
Younger of Cluny’s renouncing of his government commission and throwing in his 
lot with the Jacobites. Though at the beginning of September Cluny was 
commanding a volunteer company loyal to King George, by mid-October of 1745 
he was able bring around 350 men to the field for the rebels. Lenman attributes 
Cluny’s shift of allegiance to ‘tapping a potent vein of Jacobitism and anti-
Unionism in his clan, which helped recruit his regiment’.  Despite the Macpherson 62
men attempting to further recruit in Glenlyon, however, Menzies of Culdares’s 
tenants ‘refused it unless their Master went with him’.  In the case of Cameron of 63
Lochiel, gaining the loyalty of one man brought Charles nearly 500 more, as did 
the allegiance of young Glengarry and later Keppoch to a lesser degree. Herein lay 
the power of Highland jurisdictions and their importance to Jacobite martial 
strategy.  64
Also fathoming the power of clan chiefs, government authorities were 
convinced that large numbers of Highland rebels would quickly flock to the 
Prince’s standard: ‘They think it a most Sublime Virtue to pay a Servile and Abject 
Obedience to the Commands of their Chieftans, altho’ in opposition to their 
Sovereign and the Laws of the Kingdom’.  In a report on the ‘chieftenries and 65
dependences’ in the Highlands, government agents calculated a register of the 
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principal clans and the prognosticated numbers of men that each could raise. The 
conclusion reached by this report affirmed a total of 4900 that would potentially 
follow their clan chiefs ‘as Iron Claps to the Loadstone’.  By early September, 66
however, intelligence had deduced that Jacobite numbers under the command of 
Highland gentry actually stood at no more than 1795, which is quite close to 
reports from within the rebel force itself.   67
Despite governmental mocking of the Highlanders’ ‘slavish’ dispositions, the 
authority of the chiefs was not always absolute. Though loyalty was generally 
deemed to be ‘the master principle’ under common law and though that notion 
generated an implicit deferential respect for hereditary leaders, Duffy makes the 
point that the clan system would not have been so long-lived had it been entirely 
tyrannical.  Some heritors attempted to enforce their right to either send out or 68
reign in their men by using strong measures against those who chose to eschew the 
obedience so firmly expected of Highland tenants.  Sometimes this was effective, 69
and other times countermeasures were taken to circumvent those wishes. Aeneas 
Mackintosh, the head of the Mackintoshes of Clan Chattan, balked at Charles 
Edward’s summons and instead held on to his comfortable commission in one of 
King George’s Independent companies. This prompted his wife Anne to instead 
take command of the clan and march out to join the Jacobite army.  There are 70
numerous recorded instances of clansmen disobeying their chiefs in Cromarty, 
Airlie, Findo Gask, and Atholl, which caused considerable frustration to those 
heritors who expected unquestioned support during the rising.  Murray of 71
Broughton likewise recalled that many of the Catholic Macdonalds of Keppoch 
went home after coming into conflict with their chief, allegedly a devout 
Protestant, regarding the presence of a priest accompanying them on campaign. 
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According to Broughton, they left ‘not from any reluctancy they had to the 
undertaking, but on account of a private quarrel they had with their Cheif’.   72
Andrew Mackillop reminds us of the fact that common clansmen in the 
Highlands were in reality self-actuated souls as opposed to nothing more than 
feudal slaves: 
Far from being unthinking cannon-fodder who through visceral loyalty to their 
chiefs enthusiastically considered armed service as natural or even desirable, Gaels 
had a whole series of complicated reasons for either accepting or refusing to 
become soldiers.  73
In fact, the elder Macdonell of Glengarry’s reports after Culloden describe an 
interesting reversal when his own tenants threatened to kidnap their chief unless he 
joined the Jacobites. This motivated Glengarry to send his son out as a proxy 
leader, while he himself sought succour under the duke of Atholl and allegedly 
feigned loyalty to the Hanoverian state. It most likely was a tactic to keep the Lord 
President Duncan Forbes and the government off his back, but this scenario 
nevertheless shows the conflict that is possible between clan members and their 
hereditary leaders.  Seven Macdonell sub-chiefs and tacksmen subsequently sent a 74
signed plea to the Earl of Albemarle describing how their laird Glengarry 
oblidged us our Tennents dependers and all others of his Estate at our own 
expense to raise March and support ourselves untill we join’d the Chevalier’s Son’s 
Standard […] Now we humbly beg our Cause be heard being oblidged by the 
Superiority over us to rise in arms and if allowed will prove what we represent.  75
The tacksmen, as noted by Macinnes and others, were perhaps even more 
influential figures amidst clan hierarchy than the chiefs themselves, at least when it 
came to the raising of men for war.  Lord George Murray knew this when he 76
wrote to his brother, the Duke of Atholl, that he should ‘let every Taxman in Atholl 
know that if they do not come out at your order, their Tacts are brok, besides 
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distroying all they have’.  These scenarios exemplify the Forty-five as having the 77
essential qualities of a civil war, played out in a local context. 
Though the power of heritors to affect the behaviour of their tenants in 
Scotland was a key government concern for decades before the Forty-five, it was 
handled incongruously as a defence for sedition. In court, having been ordered into 
arms by feudal superiors was generally not considered sufficient cause for leniency. 
Citing multiple occurrences of loyal chiefs with rebellious clans, though, officials 
were convinced of the impossibility of punishing heritors for the disobedience of 
their clansmen.  Yet they concurrently sought to and did legislate away the 78
potential for such influence, despite the fact that personal authority rather than 
institutional mandate was at the root of jurisdictions.  Rather than this legislation, 79
however, it would be the reluctance of heritors to engage with their authority for 
fear of ‘commercial regression’ mixed with pressure from debts of mercy after the 
Forty-five that would contribute most to the demise of the clan system.    80
FENCIBLES AND PURCHASED MEN 
Similar to the previous source of recruits, but appropriately distinct, were 
levies demanded by the Jacobites from the localities in which they operated. These 
were mostly raised in the north-east and Lowlands by an enforced contract of 
service or based upon the value of local landholders’ estates and their tenants’ terms 
of land tenure – a system that had been used in Scotland since the Covenanting 
period.  While Stuart Reid awkwardly relegates these troops to the status of 81
fencibles and militia, both of his terms are technically correct but semantically 
inaccurate when compared to the character of defensive militia that loyal towns 
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attempted to raise soon after the rising was underway.  While a more flexible and 82
accurate nomenclature might simply be ‘contracted levy’, the term ‘fencible’ was 
indeed used on numerous occasions within Jacobite documents of the period.  83
Although there was some regional variance according to the affluence of the 
targeted estates, the general convention for estimating appropriate levy numbers in 
Scotland was usually one man for every £100 (Scots) of their valued rent as 
calculated from existing tax records.  Interestingly, the value of some estates was 84
traditionally measured by the number of men who could be raised in its environs, 
which would then be demanded as a quota for use in the army.  Alternatively, in 85
lieu of levies, it was sometimes acceptable to turn in £5 sterling per man or 
equivalent amounts of oats or straw for the Jacobite army’s forage, though this 
practice was often looked down upon by recruiters who achieved a low turnout of 
men.  Due to Jacobite needs for funding and their common practice of sending out 86
collectors of the cess in areas of active recruiting, it has been argued that the 
‘buying off’ of men was more valuable then the actual levies.  Evidence belies this, 87
however, as communications prove that offers of redemption pay were sometimes 
refused for want of able bodies. Take, for example, the case of Charles Gordon, 
Younger of Binhall, who was only seventeen in 1745 and was allegedly taken against 
his will by Glenbucket. At his trial, the defence claimed that his father tried to offer 
redemption pay to keep him at home, but Glenbucket said ‘he wanted men and not 
money, and damned him’.  Walter Mitchell, also seventeen, left his classes at the 88
University of Aberdeen to hide in Buchan with his parents for fear of being taken 
by Jacobite recruiters. Pitsligo’s men found him anyway and refused the twenty 
guineas offered by Mitchell’s mother to release him, stating they would rather have 
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the soldier. Walter Mitchell was taken away on horseback ‘with his feet tyed under 
the horses belly, and carried away a Prisoner, notwithstanding the offer his mother 
made them’.  89
The Lord Lieutenant of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire Lewis Gordon and 
his ‘prime minister of oppression’, John Gordon of Avochie, spent much of the 
rising summoning recruits from those north-eastern counties.  Sending a barrage 90
of letters to the landed gentry in a dozen different parishes, he spelled out the terms 
of what was expected. Lord Lewis was totally convinced of the efficacy in extracting 
quotas of levies from sufficiently valued estates in this manner, petitioning the most 
active of his recruiters: 
I intreat you will go vigourslie on with the levies of men, in the districk apointed 
you. I find it is the oppinion of every bodie that hase tryed the recruiting in that 
way, that there is no receding from demands, or giveing the least concessions; and 
I doubt not but you will find it the best way to threatne a great deall, and even do 
some strong things to those who are most refractory.    91
Though Gordon was confident of these tactics and, if the mass of contentions made 
against him are any indication, extremely busy through the end of 1745, it took 
nearly three months for him to gather just 300 troops in the Strathbogie district.  92
A loyalist witness to Lord Lewis’ practices commented on the meagre numbers, 
noting to Ludovick Grant that most of these levies were herds and common 
labourers who had no experience using arms, and that most ‘want but an excuse to 
get away’.  The laird of Pittodrie futilely tried to convince James Moir of 93
Stoneywood, the latter of whom was actively recruiting around environs of 
Aberdeen, that these methods amounted to punishment for the people of the 
country: 
As for raising of men, I see such a backwardness, it will be the greatest force that 
will bring them out; and as for my self, I am wors sitevate that waye then any of 
my neighbours. I have more widow wimen that hase tacks in my interest then in 
severale perishes round me; and if I should, or any els, force out the men that 
holds ther pleughs, the tack must ly unlaboured, and I fancie yow will easelie 
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belive I cannot support my famelie without rent.  94
Pittodrie nonetheless understood the consequences of not coming up with his due 
quota, and somewhat passive-aggressively signed off with: ‘But I shal be weel 
pleased to scrimpe my self to give monie to raise my proportione of men volenteers, 
and from forsed men they will be of no use’.  95
 The resistance to being pulled into military service with which Gordon and 
Moir were met even in such a traditional hotbed of Jacobite activity was reflected in 
other parts of the country. In the Western Highlands, when the Macdonell 
tacksmen complained to Albemarle that Glengarry had expected them to raise their 
tenants at their own expense, they also described that their chief had received a sum 
of money (likely from Charles Edward) ‘to bestow upon the Raising of us and all 
the other persons fensable men within his Estate’. Instead, however, Glengarry 
‘kept that sum to himself’.  Their missive was clearly intended to be a vote of 96
loyalty to the government in the months after Culloden (just as Glengarry himself 
had done earlier), and the tacksmen explicitly ask for ‘respite or pardon’ within. 
Presumably there might have been a different outcome if Glengarry had actually 
given them the money. Examples of this kind, mixed with the logistical pressures of 
constant desertion and supply, caused rebel patience to dissolve and, as will be 
explored later in this chapter, harsher recruitment tactics to be implemented. 
In addition to enforced quotas, the Lowlands provided a substantial number 
of hired mercenaries or other replacements who were substituted for local tenant 
recruits.  Sometimes this was amicable to both parties, but more commonly it was 97
a case of simply being swapped in by an employer or someone with authority over 
the surrogate. Charles Mather and John Millar, both subsistence workers drafted 
into Lord Ogilvy’s regiment, were hired out by the Forfarshire farmers under 
whom they toiled.  Eleven Glenesk men were taken prisoner at Brechin shortly 98
after Culloden, whereupon they informed government officials that over two dozen 
others from their area had joined Ogilvy in this manner. Some of these substitutes, 
they claimed, ran off before ever billeting with the Jacobite army where it lay in 
 Thomas Erskine to James Moir of Stoneywood (7 November, 1745) reprinted in Spalding Miscellany (i), pp. 94
413-414.
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Perth.  Rosebery’s List likewise features 130 men, mostly from Angus, Banffshire, 99
and the Montrose area, to have been ‘hired out by the country’ or otherwise 
appointed by a particular person. Of these substitutes whose stations are known, 
nearly 70% were either common labourers, subtenants, or servants of some kind. 
 Conversely, John Watson of Turin was brought up on charges of treason 
because he was caught attempting to pay his servant to join the army in his stead.  100
Three alleged Jacobites from Perthshire testified that in mid-October 1745, 
Thomas Drummond of Logiealmond had ordered every third tenant on his 
property to ‘use in Arms in Support of the Present Rebellion’.  In order to gather 101
the eligible recruits all in one place, one of Drummond’s captains drove the 
community’s horses and cattle away to Clashigar, where he waited for his tenants to 
come and recover their beasts of subsistence. Those that were late were made to 
pay a shilling for each horse and six pence for every head of black cattle that were 
‘borrowed’. According to the deponents, the men of Logiealmond were then made 
to stand in groups of three while the officers chose the most desirable candidates 
from each group to join the Prince’s army. They were given three days to either 
prepare themselves for deployment or to find ‘a Sufficient man in the Room of each 
Person who refused’, it being the responsibility of each group of three to pay 
around one hundred marks Scots to that replacement. The tenants who agreed to 
join had ‘Two third Parts of 100 Marks paid him by the other Two Tenants in his 
Class’. After all of this, the officers chose to exercise the right of refusal on some of 
the replacements who were raised, preferring the original choices and insisting they 
attend the army instead.  This curious situation in Logiealmond demonstrates a 102
blending of numerous recruitment tactics and outcomes all in one unquestionably 
tragic example during the Forty-five. 
Lastly, there were numerous instances of certain privileged gentlemen 
specifically hiring servants to assist them while on campaign. Some of these 
retainers were previously employed long before hostilities broke, as in the case of 
Townley’s charge, John Burne.  Others claimed to be brought in only as the army 103
took shape in order to fulfil certain tasks required of their masters. Archibald 
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Kennedy had already worked as a servant to the Edinburgh silversmith James Carr, 
but he claimed to be moonlighting for the colonel of the Jacobite artillery train on 
its way to Carlisle. Daniel Ross was hired by Captain Finlayson (probably John, also 
of the artillery) to assist him in the same manner.  Hugh McDonald came to 104
Edinburgh with his master, the drover John McLachlan, and would have marched 
with the Jacobites had he not fallen ill and gotten left behind just outside of town.  105
A servant to Lord Kilmarnock from St Andrews named James Davidson was jailed 
at Falkland and prosecuted even though he bore no arms. Apparently this defence 
was held up and Davidson was discharged while his master was executed in London 
with much pageantry.  Not all servants were hired, of course. In Perth, Miss 106
Christian Pearson witnessed a rebel officer of the Hussars who was quartered in her 
master’s house seize the son of a local weaver ‘by violence’ and use him as a servant 
during the winter of 1745-6. She swore that this officer would regularly beat and 
starve young David Morison to keep the boy reliant upon him, and Pearson ‘was 
often obliged to Give him Meat and Drink to prevent his Starving’.  107
Obtaining levies according to a regional quota had long been an effective 
recruitment process in Scotland, but what worked well one-hundred years earlier 
was patently not as efficacious in 1745. A considerable part of the reason for this is 
that the Army of the Covenant generally had the institutional and operational 
advantages that the Jacobites did not. Between burgh councils serving as 
recruitment agencies, widespread support from landowners and church ministers, 
and the willingness and ability to establish localised and national governmental 
apparatuses, the intrinsic strategy of the Covenanting movement clearly outshone 
that of the Jacobites in the middle of the eighteenth century.  Part of this can be 108
explained by the fact that the Forty-five was a more ‘modern’ and less-popular 
episode with fragmented leadership and a weaker central organisation. It is also 
informed, however, by the lack of committed plebeian incentive as well as pressing 
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concerns of subsistence that were incompatible with extended time spent on 
campaign.  109
PRESSED AND FORCED 
When reviewing the above tactics and examples of Jacobite recruitment, a 
common thread amongst many of them is the presence of numerous forms of 
compulsion. While not necessarily a distinct category by itself, notice should be 
taken of the widespread usage of forced men, compelled into joining by physical 
threats, bribery, or blackmail. To isolate this method of recruitment from the 
others would be imprudent, as instances of coercion were frequent during many 
other types of levying across all areas of the country. Rather, impressment is more 
of a superimposition projected upon the aforementioned categories and indicative 
of two qualities: one, a measure of the failure of other recruiting methods to be 
sufficiently effective; and two, a gauge of the unwillingness of local populations to 
risk joining the Jacobite banner for fear of consequence or lack of incentive. Put 
very simply, if the Forty-five had been regarded with great optimism and popularity 
in Scotland and this was reflected by the commitment of sufficient numbers of 
voluntary recruits, the need for these tactics would not have been necessary. As with 
military conscription in any time of conflict, however, the reluctance of citizens to 
actually pick up arms does not necessarily accurately reflect the depth of support for 
the cause or policy in question. What it does show is that, regardless of legitimacy, 
optimism, or passion, the decision to involve themselves in the harsh realities of war 
is not something that many commoners took lightly.  
Some measure of compulsion as well as the presence of ‘press gangs’ were 
common features of regular British army and navy recruiting during much of the 
eighteenth century. Notably, their presence does not necessarily indicate lack of 
regard or support for British interests within the populace of the nation.  Forcing 110
was also not uncommon thirty years before in the Great Rebellion, and the 
 Similar issues arose in 1715, Szechi, 1715, pp. 124-125. See the following section and ‘Identity, Resistance, 109
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government was well aware of this fact.  What makes the Scottish situation in 111
1745 so distinctive is that it was launched by a consortium of ideologues and 
military officers professedly interested in releasing a country (Scotland), as well as 
people of all the British kingdoms, from the dominance of a foreign administration 
that was deemed by them as being uninvited and unwelcome by its inhabitants. The 
relative frequency of Jacobite impressment and the severity of threats used during 
that eight-month period were arguably greater than those of traditional methods 
used by any other eighteenth-century European army.  Similarly draconian 112
measures were imposed upon the public in both England and Scotland to obtain 
income and supplies the army needed in order to function. While contentions can 
be made that forced recruitment had been commonplace in Britain for centuries, 
this was mostly utilised for the stocking of units relegated to foreign service, and 
employed as a way of removing vagrants and other undesirables from the realm.  113
Precisely the opposite was needed for the Jacobite army, whose unwavering goal 
was to secure the kingdom using a temporary army of opportunity rather than one 
destined for permanent exile or emigration. 
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The most mythologised of the Prince’s loyal clans, the Camerons under 
Donald Cameron of Lochiel, was virtually the first to deploy upon Charles 
Edward’s arrival in Scotland. ‘Gentle’ Lochiel was renowned by some as the most 
civilised of chiefs, ‘by far the Gentleman of greatest Honour and Sense of natural 
Justice’, and he was active before the rising in attempting to shatter prejudice 
against Highlanders by ‘taming’ his lands through a combination of agricultural 
improvements and social discipline.  While McCann claims that hereditary loyalty 114
to clan chiefs was more than enough to produce willing numbers in the Western 
Highlands, Allan Cameron of Callart made it clear during his trial that ‘great 
pressure’ was brought to bear on Cameron tenants who refused to follow their 
leaders. In mid-August a party of twenty-four Cameron tacksmen had entered 
Rannoch to rouse a hundred men under peril of burning homes and slaying cattle, 
ostensibly given permission to do so by Lochiel himself.  The chief’s own brother, 115
the nobly-regarded Dr Archibald Cameron, was also blamed in November for 
inducing 500 men from the Cameron lands to serve with threats of the destruction 
of their property and even personal harm. Such practices go some way in possibly 
explaining why Lochiel was able to raise more men than his father did in 1715.  116
There were numerous degrees of severity within impressment tactics carried 
out against potential Jacobite conscripts, all of which were dependent on both the 
recruiting officers and the men being targeted. Being ‘forced’ or ‘pressed’ were 
terms used to describe any type of coercion that was applied to unwilling soldiers, 
ranging from veiled warnings to extreme physical depredations.  One of the most 117
common of these were threats of ‘military execution’, which seemed to have a 
variable meaning but often was used as a language of menace describing the 
destruction of property and sometimes threatening personal harm.  Little 118
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evidence has been found that proves actual capital execution ever took place against 
targeted levies; logic suggests it would have undermined Jacobite needs by 
eliminating potential manpower.  Such severe punishment, however, might have 119
convinced some to keep their resistance to a minimum, or at the very least it might 
deprive the Hanoverians of prospective allies. Charles Edward did indeed order and 
carry out a couple of hangings while in Edinburgh, but these were implemented to 
publicly punish Jacobite soldiers for looting in a town that exhibited great 
sensitivity to the behaviour of an occupying army which badly needed recruits.  120
Accordingly, the great majority of forceful recruiting took place in rural locales. 
Beyond commonplace threats of military execution, there were many more 
detailed promises of plunder and destruction, some of which were carried out to 
great effect throughout the country. The use of burning to stimulate recruitment in 
the Highlands was implemented with two practices: the liberal use of commissions 
of ‘Fire and Sword’ and ‘the Crosstarie order’, an ancient tradition of displaying a 
burning wooden cross to communicate the need for clan mobilisation. 
Commissions that bore Charles Edward’s signature were considered general passes 
for using whatever methods were required to gather men, and they show the 
Prince’s willingness (or need) to engage with Highland tradition in order to obtain 
support there.  John Erskine collected the cess during Jacobite operations in Ross 121
and Cromarty, and was also there accused by two merchants in Dingwall of 
threatening to burn houses ‘in order to force the possessors to go with him to the 
Rebel Service’.  Glengarry’s son threatened ‘all his father’s tenants to burn their 122
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houses and hang them’ if they turned down the demand for troops.   Lord Lewis 123
Gordon, as noted earlier, favoured the use of this method when his initial summons 
for men in Strathbogie failed to yield sufficient numbers: 
he soon took to a more expeditious way, threatening to burn the houses and 
farmyards of such as stood out. This soon had the desired effect, for the burning a 
single house or farm stack in a Parish terrified the whole, so that they would 
quickly send in their proportion, and by this means, with the few that joined as 
volunteers, he raised near 300 men called the Strathboggy Battalion in the 
country thereabouts.  124
Indeed, the Lord Advocate Robert Craigie characterised the early reluctance to rise 
in Breadalbane as being ‘Resolved Rather to be burnt out of their Very houses than 
take up Arms’.  125
Numerous loyal tenants on the Duke of Montrose’s Stirlingshire estate were 
first threatened to be burnt out by rebel officers pressing for recruits before actually 
having their homes set alight by government troops riding through Buchanan.  126
One of Glengyle’s officers repeatedly menaced the tenants of that parish with 
threats that he would ‘build up the doors of their houses with stones’ and set them 
alight unless they threw in their lot with the Jacobites. Most of these tenants had 
multiple witnesses who testified to their staying clear of treasonous activity, but 
reprisals were nonetheless meted out by the King’s dragoons in the summer of 
1746.  Similar threats were widely reported throughout Scotland and fears from 127
losing property in this way were expressed in Hamilton, Urquhart, Aberdeen, 
Assynt, and Elgin.  Perhaps the most storied of these incidents was the Jacobite 128
attack on Cullen House, instigated by Lord Findlater’s refusal to pay the Jacobite 
quota of levy money on his lands. Findlater was repeatedly warned by the Duke of 
Perth to make good on his imposed debt ‘under Pain of Burning and Plundering’, 
and after effectively daring the Jacobites to do their worst, he saw his ancestral 
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home thoroughly sacked.  There are scores of further examples to this effect. 129
Although reflective of the government depredations to suspected areas of Jacobite 
sentiment recorded after Culloden, this type of behaviour was seemingly 
commonplace by both factions well before the final engagement, and irrefutably 
not just within the Highlands. 
Kidnapping and ‘seizing’ were as rampant as threats of burning, and 
numerous accounts of the forceful procurement of arms, horses, and even reluctant 
supporters bear this out.  James Robertson and members of his parish in 130
Lochbroom managed to avoid the recruiting efforts of Macdonell of Barisdale 
earlier in the campaign, but on 17 March were approached by Keppoch and his 
men, who 
unexpectedly surprised the poor people, snatching some of them out of their 
beds. Others, who thought their old age would excuse them, were dragged from 
their ploughs […] while some were taken off the highways. One I did myself see 
overtaken by speed of foot, and when he declared he would rather die than be 
carried to the rebellion, was knock’d to the ground by the butt of a musket and 
carried away all bleed.  131
The parish minister of Alvie, William Gordon, similarly attested that of forty-three 
men there who joined the rising, only three went voluntarily, ‘the rest were carried 
off by the most Arbitrary & violent method Such as burning their houses carrying 
of their Cattle & breaking their heads’.  George Innes wrote of Jacobite activity in 132
the Callander area, where they were ‘exacting Contributions without making much 
distinction of Folks and forcing out the lower Class to join them’.  This seems to 133
be corroborated by Duncan McPharie, who notes that the notorious and violent 
James Mor MacGregor arrived there ‘with forty men from Glengyle and forty-five 
soldiers that Glengyle apprehended at the roads of Loch Lomondside’.  134
Sometimes individuals were targeted, as shown by Lord Ogilvy’s letter to Sir James 
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Kinloch in November of 1745, instructing him to ‘spare no pains to bring 
gentlemen along with you, and you are authorised by this to bring with you 
William Shaw and his brother prisoners if they make any excuses’.  135
Correspondence between the Atholl factors repeatedly refers to extraction of rent 
and manpower ‘by way of party’, and in fact Andrew Spalding conceded to a fellow 
rebel doctor that he would much rather see these raised voluntarily if given the 
choice.  Even government officials were aware of these tactics, as demonstrated by 136
the Lord President Duncan Forbes’ missive to Fraser of Lovat, wherein he asks 
after intelligence from Loudoun that suggested ‘violence has been used to drag men 
out of their Beds into the Rebellion; & that by the terror of destroying their cattle 
& effects, others have been prevail’d on to list’.  Lovat of course denied such a 137
thing, contending that it was the first he had heard of it, and if it was done in his 
country he surely would have known.  138
A list of twenty Jacobites from the areas of Lowland Perthshire, Stirling, and 
Dumbarton was presented to Lord Albemarle after Culloden, all of whom were said 
to have been active by ‘taking Black Mail, by Robbing and plundering of houses, or 
by stealing and away-driving of Cattle in these parts.’  The sister of Ludovick 139
Grant wrote to her brother that ‘the people of Morange were last night threatened 
with being plundered if they did not rise and goe imediatly to the Highland 
army’.  It should be noted that some of this behaviour was undoubtedly used to 140
supplement Jacobite forage and materiel rather than to obtain levies, but the threat 
of further depredations became a useful tool that was employed in rural areas 
against potential recruits: 
William Robertson in Badenoch declares young Cluny came to his house and 
ordered 20 cows and 6 horses to be taken from him and otherwise threatened 
him & upon consenting to go they were restored except one cow which was 
killed.  141
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The prevalence of cattle and horses being used as enticement or bait to garner 
recruits illustrates the importance of these ‘bestiall’ upon which so much of 
Scotland’s rural populace relied. In known areas of Jacobite sentiment, the threat of 
such actions were also used by the government as a way to dissuade recruits from 
continuing with the army. Indeed, the Secretary of State gave orders to Sir John 
Cope during the early days of the rising that he should drive off the livestock of 
known rebels, as ‘tis thought many of them would on that account incline to return 
home’.  142
Coercion could also take the form of bribes or persuasion without coming to 
violence, though in practice it often was not enough without some material 
incentive to supplement verbal patronage. Some lairds promised rent reductions for 
willing recruits while others were offered other tangible gratuities.  Guarantees of 143
substantial reinforcement were sometimes circulated amongst the troops, helping to 
maintain morale, and fallacious reports about the destruction of the British army in 
Flanders were spread through Urquhart in order to encourage doubting tenants to 
enlist.  Angus Macdonell, the ill-fated son of Keppoch, sent a letter to Macdonell 144
of Barisdale with the wholly false information that three separate Jacobite standards 
had been set up in England.  Whether Angus was complicit in producing 145
fabricated intelligence or simply passing it along is unknown, but numerous other 
letters from rebel soldiers show that they were told similar things by commanding 
officers.  Barisdale’s own recruiting drive in Sutherland, meanwhile, was 146
supplemented by copious amounts of whisky, which he foisted upon the local 
populace as an enticing treat for joining up. When the drink was finished, nearly 
70% of his inebriated recruits melted off to their homes, and Colla Ban had to rely 
on more forceful measures thereafter. Other captured Jacobites later claimed to 
 Tweeddale to John Cope (7 September, 1745), NLS MS.7078 f. 29. See also Munro of Culcairn to several (4 142
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have also been ‘imposed upon when drunk,’ and were likely to have had quite the 
shock when clearer heads prevailed.  147
The search for hard numbers of those who claim or are thought to have 
been impressed is ultimately deceptive. It is true that the government regarded 
many such claims upon formal trial with scepticism, but officials were also willing 
to pardon thousands of plebeian Jacobites upon quitting the army and surrendering 
their arms, whether forced or voluntary.  This paradoxical combination of 148
mistrust and mercy tends to obfuscate specific details, making some accounts 
extremely difficult to take at face value. There are likewise simply too many 
instances of missing information in the published compilations of rebel participants 
to draw a satisfying conclusion, though there is enough there to grasp some 
relevant themes. Rosebery’s List, for example, contains only about 300 names who 
are noted as being forced, pressed, or compelled to carry arms. Similarly, only 127 
persons are explicitly stated to have pled impressment or seizure within the nearly 
3500 names contained in The Prisoners of the ’45.  It has already been demonstrated 149
that these sources alone are insufficient, however, and this is borne out by just a 
couple of examples that shed a bit more light on the matter.  
A document in Albemarle’s possession attempts to quantify the names of 
known rebels on the Morvern estate of the Duke of Argyll, and shows that thirty-
seven of seventy-two of Argyll’s tenants there were involved in the rising.  Of this 150
total (51.4% of the estate), ten were noted as being forced (27%), while nine were 
killed (24.3%) and eighteen were in hiding or otherwise unknown (48.6%) to the 
authorities. While it is possible that this means the entirety of captured tenants 
pleaded impressment, it also does not clarify the conditions of the total majority 
that are either dead or missing.  Furthermore, it demonstrates the occurrence of 151
even loyalist estates being riven by the civil war that the Forty-five precipitated. 
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Returns submitted by the ministers of Urquhart and Glenmoriston offer figures 
indicating even greater frequencies of force. Of nineteen men who surrendered in 
the former parish, thirteen were attested by the minister to have been impressed; of 
sixty-eight in the latter parish, forty-five were noted to have been compelled.  A 152
further example of this is the largely well-affected Stirlingshire estate of the Duke 
of Montrose, which proved to be an unstable vortex of internal conflict caused by 
the brutal recruitment tactics of Macgregor of Glengyle. Taking inventories of 
their tenants in the towns and villages of Buchanan parish, Montrose’s factors tried 
to identify at the government’s behest those who were reputed to have been 
involved with the Jacobites. In one document containing the names of twenty-nine 
tenants, subtenants, and cottars, Graham of Orchill notes that eight (27.5%) joined 
the rebel army while twelve (41.3%) took no part in the rising. Nine others (31%) 
were thought not to have joined but decided to submit their arms to the local 
minister anyway.  Another list in the same bundle reveals that of twenty tenants in 153
the Buchanan environs accused of joining the rebel army, all were spoken for by no 
less than sixteen others who were able to stay clear of intimidating recruiters. Their 
declarations were made at the local level rather than being summoned to England 
to give evidence in court, whereupon they collectively corroborated the doggedness 
of Jacobite officers in threatening folks with physical harm, destruction of property, 
and forcibly carrying many off to the regiment’s encampment at Inversnaid.  One 154
of these witnesses went on to join the Argyll militia and another was the local 
collector of the cess for the established government, and their testimonies are 
therefore not likely to be simply partisan fabrications.   155
Reliance alone upon the testimony of witnesses and suspects can sometimes 
be misleading due to untruths and embellishments, but following threads of 
evidence sometimes reveals useful corroborating information. Robert Douglas, a 
shoemaker from Dunkeld, deposed that he was threatened by an armed party of 
rebels to attend a pro-Jacobite bonfire at the mercat cross in celebration of the 
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Prince’s birthday, lest his home be burned. Upon resisting, he was carried ‘with 
Drawn Swords & Cockt Pistoles forcibly to said Bonefire’.  Douglas swore under 156
oath that he saw numerous well-affected friends there whom he knew had also been 
made to attend, and he witnessed Jacobite soldiers discharging their firelocks at the 
windows of the loyal inhabitants of Dunkeld. There is no evidence that Douglas 
was brought up on charges for treason, and his testimony was used to implicate the 
presence of numerous Jacobite volunteers in Dunkeld during the winter of 1745. It 
is commonly cited that claims of forcing were invariably disallowed in court, but 
just a few examples show that this was not always the case.  Five men from 157
Strathbrand and Gairntilly in Perthshire were sentenced to death after the rising, 
but were either pardoned upon enlistment or discharged due to their collective 
petition claiming excessive violence was used against them.  Some two dozen 158
rebels under Lochiel and Glengarry petitioned likewise, citing threats of hanging, 
burning, and being ‘cut in pieces’; it appears that many of these men were 
ultimately released.  Statistics from the two main published lists show that the 159
overwhelming majority of those who claimed forcing either never made it to trial or 
were shown mercy in court. Despite Lenman’s assertion that most who pleaded 
force were transported, according to these sources nearly three times as many 
reluctant conscripts were released than were punished by transportation or 
execution.  Though every attempt was made by government officials to indict 160
treasonous subjects whether they were voluntary or impressed, there was no chance 
that British penal institutions could process, contain, and subsist the massive influx 
of potential bodies. Some allowances simply had to be made.  161
The numerous and varied examples described here amount to only just a 
cursory glimpse of the accounts of impressment during the Forty-five. Though the 
objective truth of these narratives will always be in question, a more rigorous 
examination of these and many more is not beyond the ability of historians. In 
addition to seeking out evidence of Jacobite soldiers who claimed to be compelled, 
it is equally important to further research those who were brought up on charges of 
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enacting forceful recruiting, as well as those who were approached but ultimately 
did not relent. Merging both sides of such information can help bring relevant 
motivations into perspective, as well as the context of specific tasks related to 
recruiting during the Forty-five. Furthermore, based on the number of men in 
these lists who were charged with being ‘very active in raising men for the Rebels’ 
and with ‘forcing men out of their estates’, it is curious that more soldiers claiming 
to be impressed are not listed. Certainly their numbers are more widespread and 
copious than the fragmentary lists of prisoners would indicate, culled only from a 
limited segment of alleged and captured Jacobites. 
FOREIGN REGULARS 
As surveyed in Chapter II, Continental units also took part in the rising, like 
John Drummond’s Royal Ecossais and the Irish ‘Wild Geese’, both of whom were 
enlisted in French service. Scottish soldiers had been a regular part of military 
service in France since the Middle Ages, representing Scotland’s contribution to a 
loose contract of ‘mutual aid’, and were also prominent in Dutch and Swedish 
armies during the Thirty Years’ War.  Irish regiments had likewise served in 162
France since 1635, but many more thousands of military migrants fled Ireland to 
seek their fortunes in France after the end of the Irish Jacobite campaigns and the 
Treaty of Limerick in 1691.  The threat of French invasion was indeed the most 163
effective strategic weapon brought to bear upon Britain during the mid-eighteenth 
century, a menace which ensured that a significant number of British troops 
remained at home for defence, thereby cutting into their effectiveness in Europe.  164
This incentive naturally reinforced Louis XV’s desire for a cordial relationship 
between France and the British Jacobites, and goes some way in explaining the 
 Glozier, Scottish Soldiers in France, p. 31; Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, pp. 24-31. See Steve 162
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sustained assurances of support through the entire period of Jacobite activity, as 
well as the loan of troops in 1745. 
Scottish and Irish soldiers in early modern France served in an ‘absolutist’ 
system of military service that saw monarchical control of the martial 
administration and attempted to replace a private army with a standing one. This 
challenged the typical contract-based system of foreign recruitment that had been 
prevalent in the seventeenth century, as well as the regionalist self-esteem that 
permeated much of Scottish society.  It also challenged Scots’ innate sense of 165
‘natural’ service to their domestic sovereign, which directly conflicted with that of 
their foreign-based employers.  While debated by scholars, however, concepts of 166
loyalty within military service apparently were less defined by nationality and more 
by behavioural choices and ‘concentric identities’, and it is fitting to note that 
service abroad did not necessarily equate with a lack of interest in affairs back 
home.  167
By the eighteenth century, British recruitment into foreign service could be 
legal or illegal, and the alliances formed during the War of Austrian Succession 
assured that Scots who joined Louis’ army were not regarded favourably by the 
British government. Restrictions imposed on Irish Catholics and Jacobites from the 
1690s and in the aftermath of the Fifteen nonetheless stimulated foreign service as 
the oppressed fled Britain and Ireland for opportunities of employment.  Victoria 168
Henshaw notes that in addition to seeking wealth and stability, Scots were lured 
into foreign armies by ‘less severe methods of punishment’ as well as fixed periods 
of service, which were often seen as more desirable than the lifelong expectations of 
domestic duty.  Of those in French regiments who took part in the Forty-five, 169
most were likely recruited well before the rising started and for other purposes. In 
the case of the Royal Ecossais, John Drummond had secured a number of troops 
during a clandestine recruiting drive in the Highlands in 1744, while many of the 
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soldiers in the Irish Brigades had seen extensive action on the Continent by the 
time the Forty-five commenced.  170
Foreign troops potentially risked less upon capture due to their status as 
prisoners of war, and those who could be proven subjects of Louis XV were later 
sent back to France in exchange for British prisoners.  Contrary to widespread 171
belief, however, British subjects (including Scots and Irish) in French service were 
not entitled to the benefits of that status.  As evidenced by the results of their 172
arraignments, most were nonetheless discharged or returned to France under 
promise of never again returning to Britain.   Many of the soldiers in French 173
service who found themselves sailing to Scotland in the autumn of 1745 were 
recruited by Scottish and Irish officers with previous experience in the Jacobite wars 
earlier in the long century.  Indeed, a handful of Jacobite veterans of the Fifteen 174
served once again in the Forty-five, though most of these were officers with lifelong 
commissions rather than fixed contracts.  How many common soldiers appeared 175
in both risings is unknown. Government intelligence did figure that a sizeable 
contingent of these troops in French service were formerly British army soldiers 
captured at Fontenoy, and in fact there had been a steady stream of deserters who 
departed Drummond’s command once in Scotland to make their way to safety at 
Stirling.  Richard Cook likewise deserted from Howard’s regiment in Flanders 176
and joined the Ecossais, while Samuel Diamont left Wolfe’s command to sign up 
with Rooth’s Irish. James Lyon, a native of Montrose, absconded from Dutch 
service and was picked up as a spy and a thief before being committed for treason.  177
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BRITISH ARMY DESERTERS 
Occurrences of British army regulars choosing to desert and defect to the 
enemy can generally be explained in one of two ways: either through a crisis of 
ideological, occupational, or moral principle; or feeling that their capture by the 
Jacobites offered them little other choice. Apprehended British soldiers choosing to 
join the Jacobite ranks were quite numerous, however short were some of their 
tenures, and their reasons for doing so are varied and in need of closer 
examination.  John McKeek and William McVicar were both soldiers of the 178
Independent companies under Campbells of Cruachan and Carvaig, and were taken 
by Jacobite troops at Kinnachan and Blair, respectively. Both pleaded that they 
joined the rebels ‘because they were like to be starv’d being only allow’d a pound of 
Meal each & no more a week except one Shilling.’ In their examinations at 
Inverary, the two soldiers complained of rough treatment digging in the mines at 
Fort Augustus in service to the Duke of Perth’s regiment. They also called out a 
fellow soldier taken from Loudoun’s regiment, Lieutenant Hugh McLane, who 
enlisted in a Jacobite unit and proceeded to help the rebels to raise troops in the 
Rannoch area.  Elizabeth Rob deposed that her husband, a sergeant in Lascelles’, 179
was taken prisoner after Prestonpans and ‘was perswaded to Enlist with them’ 
before being hanged at Carlisle after the capitulation of the town to government 
troops.  After a stint of only two months, Niccol Whyte also deserted Lascelles’ 180
regiment in May 1744 and joined the Jacobite hussars in November 1745 when 
they rode through his home of Kincardine. He then left the Jacobite army and tried 
to re-enlist with government troops in February 1746, only to be recognised and 
captured.  Including the Independent Highland companies raised in Scotland, 181
over two-hundred British army deserters who went on to join the Jacobites can be 
identified, though the total number who deserted service altogether was surely 
much higher.  182
Cope had complained of desertions amongst his men as early as 20 August, 
just a day after Charles Edward’s standard was raised at Glenfinnan, and a large 
 See Appendix XIV: British Army Deserters in Jacobite Service 1745-7, fig. 1.178
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number of prisoners defected from his corps after Prestonpans.  Some of these 183
men marched with the rebels into England, and at least four were subsequently 
lured out of their regiments by government spies before being tried and executed in 
Carlisle.  By the end of November 1745, the Earl of Loudoun, commander of the 184
King’s troops in the Inverness area, had embarrassingly lost scores of his men who 
melted off to their homes. Loudoun wrote to the Earl of Sutherland shortly 
thereafter that ‘tho’ by our lawes there crime is desertion and the punishment is 
death’, he would accept them back into the regiment without punishment if they 
would make their way back to camp.  185
When punishments for desertion were carried out, they were done so in 
front of the regiment to serve as examples and deterrence, and varied ‘from 
corporal to capital’.  Courts martial were held at Perth, Stirling, Inverness, 186
Edinburgh, and Carlisle in the late summer and autumn of 1746. Though they were 
intended to be carried out within twenty-four hours of confinement, some deserters 
in Edinburgh were kept in prison for over a month with no trial.  At least forty-187
eight British soldiers were executed after their recapture (22%), a relatively high 
proportion compared to punishment for desertion in other British theatres of 
war.  This is likely defined by the severity of charges that come with defection – 188
also considered treason by any other name. Others were pardoned, transported, or 
even allowed back into their units, like the eleven men of Guise’s regiment who 
were given favourable recommendation by a minister in Inverness.   189
Desertions from the Scots regiments in the Netherlands were also common, 
and government intelligence demonstrates concern that those who made it back 
home would attempt to bolster the Jacobite effort there. To combat this, orders 
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were issued for the customs officers in Britain to stop and search all soldiers 
arriving from the Continent.  Some still got through. In addition to the cases 190
mentioned in Chapter II, John Ritchie of MacKay’s regiment was taken by the 
French at the siege of Tournay, who ‘used him with such Severity’ that he was 
forced to enlist in the Royal Ecossais.  An aide-de-camp to one of the Dutch 191
generals was later found plundering Lowther Hall in Westmoreland with a group 
of Jacobites, where he was captured by the Penrith Volunteers.  It is perhaps no 192
surprise that after the rising there was a concerted effort by government officials to 
keep those who participated in rebellion out of future service in the Dutch 
Brigades.  Albemarle in fact issued a strict directive that required recruiters to 193
swear compliance of this, as well as to provide as much information as possible 
about any potential troops enlisted for service.  Albemarle voiced contention 194
about orders from the Dutch minister that Roman Catholics were also to be passed 
over, asking for clarification from Newcastle and arguing ‘I should be glad to clear 
this Country of their great numbers’.  He was no doubt relieved by the Duke’s 195
assertion 
that it is not His Majtys Intention, to prevent the Enlisting of Roman Catholicks in 
the Dutch Regiments, that shall be recruited in Scotland; as It is rather to be 
wished, that as many of Them, as possible, should engage in That Service.  196
PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT 
Jacobite recruitment patterns have been well-treated in Jean McCann’s 
study of army organisation, though it is fitting here to review her findings and also 
to add some additional salient points. In short, McCann’s analysis highlights a lack 
of connection between ‘military successes and reverses’ and localised Jacobite 
recruiting activities. She also shows that the fortunes of the main body of the army 
had little to do with how successful or unsuccessful recruitment was during the 
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entire campaign. Most importantly, McCann notes that adherence could be 
extremely short-term and often unavailable ‘for anything more than local 
activity’.  Her identification of recruitment patterns indicates that less than half 197
(43-46%) of all levies were drawn from the Highlands and Islands, with upwards of 
20% coming from Perthshire, a county consisting of both Highland and Lowland 
areas. The three north-eastern counties of Aberdeenshire, Moray, and Banff 
account for up to one-fourth of total army strength.  That leaves 10% to account 198
for the rest of Britain (McCann does not include foreign troops in her calculations), 
but she does not accurately represent the significant Jacobite contribution from 
Angus, some of which can be considered north-eastern and all of which is certainly 
Lowland. With the exception of Angus (which is included here along with 
Kincardineshire as part of the North-East), McCann’s numbers and the 
percentages of the Jacobite constituency presented in Chapter III are not terribly 
disparate. With many more sources added in as well as a prosopographical analysis 
of the popular data, a facet that McCann did not implement in 1963, we see similar 
trends, but with even more turnout in the north-east and less in the Highlands. 
How these regions are classified, however, has much to do with the statistical 
interpretation. 
These respective studies show mixed results when comparing recruitment 
tactics by region. McCann describes the use of violent force in the Western 
Highlands as rare, citing that Lochiel had no difficulties gathering support amongst 
his clan; a fact which is refuted earlier in this chapter.  The presence of clan chiefs 199
with the main body of the army did not seem to have any bearing on the use of 
violence back home, though McCann claims the chiefs did not find it necessary to 
return to their estates to ‘beat up further recruits’.  Numerous exceptions to this 200
assertion have been described within this chapter, and it should be stressed that 
adherence in the Highlands was almost certainly never a case of ‘all or none’.  The 201
fact that most of the chiefs themselves did not return to continue recruiting does 
not rule out the instances of subsidiaries (like the all-important tacksmen) doing the 
dirty work, as well as the presence of cross-clan recruiting – as with the efforts of 
 McCann, ‘Organisation’, pp. ix-xiv.197
 Ibid., pp. xvi-xvii.198
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Glengarry, Cluny, and Macdonell of Barisdale. In both Highland and Lowland 
Perthshire as well as the north-east, McCann offers solid evidence to support the 
presence of unwilling recruits as a considerable portion of all Jacobite levies in 
those regions, garnered everywhere from Tullibardine’s contemptuous authority in 
Atholl to Lewis Gordon’s brutal tactics in Aberdeenshire.  Though there are 202
indications that some elites with considerable local influence were able to bring 
volunteers to bear in these areas, as well as considering the large pockets of effusive 
Episcopalian tradition, recruits from much of Perthshire and the north-east can and 
should be considered largely conscript forces.  McCann regards Lowland 203
recruiting as an important means for the Jacobites to have gathered finances as well 
as soldiers, and describes that both forcing and the hiring out of men were quite 
common in Angus, with very few occurrences of ‘followings, in the Highland sense’ 
either there or in the other Lowland counties.  204
The most significant misstep that McCann makes in her analysis is to 
maintain that while Jacobite officers blamed desertion for low numbers of recruits, 
the totals ‘only seemed small’ because of misleading and exaggerated intelligence.  205
Rather, a major thrust of this study contends that desertion was indeed the main 
culprit for the low ceilings on Jacobite units, which is mentioned time and again 
within correspondence and memoirs from both sides, as well as in examination and 
trial records during and after the campaign.  To this must be added the 206
widespread resistance that Jacobite recruiters faced in all areas of Britain to a cause 
that provided disjointed incentive and ambiguous goals for the mainstay of the 
soldiers within the army. Engaging in a variety of recruitment tactics based upon 
further oppression and force without option appears to have helped make a 
movement that was already waning in popularity all the less popular.  207
 McCann, ‘Organisation’, pp. 32-33, 38-45, 48, 64, 77-80.202
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IDENTITY, RESISTANCE, AND DESERTION 
The wavering depth of military commitment offered by plebeian Jacobite 
soldiers in 1745 seemingly contradicts earlier precedents and the traditional maxim 
of an innate ‘martial heritage’ in Scotland, especially amongst the Gàidhealtachd.  208
There is no simple explanation for this, but for the purposes of this study it is 
important to attempt to account for the resistance demonstrated by large sectors of 
targeted recruits rather than simply labelling the Forty-five as an unpopular 
venture. Well-supported levying efforts by the Covenanters show that it was 
entirely possible to raise an army of over 35,000 in Scotland, and, accounting for 
the turnover of troops, more than 20,000 were likely brought out in rebellion in 
1715.  Despite the effectiveness of national levies imposed during the reigns of 209
James VI and Charles I, recruiting of the lower classes had proven challenging at 
times since the 1630s.  Resistance to the passing of Lauderdale’s Militia Act in 210
1669 shows that absolutist methods of military recruitment had been not easily 
welcomed by British politicians and conjured the demons of Stuart mandates earlier 
in the century.  The focus on the ‘daily routine’ of military activity that Aonghas 211
MacCoinnich describes as being vital to the culture of Gaeldom during the 
seventeenth century appears to have slowly tapered off in the years subsequent to 
the (grudging) acceptance of Union.  The concept of a regular standing army 212
irritated the sensitivities of non-elites in Britain and by the mid-eighteenth century, 
the general consensus of most Scots was that large bodies of armed troops 
garrisoned domestically was threatening to their well-being.  Whether this 213
contributed to the unwillingness of commoners to support the Jacobites in 1745 is 
 The subject has been explored in detail in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., Fighting for Identity. Especially 208
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not clear, but it is certain that resistance to martial service manifested on both sides 
of the conflict.  214
The most crucial and delicate times for the Jacobite army were immediately 
after battles and during the all-important harvest. These were the periods when 
available numbers were at their lowest due to widespread desertion, which is 
substantiated by the number of subsistence farmers in the ranks of rebel units.  In 215
fact, Andrew Mackillop is confident that military service in the Highlands was 
essentially predicated upon support for the agricultural sector, with the harvest 
cycle and the general estate economy being ‘the ultimate priorities’ for clansmen 
despite any martial expectations by tacksmen or chief.  Advancements in estate 216
organisation continued to further the interest toward local economies and away 
from the military ‘independence’ so often associated with early modern Scottish 
culture, which had also frustrated recruiters thirty years before in the Fifteen.  217
The trend would continue until Highland reintegration with the British army after 
the rising, where the ‘sins’ of Jacobitism could be erased by engaging in martial 
service to the crown, manifesting in a new British patriotism and assisting the 
eventual demise of clanship.  218
It should be considered that pervasive desertion within Jacobite ranks, 
whether temporary or permanent, was effectively just as threatening to the 
cohesion of the army and its logistical development as any government forces set to 
oppose it. Though McCann, Pittock, and Duffy somewhat downplay its frequency 
and impact, desertion was a spectre often mentioned by Jacobite officers and the 
command was constantly struggling to keep numbers up through the entire 
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campaign, as well as instituting policies to help restrict soldiers from leaving.  The 219
Highlands of Perthshire were especially plagued by desertions, and Duncan 
Robertson of Drumachine wrote to the Duke of Atholl that  
Deserters come now to Atholl in such crowds as I am asham’d of; nor can I take 
any notice of them, my finall posse being wholly employed in securing those that 
propose to go farther north, who cannot be brought again to the Army without 
great loss of time and money.  220
Similarly, Alexander McGillivray shortly thereafter expressed his great concern to 
Drumachine: 
The desertion is now become so general that all endeavours must be used to 
prevent it otherwise it must be made of fatale consequence, so that if many of 
them are not brought back and made Examples of I’m afraid our army will in a 
short time be too thin.  221
The government was quite aware of this problem amongst rebel regiments, though 
Hanoverian intelligence may have inflated reports of Jacobite desertion even 
further, which sometimes confused some prominent loyalists. Communication 
between the Duke of Montrose’s factors during the early days of the rising related 
‘as for news there’s so many various reports, that in short, wee are [at] a loss what to 
believe’.   222
To some staunch English Whigs, disloyalty and the propensity to desert was 
part of the Highland character. Cumberland threw a nasty jab at Loudoun, who was 
considered a Highlander by many in Scotland: 
I observe a very great inclination in your People to desert & that it would not be in 
your Power to constrain them to embark, if they should not of themselves be 
disposed to it.  223
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As demonstrated by Loudoun’s own problems with desertion after being routed by 
no more than a handful of Jacobite scouts at Moy Hall in February 1746, 
Cumberland’s hyperbole might not have been that far removed from reality. Duffy 
reckons that Loudoun himself lost over 200 men to desertion after the 
embarrassing action there, and an inspection of various sources shows that at least 
seventeen from that regiment went on to enlist with the Jacobites at some time 
during the campaign.  Similarly, John Cope complained that of the few soldiers 224
from Highland companies joining him in early defence of the Corrieyairack Pass, 
many of them had broken ranks and absconded.  The tendency for desertion by 225
Highland troops on both sides can perhaps be partly explained by an interpretation 
of the intrinsic Gaelic view of military service. Mackillop interprets that such 
service was most often looked upon in similar terms as that of contractual farming, 
and therefore many Gaels justified their desertion with belief that terms of their 
military contract had been broken or otherwise dissolved.   226
While large-scale desertions remained a concern for British army 
commanders of the Independent companies and fears were raised that those men 
would take their arms and defect to the rebel ranks, it was much more of a problem 
for Jacobite units and therefore for the eventual success of Charles Edward’s 
army.  Indeed, it would prove to be a significant factor that would influence the 227
need for other methods of Jacobite recruitment during the whole affair. In 
Strathbogie, where forcing is known to have been particularly common and brutal, 
Ludovick Grant wrote that Lord Lewis Gordon and others 
were bringing them in by twos and threes, but they were takeing opportunities to 
desert in half dozens, after who partys and gentlemen were sent, and extream 
severe threats were used to deter them from desertion and bring them back.   228
After Falkirk, many of the levies from Lord George’s ancestral estate in Atholl had 
either been funnelled off to Bannockburn with Charles Edward or had disappeared 
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completely after the battle, which left Murray ‘quite dispireted’ and he entreated his 
brother ‘for God sake make examples or we shall be undone.’  Tullibardine 229
responded with as much sanguinity as possible given his intense rheumatism, 
congratulating Lord George on the victory, but making it clear that though his 
factors in Atholl were able to uplift the rents as per usual, his tenants ‘did not take 
any step or pains towards rendering me the least Service’.  Not only was the 230
decrease in able numbers noticeable after Falkirk, during which time the Jacobite 
army was already on the retreat from its offensive into England, most of Charles 
Edward’s council of war had signed a document that explicitly advised further 
retreat northward. Citing the high rate of desertion and expressing doubt the army 
was able to carry on so impinged, the chiefs recommended a major regrouping in 
the Highlands: 
We are certain that a vast number of the soldiers of your Royal Highness’s army 
are gone home since the battle of Falkirk; and notwithstanding all the endeavours 
of the commanders of the different corps, they find that this evil is encreasing 
hourly, and not in their power to prevent [...] we can foresee nothing but utter 
destruction to the few that will remain, considering the inequality of our numbers 
to that of the enemy.    231
To say the Prince was irritated by this is an understatement, notwithstanding the 
assertion of his council that another 10,000 men could be raised from the safety of 
the northern mountains.  The Jacobite command never had the opportunity to 232
bring that confidence to bear, however, as the army instead split into smaller groups 
to engage with numerous sieges along its paths of withdrawal.  Urgent calls to 233
replenish the troops were entreated, but the core of the army never saw its pre-
Falkirk numbers, and in fact as much as a third of the total Jacobite army was still 
on the march when the first cannons were fired at Culloden.   234
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ANALYSIS AND IRONY 
How successful the differing Jacobite recruitment methods ultimately were 
in gathering numbers of participants is difficult to quantify. It is unclear precisely 
what percentages made up each noted category and even what the exact number of 
total participants was, despite McCann’s reasonable estimates. Therefore, we have 
no standard measurement but the examples set forth within a wealth of conflicting 
information recorded by partisan witnesses both loyalist and rebel. One feature can 
be identified with little room for doubt: Jacobite officers were greatly disappointed 
by the inadequate turnout of support after their arrival upon British soil, especially 
after what prognostications were reported by sympathisers in England and Wales 
before the rising fired off. Already suffering from inadequate manpower to 
comfortably occupy and defend the territories they had captured, Jacobite 
recruiters arguably further weakened the cohesion of the army by leaving it to find 
soldiers.  They were also persistently vexed by widespread desertions that 235
threatened the very structure of the army, and therefore the Jacobite task at hand in 
Britain. To make up for this dearth of soldiery, progressively harsher tactics had to 
be employed to draw troops into the army, and preventative measures and false 
assurances were established to keep them in the ranks.  
It was not that these men were inherently undisciplined or incapable. On the 
contrary, their brilliant marches both into and back from England kept the British 
army bewildered, and the successes at Prestonpans and Falkirk, not to mention 
Highbridge, Clifton, Inverurie, and Moy, more than proved the military capacity of 
Jacobite men-at-arms once they were upon the field of battle. Acknowledging the 
frustration and desperation within Jacobite leadership regarding their difficulties in 
raising supportive troops does not necessarily paint a ‘Whiggish’ interpretation of 
history.  Nor does the assertion that the breadth of causes that later Jacobitism 236
espoused failed to take firm hold upon its would-be constituents. The simple fact is 
that plebeians in the mid-eighteenth century were reluctant to pick up arms for 
 A Presbyterian minister commented that the absence of certain officers that ‘were sent to different countries 235
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either side.  Take, for example, Lord Glenorchy of Breadalbane who could not 237
raise his men to join Cope at the outset of the rising, ‘they all with one voice 
declined goeing and threatened, if he insisted, they would joyn the other side’.  238
Even on the Duke of Argyll’s estates, where recruiting for the government militia 
was focussed initially, many tenants disregarded summons to gather for the levy or 
violently reacted against it, having ‘constantly been upon the flutter’.   239
Despite the insistence by many scholars of Jacobitism that impressment 
within the army was overstated and ultimately marginal, the sheer proliferation of 
sources on both sides of the conflict, as well as by neutral parties, states otherwise. 
The most common of these arguments are threefold: one, that the pleas of forcing 
made by captured rebels were simply ploys to save their own lives; two, that 
impressment was a regular occurrence in all armies of the eighteenth century; and 
three, that force through authority was always a factor in the feudalistic lifestyle of 
rural Scots and did not represent anything remarkable. Each of these can and 
should be briefly addressed by the summation of evidence presented in this chapter. 
First, while there were no doubt many scores of prisoners who falsified claims of 
being coerced in order to appeal to the sympathies of crown solicitors, the number 
of eye-witness accounts corroborating some of these incidents are undeniably valid 
and must be factored into the larger story. It would be lazy scholarship to only rely 
upon the frantic defence of condemned rebels, and equally remiss to take the 
government’s verdicts as rote. Both sides had a pressing agenda, to say the least. 
Instead, individual incidents should be carefully tracked and organised to identify 
and reveal common threads within. This methodology can be applied to the lineage 
of the entire judicial process as it relates to individual prisoners, their witnesses in 
defence and prosecution, and the greater context of each trial rather than only the 
verdict alone.  240
Second, while there has been no scholarly comparison of impressment 
tactics and frequencies between prominent military forces of the eighteenth 
century, the very nature of that enquiry is missing the mark. The Jacobite army was 
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not by any means a regular military force. Rather, it was an army of necessity 
erratically drawn from the civilian middle class and subsistence labourers on rural 
estates, many of whom had no other options and enjoyed minimal training if any at 
all.  The only professional soldiery outside of a limited few within the Jacobite 241
officer corps and deserters from the British army lay in the army’s foreign 
supplements, the Royal Ecossais and Irish Brigades lent in service to France. Most 
of those foreign troops were captured before arriving in Scotland, and the tens of 
thousands of additional men and loads of materiel expected by optimistic 
commanders never came, but were consistently promised to be on the way. 
Providing the large majority of Jacobite soldiers with proper weapons and even 
sufficient clothing was a very real challenge, and collections officers had to be 
deployed in order to raise funds and supplies from the communities upon which 
they were billeted using violent threats.  There was no centralised government set 242
up in the wake of the army’s victories as there was during the Covenanting period, 
and it appears that the rising was never popular enough within the major burghs to 
allow this to happen without facing great resistance.  Just as critically, these locales 243
also did not provide sufficient numbers of troops to give the Jacobite effort the 
momentum it needed to thrive, and the rural landowning class in Scotland was less 
committed than it had been in earlier risings, Jacobite and otherwise.  The army’s 244
very purpose was to overthrow an established government defended by a trained, 
regular force predominately composed of volunteers. All of these characteristics 
suggest that it is problematic to compare both the nature and the fortunes of the 
Jacobite army with that of any regular military host of the period in Europe, or 
even with earlier ones in Scotland.  
Third, the prevalence of force as a recurring theme during the Forty-five is 
not only explicated by Jacobite recruitment efforts, but of a much larger tableau 
that helped associate the movement with an enduring perception of desperation and 
reluctance. Only to some degree may these characteristics be blamed exclusively on 
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Jacobite actions rather than Whig propaganda, but the extensive use of 
impressment crucially impacted that perception by both loyalists and unwilling 
rebel participants alike. Although there were plenty of examples of progressive 
Highland estates and rural Lowland communities well on the way to agricultural 
and social improvement by the commencement of the Forty-five, an atavistic 
miasma lingered behind in some areas to hamper their integration with urban 
centres in rest of the country.  This was pronounced within the traditional 245
hierarchy of feudal relations in many areas of the Highlands, as well as 
incontestable dominance of land-owning influence on various estates of Lowland 
Perthshire and the north-east.  The reliance on this authority played out 246
formidably but ultimately ineffectively in the recruitment methods employed by 
Jacobite elites, and the letters penned and depositions sworn by the recruits and the 
recruiters themselves only perpetuate that notion. Despite the strategic attention to 
implementing superficial uniformity upon the army, the divergent breadth of both 
constituent and cause throughout numerous heterogenous localities – many of 
them exhibiting disparate traditions and values – counteracted any real cohesion 
attempted by Jacobite command.  What is left behind from a sweeping analysis of 247
the evidence on both sides is that voluntary support for the Jacobite cause during 
the final rising may have been broadly representative, but it was also paper-thin. 
Identifying the way in which Charles Edward’s soldiers were brought into 
the army naturally leads to larger and more relevant concerns about the nature of 
Jacobitism and the Forty-five, in particular. At the foremost of these is the irony of 
Jacobitism’s legacy in popular memory as a ‘good’ cause of dedicated patriots versus 
the ‘evil’ and despotic Hanoverian government. Aligned with this pervasive myth – 
one of many established by the legacy of the movement and its subsequent 
literature – is the popular misconception that the Forty-five was masquerading as 
the last significant attempt to liberate Scotland from the clutches of oppression. If 
we may qualify a movement by its constituents, the precedent would then state that 
 John Stuart Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society 1707-1764: Power, Nobles, Lawyers, Edinburgh 245
Agents and English Influences (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 118-146; Henry Hamilton, ed., Life and Labour on an 
Aberdeenshire Estate 1735-1750 (Aberdeen, 1946), passim; Mackillop, More Fruitful Than the Soil, pp. 78-79.
 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, p. 12; Macinnes, Clanship, pp. 142-148; E. Dunbar Dunbar, Social Life in 246
Former Days: Chiefly in the Province of Moray (Edinburgh, 1865), pp. 80-86, 297-304; Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite 
Culture’, pp. 94-95; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 247.
 While most armies consist of troops with heterogeneous backgrounds and motivations, these factors 247
constituted an insurmountable challenge for Jacobite commanders during the Forty-five for the reasons described 
in the preceding chapters.
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a significant proportion of the Jacobite army was made of willing patriots.  This 248
claim is subverted by proof of the prevalent use of force in order to recruit Jacobite 
support in all areas of Scotland during the entire eight-month tenure of the last 
rising, as well as the widespread resistance or marked ambivalence to joining the 
affair by a significant number of its rank-and-file. 
 See Strachan, ‘Scotland’s Military Identity’, p. 321. An enduring feature of ideological Jacobitism is that it is 248
indeed not qualified by the mass of its popular constituents, but rather by the elite few. Arguments can be made 
whether or not this is the typical case with revolutionary movements through history.
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CHAPTER V: CONSEQUENCES 
FITTING THE CRIME 
In a sense, the engagement at Culloden was only the beginning of government 
measures to quell Jacobite-generated disloyalty within Britain.  Seeking out 1
participants who were in arms was a simple task at that point, as many hundreds 
were killed on the moor or captured shortly thereafter in the flight from 
Drumossie. Marked by their very presence on the field, most of the fallen Jacobite 
combatants were spared the trouble of arrest and trial, instead being killed where 
they lay or hunted down in the hours and days after the battle. The acts of brutality 
committed by the British army under Cumberland’s command are poignant and 
enduring, and they cast a dark film over attempts at government-imposed societal 
reconstruction before they even commenced. Perhaps as calamitous to the victims 
of civil war both Jacobite and ambivalent were the violent depredations 
subsequently committed by the Hanoverian regime throughout Scotland in 
retaliation for rebellion, a design which Allan Macinnes has controversially labeled 
as blatantly genocidal in origin and intent.  What is certain is that 16 April 1746 2
was a potent historical fulcrum that would underscore the lines between sectors of 
both Britain and Scotland that were already fractious.  
The latter years of active Jacobitism succeeded in further pulling apart an 
already fragmented and delicate Scottish society, which was concurrently trying to 
settle into and break away from what was considered by many an imperfect Union. 
The ‘fault lines’ which this rifting exposed ran through all areas of Scotland and 
beyond: within as well as amongst the clans; between Lowland and Highland; and 
across the lines of religious doctrine throughout Britain.  In this way, part of 3
Jacobitism’s legacy was to unwittingly speed the evolution of British (and especially 
 Pittock, A New History of Scotland, p. 211; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Gaeldom and the Aftermath of the ’45: The 1
Creation of Silence?’, in Lynch, ed., Jacobitism and the ’45’, p. 71.
 Macinnes, ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’ in Robert Woosnam-Savage, ed., 1745: Charles Edward Stuart and the 2
Jacobites (Edinburgh, 1995), p. 103 and ‘Jacobitism in Scotland’, p. 252 (footnote 80). See also Clanship, p. 217 
for the term ‘state-sponsored terrorism’. 
 While scholars, including this study, have definitively shown that Jacobitism by 1745 did not follow divisions 3
between Highland/Lowland, Presbyterian/Episcopalian, and Scottish/English, resentment on both sides of the 
conflict after Culloden furthered the fractiousness of each of these sectors. See Harris, Politics of the Nation, p. 
159; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Gaeldom and the Aftermath of the ’45’, p. 74 for brief examples.
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Scottish) society by ushering in a transformative campaign of government-
sponsored regulations and modernisations.  The Forty-five was the fourth armed 4
insurrection or invasion in just over half a century by those whose leaders donned 
the mantle of Jacobitism. By examining the measures taken by George II and the 
British government to authoritatively punish transgressors and prevent such 
rebellion in that name from happening yet again, a gauge of the scope and severity 
of the Jacobite threat is revealed. 
There can be little argument that the government’s anti-Jacobite 
suppression after Culloden was brutal and effective. Assessments of such barbarity, 
however, should be held against the tradition of the British state in punishing 
internal unrest and its precedents during the aftermath of preceding rebellions. 
During the rising of 1715, the broad appeal of Jacobite ideologies and rawer 
Scottish hostility to the Union restricted the then fledgling Hanoverian 
government in its reaction to that particular Jacobite threat.  By 1746, the 5
government was not so inhibited, and the depth of Jacobite commitment to a 
variety of causes, as has been shown, was not as tightly laced through plebeian 
society. To some extent, this must have made it easier for government officials to 
help identify ‘the hostile other’ and definitively draw the line between rebel and 
patriot in no uncertain terms for elites and commoners alike.  Tracking down the 6
disaffected in the years after Culloden, however, would require extensive 
collaboration with loyalist informants, intricate networks of judicial and parochial 
logistics, and a significant outlay of financial resources, all three components which 
have not yet been critically measured with any relevancy by modern historians. 
While numerous scholarly publications have explored the government’s response 
post-Culloden in broad terms of polity, only a few have touched upon the specific, 
grass-roots acts of policy implemented to punish those responsible for fomenting 
 In addition to Harris, John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 4
(Cambridge, MA, 1988); Tom Devine’s Clearance and Improvement: Land, Power and People in Scotland 
1700-1900 (Edinburgh, 2006); and A.J. Youngson’s After the Forty-Five: The Economic Impact on the Scottish 
Highlands (Edinburgh, 1973) are useful primers.
 Margaret Sankey notes that these factors in 1715 ‘effectively made the treatment of the rebels in [that rising’s] 5
aftermath the true test of the dynasty’s legitimacy and stability’, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, p. ix.
 Colley, Britons, pp. 5, 74.6
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rebellion.  These themes should be considered no less influential in contributing to 7
the social history of popular Jacobitism than the acts of rebellion themselves, and 
therefore shall be given appropriate treatment in the following chapter. 
While an extensive survey of Jacobite prisoners and an overview of the 
judicial process regarding them is explained satisfactorily in Seton and Arnot’s The 
Prisoners of the ’45, there is room for elaboration. In addition to the relevancy of the 
themes noted above, there are a number of valuable resources which were not used 
during its writing in 1928, including some collections in Scotland that should be 
considered vital. Of these, two stand out as particularly apposite. First, the records 
at Perth & Kinross Archives concerning precognitions of witnesses and depositions 
of prisoners held in Perth Tolbooth illustrate the minutiae of evidence presented to 
the government and how that evidence influenced their cases. These documents 
also shed some light on how prisoners were prepared for further processing, and on 
the many who were released before being sent to England for trial, as well as the 
types of evidence that conferred that freedom upon them. The second resource is 
the collection of correspondence, intelligence, and receipts from the office of 
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, Lord Justice Clerk in Edinburgh. This rich repository 
of information concerning prisoners, process, and policy helps to outline the 
consequences of the Forty-five by measuring the response of the administration as 
well as its role in determining the fortunes of the common people involved on both 
sides of the affair. 
Nor has enough work been done on the effectiveness of Scottish 
Presbyterian clergy as loyal watchdogs for the government during and after the 
Forty-five. The scholarship that does exist is mainly focussed on either the rhetoric 
of anti-Jacobite sermons or specific individuals of note who resisted the ideological 
pressure brought to bear by a nation in revolt – divided both by political loyalties 
 The most extensive of these with original analysis is vol. i of P45, though it excludes numerous vital primary 7
resources and has aged without revision. William Speck’s The Butcher is likewise salient. Also important but with 
somewhat less analysis are the reprinted documents in Rupert Jarvis’ Collected Papers on the Jacobite Risings (2 
vols.) and Allardyce’s Historical Papers (2 vols.). The published collections of Terry’s Albemarle Papers (2 vols.), 
Duff’s Culloden Papers, and Warrand’s More Culloden Papers (vol. iv, specifically) are also valuable. There is not 
yet a modern work on the judicial administration of the Forty-five as useful as Sankey’s Jacobite Prisoners of the 
1715 Rebellion.
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and by faith.  Doctrinally, the clergy’s collective motivation can generally be 8
distilled into two themes: one, the fear of popery and the return of absolute 
monarchy, and two, a terrible rift in the ‘moral disposition of the nation’.  While 9
these are revelatory concepts that accurately reflect the intrinsic nature of earlier 
ideological anti-Jacobitism, there is still a place for the review of tactical measures 
involved in leveraging ministers against later Jacobite strategies, as well as the level 
of success these operations incurred. The Presbyterian clergy were primary players 
in the administration’s efforts to identify and cause the submission of rebels, and 
formed the very backbone of its intelligence networks during the affair. Often times 
it was the word or witness of a rebel prisoner’s parish minister that meant the 
difference between freedom or transportation. Though ministerial service was 
employed by the state in other conflicts like the French wars of religion and in 
England during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, Presbyterian clergy were not 
leveraged as systemically in previous Jacobite affairs.  This becomes especially 10
poignant when considering that the Church of Scotland was the Hanoverian 
government’s greatest organised domestic ally in the mid-eighteenth century.  
Examining the monetary costs of fighting a rebellion helpfully frames the 
impact of the event upon government financial reserves, and is equally as important 
as the fiscal outlay of the Jacobite army.  It is for that reason that the information 11
discussed herein focuses less on the specific needs of the rebels while on campaign, 
and more on how the effects of that campaign influenced the economic welfare of 
the British state. While calculating the total sum that was expended to resist and 
subsequently suppress the rebellion is impossible, copious receipts and 
correspondence relating to these expenditures highlight the fact that the Forty-five 
 See Christopher Whatley, ‘“Zealous in the Defence of the Protestant Religion and Liberty”: The Making of Whig 8
Scotland, c. 1688-c. 1746’ in Macinnes, et al., Living with Jacobitism, pp. 55-69; Whatley, ‘Reformed Religion, 
Regime Change, Scottish Whigs and the Struggle for the ‘Soul’ of Scotland, c. 1688-c. 1788’ in SHR, 92:233 
(April 2013), pp. 66-99; D. Napthine and W.A. Speck, ‘Clergymen and Conflict 1660-1763’ in The Church and 
War (SCH 20, 1983), pp. 231-251; Deconinck-Brossard, ‘The Churches and the ’45’, pp. 253-262; Alasdair Raffe, 
‘Presbyterians and Episcopalians: The Formation of Confessional Cultures in Scotland, 1660-1715’ in EHR 125:514 
(June 2010), pp. 570-598; Jeffrey Stephen, Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707 (Edinburgh, 2007). 
See also Jeffery Stephen, Defending the Revolution: The Church of Scotland, 1689-1716 (Farnham, 2013). See 
Jeffrey Stephen’s ‘Hymns to Hanover: Presbyterians, the Pretender and the Failure of the ’45’ in RSCHS, 40 
(2010), pp. 70-114 for a critical look at Presbyterian involvement in suppression of the Forty-five. 
 Napthine and Speck, ‘Clergymen and Conflict’, p. 246; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, pp. 81-82.9
 Presbyterian ministers ‘readily co-operated with civil authorities’ in raising Scottish Covenanting troops in 1640, 10
but it does not appear to have been as systemic a network as during the Forty-five, Furgol, ‘Beating the Odds’, p. 
41; ‘Scotland Turned Sweden’, pp. 138-139; Covenanting Armies, p. 4. No mention is made of the clergy in Paul 
S. Fritz’s assessment of Walpole’s anti-Jacobite intelligence networks, The English Ministers and Jacobitism 
Between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto and Buffalo, 1975), pp. 109-125.
 McCann’s Chapter VII: The Financial Resources of the Jacobite Army is a helpful overview of this subject, 11
broken down into six specific categories of asset, ‘Organisation’, pp. 150-195.
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created as much financial as political and social risk for the Hanoverian regime.  12
Between the crippling of trade and commerce due to the fear of impending 
occupation, and creating a backlog of debt occasioned by the colossal administrative 
process of capture, subsistence, trial, and sentencing, Britain felt the pecuniary 
waves produced by the Jacobite tide for many years after the actual fighting had 
ceased. While seemingly not directly connected with the popular constituency of 
Jacobitism, it is indeed a relevant gauge that inversely measures the influence of 
that constituency and to what extent the government was able to deal with the 
thousands of individuals who were crammed into the British penal system. 
The chaos and uncertainty of widespread political and societal unrest also 
provided a fertile breeding ground for divisiveness of which could be taken 
advantage by unscrupulous or overreactive whistle-blowers. While the networks of 
loyalist informants were essential to the government’s clean-up effort both during 
and after open hostilities in the field, there are numerous examples of flagrant 
paranoia and compensatory inculpation, mostly carried out within populated urban 
areas where social and economic competition was greatest. The misfortune of these 
small-scale scandals is largely neglected amidst the better-known tragedies of 
Jacobite elites, but the instances of ruin or defamation borne by the plebeians and 
middling classes caught in the fray were not uncommon occurrences. From 
instances of personal revenge and vendetta to larger conspiracies with significant 
financial stakes, an accusatory mania lingered in the British public sphere during 
and after the Forty-five. The deliberate or fetishised misapplication of treasonous 
charges is a fitting coda to the theme of the final chapter, which provides yet 
another ironic twist to the last Jacobite conflict. Though the government’s judicial 
process of punishing alleged rebels was more conspicuous and systematic than not, 
it was sometimes loyal citizens who caused the greatest social consternation to 
bubble up. In its attempts to quell the internal conflict fomented by Jacobite-
branded disaffection, British society would create more work for itself due to the 
innate destabilising force and fractiousness of civil war. Paradoxically, however, a 
persisting legacy left over from the suppression of the Forty-five was the increase of 
the British military’s prominence and prestige, as well as its ability to support the 
government’s empire abroad.  13
 Saltoun Papers, NLS MS.17529-31.12
 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, p. 5; Clyde, From Rebel to Hero, p. 17; Mackillop, More Fruitful Than the Soil, 13
pp. 39-40; Strachan, ‘Scotland’s Military Identity’, pp. 321-322.
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CAPTURE AND CONDITIONS 
Stopping the spread of open disaffection was the obvious agenda that shaped 
Hanoverian disciplinary policy from the outset of the Forty-five. Based on the 
aggressive measures taken to bring suspected rebels into custody, this was from the 
start meant to be the last time an insurrection in the guise of Jacobitism would 
affect Britain from within; if the aftermath of the Fifteen was handled too lightly, it 
would not be so again. To assist with capture and the legality of holding potential 
enemies of the government without immediate trial, some ‘exceptional measures’ 
were authorised. Numerous Acts of Parliament were passed, including the 
suspension of habeas corpus on 18 October 1745, which eased the conditions for 
unlawful imprisonment, and others which allowed British justices to try those 
accused of high treason in a county of the King’s choosing.  Soon after the 14
dispersion of the Jacobite army at Culloden and the capture of those who could be 
found streaming from the moor, the pursuit of the thousands still thought to be 
hiding began.  Systematic search and seizures were made within any property 15
thought to be harbouring enemies of the state. Sheriffs and magistrates were 
required to submit lists of those thought to be connected with the rebellion, and the 
officers of customs and excise were instructed to do the same, given their proximity 
to the ports.  Warrants granted by the Lord Justice Clerk set officers of the law 16
upon numerous households in Kincardine, Edinburgh, and Leith that were 
precipitated by incriminating knowledge, and a blank warrant of the same nature 
reveals that this was likely a widespread practice.  Fletcher specifically directed the 17
sheriff-deputy of Moray to be secretive and firmly vigilant when searching for 
rebels and not to only look in the usual suspected places ‘because it is not 
impossible that in some of his Majesty’s subjects, not disaffected, an ill-judged 
tenderness may have got the better of their duty to their king and country’.  18
 Habeas Corpus: 19 Geo. II cap. 1; Jurors (Scotland): 19 Geo. II cap. 9; Sheriffs (Scotland): 21 Geo. II cap. 19; 14
see P45 (i), pp. 50-52 for more detail on these Acts. Note that Habeas Corpus was also suspended after 1715, 
Baynes, The Jacobite Rising of 1715, pp. 31, 187. See also Fletcher to Newcastle (15 March, 1746), SPS.
54/29/18 for the differences in the respective policies.
 See Cumberland’s Second Proclamation (1 May, 1746), SPS.54/31/31b; P45 (i), p. 2.15
 NLS MS.17522 ff. 1-3, passim; 17523 ff. 3-4; Accompt of Hugh Fraser, NLS MS.17530 f. 180; Fletcher to 16
Newcastle (7 August, 1746) reprinted in Albemarle Papers (ii), pp. 401-404; same to same (9 April, 1747) 
reprinted in ibid., pp. 439-443.
 Saltoun Papers NLS MS.17527 ff. 74-77, 103-104. See f. 105 for the blank warrant. Prominent Jacobites were 17
specifically targeted with search and seizure notices even before the rising began, see the warrant for Glengyle in 
Craigie to Murray of Ochtertyre (21 June, 1745), NLS MS.17526 ff. 3-4).
 Fletcher to Earl of Moray (17 October, 1747) reprinted in Dunbar, Social Life in Former Days, pp. 382-384.18
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Detachments of the King’s troops patrolled Highland roads and rode deep into 
difficult territory looking for anybody who might have taken part in the rising or 
had been known to express Jacobite sentiments. Fifty men under Lord Glenorchy 
were sent to Rannoch and Glenlyon ‘to apprehend what Rebels the army drove’ 
that way.  The same number were despatched under Loudoun’s orders to the 19
Western Isles to find sequestered rebels, materials of war, and boats that could be 
used to transport them.  Areas reporting the surrender of plebeian Jacobites or the 20
submission of their arms were targeted to find any remaining recalcitrants, as was 
done with some success in Moidart, Arisaig, Morar, and Eigg.  In some cases, 21
brazen schemes were drafted to draw out those in hiding. Alexander Robertson 
employed the assistance of a Presbyterian minister in ‘planting Some trusty 
Highland Souldiers’ in Braemar and ordering them to ‘pretend they are Rebells 
Lurking there till they find their Oportunity’.  22
No expense would be spared, as this would not be allowed to happen again 
during the reign of any Hanoverian monarch.  All northern ports were kept closed 23
for months after the hostilities ended to ensure straggling rebels would not escape 
under the government’s nose.  Though this extended the obstruction of trade in 24
Scotland and was met with pleading and frustration by magistrates and burgesses in 
port towns like Aberdeen, Cumberland’s main priority was to ‘pursue & hunt out 
these Vermin amongst their lurking holes’..  In England, Catholic schools for 25
children were searched on a tip that behind their walls were hiding hundreds of 
arms for would-be rebels.  To understand the scale of the effort and what was 26
undertaken, it helps to compare government response following the Forty-five to 
that after 1715. In both risings, anti-Jacobite processes were implemented which 
relied on gathering intelligence, capturing known rebels, and disarming ‘Papists, 
 Glenorchy to Argyll (3 July, 1746), SPS.54/32/35b.19
 Loudoun to Campbell of Ensay (7 April, 1746) HL Box 10/LO 11829.20
 Intelligence from Tobermory (10 June, 1746), SPS.54/32/13; Albemarle to Loudoun (24 July, 1746) HL Box 21
32/LO 7142.
 Report of Alexander Robertson (4 December, 1746), SPS.54/34/35.22
 The sheriff-deputy of Perth knew the costs associated with such an endeavour, including the search and 23
apprehension of Jacobite rebels, would be considerable, asking Fletcher from which fund the expenses would be 
drawn, Queries by George Miller and Thomas Bissett (20 May, 1746), NLS MS.17526 f. 204.
 Allardyce, Historical Papers (i), pp. xl-xli.24
 Governours of Aberdeen to Fawkener (25 April, 1746) reprinted in ibid., (i), p. 246; James Morison to Anon. (5 25
May, 1746) reprinted in ibid., pp. 250-251; Cumberland to Newcastle (30 April, 1746), SPS.54/30/30a.
 Instructions for Searching Three Catholic Schools in Hammersmith, SPD.36/79/20.26
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Non-jurors, and other Persons dangerous to [the] Government’.  But it is 27
important to reiterate that only certain policies resulting from the two affairs were 
similar, emphasising that prevailing attitudes were far more critical (and the hunt 
for justice much more stringent) in 1746 than after the Great Rebellion. In effect, 
the coming of the Forty-five was seen as a consequence of the inadequate handling 
of punitive procedures in the aftermath of the Fifteen.  Therefore the severity of 28
response in 1746 was naturally greater, and promulgated the objective of effectively 
snuffing out disaffection by any means necessary. 
The respective programmes of incarcerations in both risings were 
significantly different and do not scale to reflect the numbers of likely participation. 
Of an estimated 20,000 active Jacobites out in 1715, records show that only about 
1300 were taken into custody.  Conversely, a conservative estimate of the numbers 29
of prisoners taken from at least 12,000 involved in 1745-1747 is generally 
considered to be near 3500, though this number is significantly off by many 
hundreds who were actually imprisoned.  Even in the aftermath of the Fifteen, jails 30
throughout Scotland were filled to bursting; so much the case that it became a 
serious problem for both the prisoners and the authorities who held them. 
Conditions were beyond cramped and illness ran rampant through the communities 
of inmates. The prisons were simply not prepared for the amount of usage they 
received, and the government raced to make room for the most notorious Jacobites 
by implementing representative punishments and a radical programme of 
transportations to remove them from the beleaguered judicial system.  Evidence 31
shows it was at least as bad after the Forty-five, with over twice the number of 
prisoners and about the same number of facilities with which to hold them.  In 32
addition to a renewed commitment to quashing the possibility of a future rebellion, 
 Duke of Argyll’s Instructions for Suppressing Insurrection (8 September, 1715), SPS.54/26/13.27
 Mitchison, ‘The Government and the Highlands’, p. 30; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 17-18; Daniel Szechi, 28
‘Jacobite Activists of the 1745 Rising (act. 1745–1746)’, ODNB online ed., accessed 19 November 2014.
 Of these, only 74 were tried, with thirty-three actually executed and 638 transported to the American colonies, 29
Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, p. 56. Szechi figures up to 2000 were taken prisoner with 
seventeen executed, 1715, pp. 5, 206.
 There are 3471 records within P45, which is the figure most often cited by scholars. See Duffy, The ’45, p. 536; 30
Pittock, Myth, p. 73; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 271. As shown in Chapter III: Constituency, hundreds 
of additional prisoners are found within numerous sources not used by Seton and Arnot, and hundreds of 
prisoners used in their study are most certainly civilians. An excellent source for prisoners in Scotland is NLS MS.
288.
 Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, pp. 48-50; Szechi, 1715, p. 207.31
 Seton and Arnot reckon that around 1000 detainees were kept in the twenty-one Scottish prisons at any 32
particular time, P45 (i), p. 66. Again, the actual number is likely significantly higher.
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part of this increase in number of detainees can be explained by the propensity of 
the government to hold prisoners on suspicion alone as well as under proof of 
treasonable activities.  In being that much more assiduous with locking up 33
potential enemies in 1745, the government strained its penal institutions to the 
point of breaking.  
Though space was remarkably scarce, the real problem that plagued the 
prison system was the government’s failure to provide financial support to them in a 
timely manner. Shortly after Falkirk, the Sick and Wounded Office received 
numerous petitions seeking assistance for subsisting Perth’s and Edinburgh’s 
untenable loads of inmates. It was under the Board’s purview to care for prisoners 
of war, but early on there was neither a fund set up to provide for them nor the 
proper agents with which to facilitate such assistance.  In theory, a crown-34
appointed agent would be able to either provide the funding for the prisoners’ 
sustenance or the credit with which to borrow it. Without such a resource, keepers 
of the jails in Scotland had to provide out of their own pockets, and many were 
none too happy about it. In mid-February 1746, the keepers of the three primary 
jails in Edinburgh conceded that while William Forbes had been appointed to 
subsist their prisoners at 3d per day, their dependents had ‘Swelled to a very great 
Number’, and Forbes had not actually been given the money to pay for such 
aliments. Finding that very few of the prisoners had any ability to sustain 
themselves and expecting many more to arrive in the coming days, the keepers 
petitioned Andrew Fletcher ‘in hopes of being relieved of the Heavy Burden that 
Lys upon us’.  James Rob, the warden of Edinburgh’s tolbooth, described that due 35
to the ‘winter colds and feavors’ he was obliged to provide blankets to the ill with 
his personal expenses, and many of these were already ‘quite wore to raggs or will 
be so wore out afore any goal delivery can happen’.  In Aberdeen, the magistrates 36
described how their tolbooth jail was already overcrowded with captured rebels 
before taking up a dozen more in late April 1746, asking after their subsistence and 
 Forbes, Jacobite Gleanings, p. 33; Fletcher? to Commissioners of Sick and Wounded Seamen (19 February, 33
1746), NLS MS.17526 f. 136.
 Ibid. Fletcher estimates the number of prisoners in Edinburgh alone at between 200-300. See also NLS MS.34
17529 ff. 69, 94; NLS MS.288 f. 57. This had also been the case in Edinburgh and Glasgow during the Fifteen, 
Szechi, 1715, p.133.
 Memorial for the Keepers (18 February, 1746), NLS MS.17526 f. 134. The keepers tally that in mid-February 35
1746, there were no less than forty prisoners in the Edinburgh Tolbooth, twenty in Canongate, thirty-five in Leith, 
and fifty who had recently been brought down from the Castle.  
 Memorial for James Rob, NLS MS.288 f. 57. Rob claimed that he had purchased twenty-five pairs of blankets 36
at 5s per pair.
180
noting ‘they are all poor people’.  James Wells, the constable at Moffat, sought 37
repayment for thirty days of care for a sick Jacobite prisoner at 6d per day, 
including ‘my oun and my wifes Trouble in Attendance upon him until he turned 
better’.  Even the magistrates of Annan in Dumfries-shire requested they send a 38
lingering Jacobite prisoner to Edinburgh, having been maintained at the expense of 
the town and asking for reimbursement.   39
Conditions in England were no better. As there was no castle supporting the 
British army garrison at Berwick, the 156 prisoners sent there in April 1746 had to 
be lodged in the barracks and guard rooms. The commander at the garrison 
appealed to Newcastle: ‘as I have no Money belonging to the Government in my 
Hands, I must beg your Graces Directions, as soon as possible in what manner they 
are to be Supplied’.  General Pulteney likewise confided to the Duke of Newcastle 40
in February 1746 that the town of Hull was ‘under some Embarassment’ from not 
being able to safely lodge 153 rebels within anything more than ‘a rotten Prison’. 
Apparently a conflict between whether the county or town should pay for its repairs 
had been going on for some time before the rising began.  The mayor of Rochester 41
confronted Newcastle with a similar issue, stating that his jail was too small for the 
prisoners recently committed for treason, and requested that the Duke give orders 
to remove the mundane debtors and petty criminals in order to make room.   42
Repeated mentions are made of the general destitution of Jacobite prisoners, 
and their inability to subsist themselves while incarcerated. Before being moved to 
Carlisle for trial, the prisoners in the Canongate tolbooth had been regularly visited 
by ‘Idle persons’ who would pass them alcohol through the bars. This became 
problem enough that Fletcher gave strict orders to place sentinels at the gates of 
the prison to keep sympathetic citizens away.  The few ‘better Sort of folk’ that had 43
money upon capture were able to use it without appealing to the constables for 
help, but this was soon used up, and they ‘haveing no friends at hand to help them 
 Magistrates of Aberdeen to David Bruce (23 April, 1746) reprinted in Allardyce, Historical Papers (i), pp. 37
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are reduced to same Condition with the poorest Creatures’.  In contrast, 44
imprisoned elites like Lord Lovat were sometimes allowed to receive the rents of 
their estates for their own subsistence, at least until those estates were taken by the 
crown.  45
The cost of caring for prisoners varied, but is usually quoted at the 3d per 
day mentioned above.  Accounts of cash disbursed from differing institutions offer 46
snapshots of numbers detained and, therefore, the costs to each facility. At 
Inveraray, thirty-four Jacobites were kept for much of October 1746 at a cost of 
£12.4.3. Between the dates of 8 September 1745 and 18 November 1746 at 
Dumbarton Castle, £39.12.3 was paid out for the welfare of thirty-one prisoners 
under varying sentences.  By the middle of 1746 there were likewise ninety-nine 47
detained in Inverness, thirty-five in Aberdeen, twenty-six in Arbroath, forty-four in 
Glasgow, forty-three in Montrose, 148 in Perth, and fifty-nine in Sterling goal, 
with another thirty-three held in the castle there.  Hundreds more would be 48
admitted in the following months. This crisis of supporting extensive numbers of 
captured rebels in Scotland was eventually somewhat alleviated by the transfer of 
many hundreds to England for trial, but the need for reimbursement was still 
pressed by keepers and solicitors until early July 1746. It was not until then that 
crown assets started to flow back to the officials who advanced sizeable funds for 
subsistence. 
A memorial from two of the most prevalent of these agents demonstrates the 
difficulties faced on all sides of the system by this lengthy delay in attention. 
George Fraser and James Finlayson were first appointed in March 1746 to oversee 
the accounts of Scottish prisons ‘where there were any Considerable Number’ of 
Jacobites being held. Payment for their services was set at 2s 6d per day. Vexed by 
the complex and intensely frustrating process of effective communication between 
the jailers and the Sick and Wounded Office, as well as ‘getting the Goalkeepers to 
understand & follow the Instructions sent’ regarding accounts for the prisoners, 
they were apparently overwhelmed from the start. By mid-April, Finlayson was 
sending notices of arrears to the Office trying to collect the £246.5.2 owed to him, 
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and he resigned shortly thereafter, ‘having excused himself from the Trouble of 
that Business’.  William Gray soon took his place, but he and Fraser were not 49
given a pledge of payment from the Commissioners of the Treasury until 1 July. 
The two solicitors were still complaining about the workload – including 
miscalculated accounts and extensive travel – in April of 1748. Hoping for some 
compensatory recognition, they then appealed to the Sick and Wounded Office on 
the 7th of that month to extend their rates to that of two agents each, which they 
assured the Commissioners was still an excellent value. It took until 10 November 
1749 for the Lord Justice Clerk to sign off on final payment to the agents in charge 
of subsisting the Jacobite prisoners in Scotland, which cost the crown £3688.5.3 
sterling in total.  Judging by the many notices of arrears sent by both Fraser and 50
Gray during the tenure of their service, they did not have an easy time of it.  51
THE ROLE OF THE CLERGY 
Though the involvement of Presbyterian rebels has been shown to be 
greater than hitherto expected, Jacobitism was considered a corrupt and 
distinctively ‘popish’ enterprise to both the Church of Scotland and Hanoverian 
state. This umbrella of polemic included the majority of subversive non-juring 
constituents who came out in the Forty-five as well as legacy of Catholicism 
espoused by the House of Stuart and its adherents, mostly superimposed upon 
particular regions of the Scottish Highlands.  On 24 February 1746, Cumberland 52
had issued a proclamation appealing for the surrender of any rebels who had 
returned home from the Jacobite army but still possessed their arms. The terms of 
surrender stated that ‘all ordinary common People’ must deliver up any weapons to 
either the local magistrate or minister of the Church of Scotland, upon which time 
they must also provide their name and place of habitation before submitting 
themselves ‘entirely to the King’s Mercy’.  This was intended to address 53
governmental intelligence attesting to the rampant Jacobite desertions and to help 
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drive out those beyond the reach of informants in the field, as well as to mark 
known rebels for later attention. Noting the language, it also draws a distinction 
between plebeian combatants and those with some rank or station in the army, 
which would prove relevant when levying charges of treason. A further 
proclamation was printed on 1 May, specifically aimed at civil authorities and 
church ministers, ordering them to round up the large numbers of dispersed rebels 
that were returning home after Culloden. Of specific note in this later directive was 
a clause that   
the Officers of the Law above-mentioned are to take Informations from the 
Ministers of the Gospel of the established Church of Scotland, touching the 
Behaviour of the Inhabitants within their respective Parishes.   54
Cumberland’s proclamations were presented and read to the General 
Assembly in Edinburgh and from there were appointed to be posted and announced 
to the congregations ‘in all the Churches within Scotland’.  For its meeting on 15 55
November 1745, the Assembly had previously published a condemnation of Charles 
Edward’s own proclamation upon the Jacobites entering Edinburgh. Taking on the 
Prince’s promise to call a free Parliament, church officials commented upon the 
absurdity of such a claim by one  
who founds his Title to govern upon an hereditary and indefeasible Right, that he 
who considered the whole Nation as his natural Estate, and all the Members 
thereof as his Property.   56
In response, they urged all Protestants in Scotland to ‘beware of the delusive Arts’ 
which their enemies wield, a direct affront to hard-won Revolution principles and 
the security of the current establishment. These documents reinforce the 
importance of the Church of Scotland’s contribution to anti-Jacobitism as well as 
the allegiance between the church and state, which were united in working against a 
common enemy. 
The collective power and reach of Presbyterian minsters was one of the 
government’s most potent weapons during the aftermath of the rising.  In addition 57
to being sanctioned recipients for the submission of illegal arms and a networked 
repository of information used to identify alleged rebels, the ministers were some of 
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the only people in Scotland that the government could trust.  Alexander Melville, 58
5th Earl of Leven, who was High Commissioner of the General Assembly during 
the Forty-five, remarked to Newcastle at the end of May 1746 that the loyalty of 
the Scots clergy was exemplary, and despite ‘the smooth arts of flattery & cajoling’ 
used by the Jacobites to gain their trust, only two ministers were known to have any 
sensitivities to the cause.  Some were used to provide intelligence on the 59
whereabouts of the Jacobite army soon after it started to coalesce in August 1745, 
functioning as a valuable surveillance network that was already inured to keeping 
careful records.  Shortly after Culloden, the ministers of Brechin sent information 60
to Fletcher about a cell of merchants – including the provost – who were 
harbouring the personal effects of a notorious Jacobite. Figuring this was sufficient 
indication that there was extensive disaffection within the town council, the 
ministers named the six individuals and their stations, declaring they were ‘bound in 
Consequence’ to do so.  John Jardine, the minister of Liberton parish in 61
Edinburgh, directly (and clandestinely) reported to Fletcher about Jacobite 
activities in and around Carlisle.  A journal kept by John Bisset of Aberdeen’s Kirk 62
of St Nicholas provides detailed accounts of military intelligence as well as personal 
interactions witnessed by him directly.  63
The ability of church ministers to directly interfere with Jacobite levying 
efforts was also notable. In Arbroath, the clergy were ‘remarkably active in 
dissuading their parishioners from joining in Rebellion’, to the degree that Jacobite 
soldiers there drew up plans to seize and detain several members of the 
Presbytery.  A similar state was commented on by one of the more successful 64
recruiting officers in the north-east of Scotland, Lord Lewis Gordon. A frustrated 
Gordon described to James Moir of Stoneywood that the Prince’s affairs 
have suffered by the vile and malicious behaviour of the Presbyterian ministers, 
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who abuse his Highnesses goodness by irritating the minds of the common 
people, in telling them a parcell of infamous lyes. I therefore require and direct 
you to issue out an order in my name to all the ministers in your part of the 
country, intimating if they dare to say a disrespectful word of the Prince, or any of 
his friends, that I will punish them as the law directs.  65
Though no strong evidence exists that these threats were ever put into effect, some 
anecdotal acts of menace do make an appearance. Bisset’s diary, for example, relates 
the accounts of numerous ministers being killed in the battles at Falkirk and 
Inverurie, and suggests that Charles Edward specifically gave orders not to bury 
them, ‘their naked bodies exposed to dogs, the fashion in France with the dead 
Protestants’.  Patrick Crichton, a loyalist who observed the Battle of Prestonpans, 66
claimed to witness a group of Jacobite soldiers beating the minister of Drum with 
their swords ‘under the notion that he had been with Cope’.  Alexander Robertson 67
mentions that the parish ministers in Lord Airlie’s country would be optimal 
evidences against potential Jacobites, but were too afraid to speak against them.  68
Likewise, the Presbytery of Brechin applied to the government for protection from 
roving groups of rebel insurgents in September 1746, supported by words of dismay 
from the minister of Lethnot about the level of dissatisfaction in the area.  Adam 69
Hay, a young rebel from Aberdeenshire, had given his personal protection to 
several churchmen during the rising, all of whom subsequently interceded for Hay 
at his trial.  More mirthfully, sixteen-year-old butcher George Campbell from 70
Coupar Angus deponed that one Thomas Donaldson loudly declared the King’s 
family were atheists, after which he offered young children at the mercat cross ‘four 
pence worth of Drink to go & break the Ministers windows’.  It is clear if these 71
cases are accurate and representative of greater trends, the Presbyterian clergy were 
an effective force for frustration if not for staunchly-organised resistance. 
Hundreds of plebeian Jacobites are thought to have surrendered to ministers 
throughout Scotland, handing in their arms and returning home as per the 
instructions given to them in Cumberland’s February proclamation. Though it is 
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difficult to quantify a precise number who did so, some examples can be offered. 
The muster roll of Lord Ogilvy’s regiment shows 168 ‘at home’ out of 630 in total, 
which signifies that these persons likely had their whereabouts recorded by the 
authorities after submitting.  Though not all Jacobites chose to surrender to parish 72
ministers instead of secular officials, one could imagine the former option might be 
considered a safer bet when seeking mercy under threat of high treason.  Lists 73
from the Commissioners of Excise note 137 rebels who surrendered or submitted, 
with twenty-two of those specifically mentioning that it was in the presence of a 
minister. At the time of their compiling, 605 persons from these lists were known to 
be at home, which might be considered the same thing as opposed to ‘lurking’ or 
‘skulking’, the latter denoting they were likely given up by information from 
others.  Five prisoners within the examinations from Perth swore they turned in 74
their arms to clergymen, and five from the parish of Alvie in Inverness-shire did the 
same, reported by the minister himself.  Forty-seven rebels from the Lochbroom 75
area who surrendered were accompanied to Inverness by their parish minister, and 
twenty-five from Daviot and Dunlichty gave up their arms to Rev John Campbell 
there.  Eighty-seven Jacobites from Urquhart and Glenmoriston turned themselves 76
in to Ludovick Grant in May 1746, but it was the clergy from those parishes who 
recorded detailed information about their homes and characters for the government 
according to their ‘best information and ‘real opinion’.  In Buchanan, thirty tenants 77
submitted to the parish minister Robert Mcfarlane. These were subsequently 
examined by Gorthie, with accounts of their arms, where they resided, and any 
other intelligence they could offer.  Patrick Stewart from Innervaik claimed he 78
tried to deliver up his firelock to the minister at Blair Atholl but was refused on 
account of a rumour that he was an officer. This and other similar claims 
demonstrate that the offer of submission for mercy was truly intended for the 
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common rank-and-file only.  Arms that were handed in would usually be sent to 79
the nearest British army garrison so they would not find their way back into the 
hands of the rebels.  80
In addition to receiving many of those who had submitted for mercy, 
Presbyterian ministers were likewise instrumental in exonerating the common 
people who were taken on (presumably) false suspicion of being involved with the 
Jacobites. One of the more auspicious alibis that captives could hope to receive, 
‘certificates of loyalty’ were occasionally included within the depositions of those 
who merited such support. Archibald Mcalister and James Stewart from 
Glengoulandie were both apprehended by government troops near their homes, the 
former while begging and the latter for being forced into arms for two days by the 
Macphersons. Both prisoners declared at their examinations that they would obtain 
certificates from their parish ministers for release, and both were eventually 
discharged.  Alexander McQueen also professed his innocence to the sheriff-81
deputy in Perth after capture by men from Sempill’s regiment. Though two locals 
claimed to actually have seen him in arms, the minister at Comrie signed a 
certificate of loyalty for McQueen and he was dismissed on bail a month later.  82
Similar cases can be seen with prisoners on suspicion from Edinburgh, Leven, 
Aberfoyle, Achray, Inverness, Balquhidder, Peebles, Banchory, Aberdeen, Luss, 
Kingussie, York, and many other locales.   83
Though abbreviated extracts of these cases might make such certificates 
appear frivolously commissioned, the clergy took the identification of rebels and 
the exoneration of innocents as solemn responsibilities to be handled with great 
care and moderation. As delineated in the instructions from the Synod of Moray at 
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Forres one day after the Battle of Culloden, extreme caution was advised regarding 
the attestation of surrendering Jacobites as well as those taken on suspicion. 
Ministers were instructed only to grant attestations within their own parishes, and 
to counsel with those from neighbouring parishes before doing so. They were also 
recommended to keep exact copies of each certificate ‘to be produced when called 
for’.  While it is clear that the opinions and attestations given by the clergy held 84
some weight in the judicial process, a study that measures the effectiveness of 
loyalty certificates in the trials of rebels would be useful. Evidence shows that they 
could work both ways, securing the freedom of some and conversely not being 
sufficient to do so for others.  These certificates were neither always collected nor 85
invariably used by Hanoverian authorities, however. The Duke of Montrose’s 
factors were nonplussed that several of his tenants were taken into custody and sent 
to Carlisle for trial even though they had indeed surrendered according to the 
terms of Cumberland’s proclamation. The factors argued that the indemnity did 
not mean very much if the ministers had to travel to court to acknowledge their 
submissions in person, and claimed it would be ‘very difficult to persuade those that 
were guilty that their submissions would be of any use to them’.  86
Soon after the fighting had stopped and attentions were turned to finding 
those involved in the rising, Hanoverian justices cleverly demanded that 
Presbyterian ministers make up lists of their parishioners who were not concerned in 
the rebellion. The Lord Justice Clerk wanted proof of everyone who was innocent, 
rather than guilty, as well as reports of any preaching discovered in non-juring 
congregations, whether it be public or private. This tactic allowed the government 
to be far less discriminating with their initial arrests, but it also contributed to the 
strain on the penal system. Counting on the fact that the clergy would likely know 
most faces in a given area, Fletcher sent directives to his sheriff officers throughout 
Scotland to put this plan into play.  The tenor of his request is related in the 87
general dispatch from the Sheriff of Moray to his parish ministers: 
As you must be best acquainted with those in your parish who have not been 
connected in this wicked and unnatural Rebellion [...] you will make up lists of all 
those in your parish who have not been concerned in this Rebellion, either by 
carrying arms or otherways; including in that list not only residenters of all ranks, 
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but likeways heritors and liferenters though not residing.  88
Two sealed copies of every list were requested, one to be sent to Fletcher and one 
for Cumberland’s secretary, Everard Fawkener. Accordingly, most of the 
prominent ministers complied, and many of their lists are still within Fletcher’s 
papers. In Morayshire, affirmations were made by ministers in Alves, Rafford, 
Dyke, Knockando, and Cromdale. On Montrose’s estates, only Drymen, Buchanan, 
and Aberfoyle appear to have been targeted, much to Graham of Gorthie’s surprise. 
Sutherland sent in rosters of the well-affected from Assynt, Clyne, Creich, Farr, 
Golspie, and Dornoch. Ross and Cromarty provided a list from Logie Easter, and 
even Orkney was represented by Deerness, Holm, and St Andrews parishes.  Many 89
more surely were turned in, though their whereabouts have not yet been found. 
Feeling that the Lord Justice Clerk’s scheme was perhaps not entirely fair to 
many potential innocents regardless of their faith, one minister expressed dismay in 
the apparent persecution of their fellow Christians. Lauchlan Shaw in Elgin 
affirmed that despite the government’s attempts to equate all non-jurors with 
Jacobites, he had not had access to any Episcopal meeting-houses in the area  
to know their conduct, which we have had with respect to our own people. It 
cannot be justly inferred, that all who are not in our lists are guilty; the natural 
inference from it is, that we are not proper judges of the moral conduct of those 
who do not submit to our ministry.  90
Such resistance however, was the exception rather than the rule. As Captain 
Hamilton of Cobham’s Dragoons noted in his report to government officials, the 
minister of Forfar was ‘of singular Service’ to him in detecting and apprehending 
alleged rebels, and ‘with constant & unwearied diligence gave [him] all the 
assistance in his power’.  91
Like Presbyterian Jacobites, not all Presbyterian clergy were firmly loyal to 
the government, and some even showed considerable sympathy to suspected rebels 
despite their responsibility to function as informants.  The two questionable 92
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characters mentioned by Leven, probably James Warden and John Grant, were 
both accused of aiding and abetting the Jacobites in some manner. A schoolmaster 
and precentor in Alyth, Warden was said to be heard ‘singing treasonable songs and 
uttering treasonable words’, as well as soliciting recruits for the rebel army. In July 
1746, thirty-three people who knew the minister were examined in Perth, around 
half of them providing damning evidence of his activities.  Warden admitted to 93
publicly reading Lord Strathallan’s demands for cess to his congregation, but 
guaranteed the Sheriff that he ‘Entirely ommitted the Titles & authority’, and he 
was discharged by July 1746.  John Grant, minister in Urquhart, has an equally 94
convoluted story. Also heard by numerous people reading a Jacobite manifesto from 
the pulpit as well as being accused of concealing wanted rebels after Culloden, he 
was taken prisoner by Ludovick Grant until he could be tried in London. 
Maintaining his innocence and commenting that ‘it is next to a miracle that he was 
not sacrificed to [Jacobite] Resentment’, Grant was eventually also discharged by 
early December 1746.  The fact that both were released despite overwhelming 95
evidence against them is a testament to the security that the clergy enjoyed from 
being so closely aligned with the government. 
Similarly, John Cameron was a Presbyterian minister from Fort William 
who openly joined Lochiel and reported in his journal the Jacobite army’s 
movements from Falkirk until Charles Edward’s departure.  The Reverend James 96
Lumsden in Towie bucked the norm by offering his home as a refuge for two 
fleeing Jacobites after Culloden. When the manse servants became suspicious due 
to large amounts of food disappearing from the larder, Lumsden’s wife blamed it on 
two new pigs in the stable.  Other disaffected or sympathetic ministers are surely 97
yet to be discovered, but their impact in favour of the Jacobite cause was likely 
minor. 
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GATHERING OF WITNESSES 
Though suspected Jacobites were held in Scotland for up to many months, a 
concerted effort was made by officials to register and transport them to English 
prisons before trial, as was the case with the aforementioned John Grant. This was 
met with a measure of outrage by some who were incarcerated, prompting petitions 
to defend their right to be tried in the county where the crime was committed.  98
Accordingly, this also meant that witnesses slated for trial were compelled to travel, 
regardless of their provenance. Many potential witnesses were reluctant to do so, 
however, due to the costs of the journey and for fear of retribution by still-active 
rebels.  Fletcher, working from Edinburgh, was at first not convinced he had the 99
authority to impose these summons to England on what he knew was going to be 
an extensive number of Scottish witnesses. He commented to Newcastle that the 
only way many of the potential deponents would travel was by compulsion, 
admitting that he did not totally grasp the minutiae of trials for high treason south 
of the border.  Fletcher was aware that crown judges could lawfully compel 100
witnesses to give evidence, but those not charged with any crime could not be held 
in custody without a warrant, thereby making the task of gathering witnesses more 
difficult.  Nonetheless, the Duke was comfortable in expediting the process and 101
giving the Lord Justice Clerk carte blanche to not only pay for their travels, but to 
defray all costs for witnesses associated with prosecutions for treason throughout 
Britain.   102
Witnesses were therefore unceremoniously summoned from all parts of the 
nation to the few places hosting proper trials for suspected Jacobites: namely 
Southwark, Carlisle, and York.  John Horn, a farmer in Duddingston, received a 103
letter from a crown solicitor commanding that ‘all other things set aside and ceasing 
every excuse you be’ to appear in Carlisle on behalf of Charles Spalding of 
Whitefield. Horn was threatened with a fine of £100 if he would not show.  104
Robert Morison and Robert Mitchell, bookbinders in Perth, were likewise 
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46.
 Fletcher to Newcastle (21 March, 1746), SPS.54/29/28a.99
 Fletcher to Newcastle (14 July, 1746), SPS.54/32/46.100
 SPS.54/29/28a.101
 Newcastle to Fletcher (21 March, 1746), SPS.54/29/22.102
 See P45 (i), pp. 64-110.103
 Alexander Stewart to John Horn (12 August, 1746), NLS MS.17527 f. 60.104
192
subpoenaed to speak against Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart under the same threat 
‘to testify the truth and give evidence’ on 12 September 1746.  At least twenty 105
witnesses were brought to London in October to give evidence, including 
numerous servants of prominent Jacobite elites and eight soldiers in various rebel 
regiments.  Particular targets of high value were specifically pursued in the hopes 106
they would provide added intelligence. The clerk and assistant to the governor of 
Dundee, John Rattray, for example, was noted as being ‘capable of making 
discoverys if apprehended’.  John MacNaughton, a watchmaker from Edinburgh, 107
was chased through Glenlyon for three miles by government troops. Though only a 
servant of Murray of Broughton, he was considered to be ‘a Prisoner of 
Consequence’ by Glenorchy and ‘can make considerable discoveries’ if properly 
examined.   108
The ratio of witness to the accused and suspected was often great, allowing a 
number of different depositions to be compared. Fletcher suggested a minimum of 
two witnesses against each prisoner, with three for those who were ‘most 
Obnoxious’. But he soon after conveyed to Newcastle that nine witnesses, most of 
whom had been involved with the Jacobite army, had recently provided ‘concurring 
Evidence’ against eighty prominent rebels.  The examination briefs from Newgate 109
prison versus thirty-four detainees feature 132 unique witnesses, broken up into 
‘bundles’ with each assigned an identifying number.  Surveying the spectrum of 110
these informants, ninety-nine of them were brought from all parts of Scotland, 
while sixteen were already residing in England.  112 were also facing trial for their 111
own charges of treason, demonstrating the frequency of alleged Jacobite prisoners 
turning evidence, presumably to help lessen their own punishments. This group of 
witnesses represents a broad cross-section of British society, with vocations that 
expectedly vary along similar lines as that of Jacobite prisoners – with the exception 
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of the agricultural sector.  At the Southwark trials, eighty-four Jacobite soldiers 112
and twenty civilians participated on the crown’s behalf.  Fifty prisoners lodged in 113
the tolbooth of Aberdeen were witnessed by only ten named persons, two of which 
were also alleged Jacobites.  A tallied list of the early Perth examinations, 114
meanwhile, features 132 prisoners spread between at least 150 unique witnesses, 
most of whom were brought in from the towns and villages within the boundaries 
of Perthshire. While most of these witnesses testified against only one or two of the 
accused, a smaller number spoke against upwards of a half-dozen prisoners, with 
the most active witness providing evidence in ten different cases.   115
A short list of the witnesses procured by Loudoun on 16 February 1747 also 
informs the great variance in people who came forward to speak at the trials of 
captured rebels. Many of these particular deponents were brought in specifically to 
either implicate or exculpate Simon Fraser of Lovat, and therefore had some 
dealings with him or personal knowledge of his activities. Hugh Fraser of Moullie, 
for instance, was a wadsetter on Lovat’s lands and supposedly ‘a great Confidant’, 
while John Fraser of Dunie was employed in raising the rents on the Fraser estates 
and was known to be ‘a great Adviser’ to his laird. William Fraser of Balhachie, who 
referred to himself as ‘the oldest Cadet in the Family’, was apparently pillaged by a 
British officer and was perhaps hoping for justice by defending ‘the Old Fox’. 
Others include a corporal in Sempill’s Highland regiment; a banker and a gardener 
with the surname of Fraser; and John McJames, Lovat’s personal letter carrier.  116
This congregation of witnesses was summoned to London at the cost of £170 to the 
government for travel, so it appears that the crown was willing to foot the bill for 
deponents representing both sides of important trials.  During their transfer, one 117
of these men apparently had ‘given them the slip and absconded’, prompting 
Fletcher to comment that it is probably better that someone so roguish stay away 
from the investigation entirely.  118
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Since many witnesses were often themselves suspected or proven Jacobites, 
they were not always given the most hospitable lodgings during their service to the 
crown. Kept either in confinement with those on suspicion or in the homes of 
court-appointed messengers for both supervision and protection, many were 
essentially treated as if they were prisoners, though almost always being isolated 
from those against whom they were informing.  Instructions from Fletcher to 119
Lieutenant Charles Campbell of the Edinburgh Regiment stressed caution when 
transporting a group of four prisoners-turned-witnesses from the Scottish capital to 
London, reminding Campbell to remain on his guard but to treat them with care: 
You are to be exceeding civall to them and Let them not want [...] you are to take 
all care of them both day and Night and particularly to secure all their cloaths 
every Night [...] and in case any of the Prisoners give you any disturbance in the 
Night time You are afterwards to apply to the Magistrates of each place you Shall 
come to for haveing them secured in proper prisons every night.  120
Lieut Campbell himself had been familiar with numerous people engaged in the 
rebellion due to his efforts to gather intelligence for the Lord Justice Clerk. He was 
thus offered up by Fletcher to be examined upon his arrival in London, being 
promised a recommendation to the favour of Newcastle if he abided and ‘executes 
his orders right’.  121
Like Campbell, witnesses who proved helpful during precognitions and 
trials were often given benefits by the crown, but their motives for assisting with 
the conviction of accused Jacobites varied greatly. One of Lovat’s witnesses subtly 
asked for the favour of recommending his brother to a higher post in the British 
army’s ordnance train in return for his cooperation.  On at least one occasion were 122
potential witnesses promised anonymity by government authorities should they 
provide helpful information, thereby rendering ‘their intention for the service of 
the Government more effectual’.  For those themselves under charges of treason, 123
turning King’s evidence could lead to their release on bail or even full pardons. 
Four surgeon apprentices imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle were allowed to roam 
freely within its walls after assisting state solicitors, and two servants of prominent 
Jacobite officers were admitted to bail by the Lord Justice Clerk upon promising to 
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tell ‘every thing that was true’.  Alexander Stewart and a number of prisoners at 124
Carlisle were brought lists of others under suspicion, being offered their freedom if 
they would admit knowledge of the persons therein.  Some rebels were even 125
offered money to provide evidence against extremely valuable prisoners, like 
Murray of Broughton’s servant MacNaughton, who turned down £30 or £40 
sterling per annum for as long as he would live.  Everard Fawkener admitted to 126
Newcastle that for those who agreed to turn evidence, ‘hope would be a powerful 
motive on the one side, & fear must operate on the other’, but that ultimately the 
government would have no control over them once freed after trial.  He therefore 127
desired that those common people who gave evidence and were subsequently 
pardoned would plead guilty instead of returning home so ‘they may be so disposed 
of as to be rendered of some use to the world’.  128
Not all witnesses were helpful, of course. John Kent was apprehended and 
imprisoned in Chester Castle for attempting to persuade one of the King’s 
witnesses not to offer evidence against the rebels.  William Murdoch, a merchant 129
in Callander, was one of many supposedly forced out on no less than three separate 
occasions by Buchanan of Arnprior. Though at least seven others had spoken 
against Buchanan, government officials were frustrated by Murdoch’s refusal to do 
the same, noting that ‘he woud rather Hang than say anything of Arnprior, tho he 
was the person Inticed him in to the Rebellion’.  Patrick Keir had been seen by 130
numerous others carrying arms with the Jacobite army in Carlisle, and offered to 
testify against over fifty of the ‘principal’ rebels to secure his own freedom. Upon 
Philip Carteret Webb’s arrival in Carlisle, however, Keir refused to testify and 
‘declared all he had said & signd was false’. Webb noted to Newcastle that Keir was 
‘a very wicked old Man’, and he was executed at Carlisle in November 1746.  131
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EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION 
From the time the very first Jacobite prisoners were locked up and processed 
through British jails, a significant outlay of time, resources, and personnel were 
spent on gathering information about those who had been taken into custody. The 
main goal of this information was of course identifying anyone who was remotely 
involved with any aspect of the ‘wicked and unnatural’ rebellion, as well as 
uncovering any of their associates or networks that were still able to spread dissent. 
Whether blatantly caught in the act or held on suspicion alone, the Hanoverian 
administration crafted an intricate matrix of intelligence-gathering that involved 
every sector of society.  Being singularly focussed on the capture of rebels hiding 132
beyond his reach, Cumberland implemented a policy of obtaining information that 
essentially made anyone who failed to report suspicious activity guilty as traitors. In 
fact, the Duke explicitly stated that it was the responsibility of a region’s magistrates 
to ensure that suspected persons were seized if the force stood against them was not 
too great.  In no uncertain terms, Cumberland drew a line in the sand and made it 133
clear that there would be no neutral parties when it came to rebellion. Like his 
proclamations calling for the submission of arms, this notice penned at Aberdeen 
was to be read in every parish church in Scotland ‘immediately before Sermon, both 
morning & Evening, every Lord’s Day for one Month from the Presentation 
thereof’.  Between Cumberland’s enforcement of secular intelligence-gathering 134
and Fletcher’s plan to tap into parochial networks of information, it would be 
difficult for hidden rebels to remain that way. 
By early March 1746, the Lord Justice Clerk had deployed a number of 
clandestine agents to the Central Highlands under Lauchlan Grant, all who 
‘understood the Highland Language’ and who ‘knew most exactly’ the land into 
which they were sent. Their task was to gather knowledge about the numbers and 
movements of the Jacobite army, but also to inform against anyone who was 
identifiable as a rebel. This was supplemented by intermittent reports from well-
affected lords in the region like the Duke of Atholl and Lord Glenorchy, which 
provided a check for the information from Grant’s cell. Even with this system of 
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intelligence in place, Fletcher noted to Newcastle how difficult it was to obtain the 
names of prominent Jacobites, as even their intimate acquaintances only knew them 
by the title of their lands.   135
Before officially being charged, most prisoners were first briefly examined 
by the regional sheriffs and deputies of the towns in which they were being held. It 
appears that these local officers were trusted by the chief justices in Edinburgh and 
London, as they were given the leeway to make decisions about either continued 
imprisonment or immediate release upon careful review of the evidence. Part of this 
review was carried out by the extensive implementation of witness precognitions, 
recorded in preparation for a more formal judicial review if deemed necessary. 
George Miller, sheriff-deputy at Perth, conducted at least 153 individual 
precognitions between 19 and 28 July 1746 in addition to compiling full 
examinations of 73 witnesses and prisoners between 10 April and 23 July of the 
same year.  He also supervised additional examinations of 113 state prisoners 136
lodged in Perth Tolbooth in the presence of David Bruce, who served as the Judge 
Advocate of the Army and was instrumental in preparing a large number of Jacobite 
prisoners for trial.  Fletcher noted to Newcastle that by the middle of March 137
1746, officers at Perth had compiled over 500 pages of examinations with ‘full 
proof’ against 250 rebels.  138
Precognitions of witnesses and prisoners were carried out in clusters at 
different times and by varying officials, giving the government a ‘file’ of evidence to 
reference as the judicial process moved forward for each case. For instance, in the 
proceedings against Matthew Cheap, a saddler in Perth examined in May who 
denied assisting the rebels in any manner, Miller refers to an earlier precognition 
taken by the ‘Crown Luwyers’ in which numerous witnesses testified against Cheap. 
Noting that this particular case was well ‘in the Hands of the Ministers of State’, 
Miller kept Cheap detained in the tolbooth until further notice from the courts.  139
Alexander Home, one of those crown lawyers, was appointed to help with the large 
docket of cases at Perth, staying there for six weeks between February and March. 
Home charged the government £114.8.6 sterling for his services, which included 
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food and drink, rent for lodging, horse hires for travel, and the cost of subsisting a 
number of witnesses called in to give evidence.  Similar arrangements were made 140
in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Stirling, Lanark, and Dunkeld, though they were often 
not as formally organised.  As a pair of prisoners was escorted through Kirkcaldy 141
on their way to Edinburgh by thirteen loyal citizens, for example, the officer of 
excise at Leven described how the local justices simply met them on the road to 
take statements from each participant.   142
At the top level of government, Newcastle also gave the Lord Justice Clerk 
dispensation to review as many pre-trial ‘informations’ as he could, with an eye 
toward helping things along. The authorisation came from King George himself, 
leaving it in Fletcher’s hands to dismiss or admit to bail any cases that could not 
garner sufficient proof or suspicion.  Fletcher was thankful for the leverage, but 143
remained cautious about how to fairly implement such a responsibility without 
proper knowledge of the individual cases: 
There are often prisoners sent hither, by the army without any informations 
charging them with Treason, or any other Crime, and tho’ these persons may 
really be very Criminal, yet as they are for the most part strangers to me, I can 
hardly from their own Examinations, find sufficient cause for comitting them.  144
Judge Advocate Bruce shared similar powers, including those to examine ‘all the 
State Prissioners in every Town he shall pass thro’, but as of the summer of 1746 he 
had not bailed a single one. Bruce was as cautious as Fletcher, taking the stance that 
he would not sign any dismissals without the express consent of the Lord Justice 
Clerk, but he was also cautioned by Cumberland that he was not to discharge 
anyone simply for lack of evidence against them.  Lists of prisoners, as well as 145
briefs of their cases and specific crimes, were shared between Bruce, Fletcher, and 
Cumberland (through his secretary, Fawkener), providing an effective network of 
information about potential subjects for trial. These were then transmitted to 
Argyll and to Newcastle, who had direct audience with the King.    146
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Evidence given against alleged Jacobites varied greatly depending on the 
witnesses and the nature of the accused’s acts of rebellion. Fawkener was 
discouraged at the scope of the task: 
This will be a work of great labour & infinite difficulty. The disaffected wont know 
anything, others are intimidated, & many weak People who are not disaffected, 
have unaccountable silly scruples about bearing Evidence which may affect the life 
of another.  147
What mattered most to the government, though, is if the rebels were seen in arms, 
which was the simplest route to a charge of high treason.  Fawkener admitted to 148
Newcastle that the legal process for convicting rebels was so complex that even ‘the 
men of the Law at Edenburgh will be often at a Loss’, but the larger problem was 
ensuring that enough ‘clear & distinct’ evidence could be found against them to 
ensure they made it to court.  Despite the recent Acts of Parliament allowing all 149
rebels to be tried in England, Fletcher was adamant that those who never joined the 
army be allowed to be ‘tryed in the County where the Treason is committed and in 
no other’.  Carlisle, of course, was held by nearly 400 rebels during the winter of 150
1746. Therefore, with very few exceptions, many of those taken or seen in arms 
were sent there for trial along with any for whom sufficient evidence was thought to 
be forthcoming.  Though the number of prisoners moved to Carlisle is elusive, 151
Seton and Arnot figure it was at least 270 by mid-August 1746, with numerous 
smaller batches sent to London and York in the following months.  152
In addition, over 300 persons were committed to prison on suspicion alone 
without any formal evidence tied to their cases. Fletcher informed Newcastle that 
even with the suspension of habeas corpus, it was unlawful to ‘commit one to prison 
who was not accused of any Crime whatever’, but he underlined the fact that those 
on suspicion of treason were excepted from this rule. In effect, the government had 
unlimited power ‘to imprison for Treason or Suspition of Treason’ during the time 
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of the Act’s suspension.  Accordingly, warrants were issued to enforce the seizure 153
of those ‘upon suspicion of haveing acted against His Majesties Person or 
Government’, who were then held in local jails to await examination, whereupon 
they would either be prepared for trial or ‘Liberat by due Course of Law’.  At the 154
end of September 1746, the tolbooth of Edinburgh still contained thirty-five 
prisoners, seven of which were then being held on suspicion.  Twenty-nine of 268 155
prisoners sent from Inverness to Tilbury were likewise singled out as being only 
suspected.  In England, prison records show a similar trend. In mid-February 156
1746, the castle at York held 251 inmates, twenty-four of which were specifically 
committed on suspicion or for ‘treasonable expressions’ (ten of these were noted as 
papists or ‘Popish priests’). In Newcastle, eleven of twenty prisoners were taken on 
suspicion; eight of 159 in Lancaster; seven of nine in Coventry; twenty of thirty-
four in Carlisle; and fourteen on suspicion alone in Stafford gaol. In all, eighty-one 
of 647 prisoners in England were held with no formal evidence against them – and 
this well before the rising was over and four months before the majority of captives 
in Scotland were sent southward.  Though most were dismissed or eventually 157
either pardoned or acquitted, at least two-dozen committed on suspicion were 
transported to the colonies, three were executed, and another three died in prison 
while awaiting trial.  158
In all, Seton and Arnot reckon that around 1000 prisoners were being held 
in Scotland by the middle of 1746, with no less than 2500 already locked up within 
facilities in England around the same time.  While the further cross-referencing of 159
records still needs to be undertaken, it can safely be determined that many 
hundreds more can be added to these numbers simply accounting for the sources 
not used in their work, as well as the significant number of persons who were not 
yet apprehended by the time most of the trials were undertaken. For example, 
Advocate William Grant noted to Newcastle that at least seventy rebels with 
 Fletcher to Newcastle (15 March, 1746), SPS.54/29/18.153
 For example, Warrant from James Cochrane (5 December, 1745), NLS MS.288 f. 21. See also TNA TS.154
11/1081/5602-4; 20/49/2; TS.20/63/1; 20/74/7; 20/76/6.
 NLS MS.3142 ff. 125-126.155
 List of Prisoners Sent to Tilbury (2 August, 1746) SPD.36/86/6. There were originally 300 prisoners sent, but 156
twenty-nine had died before registering in England, and three were conferred to the care of a messenger. Forty 
are noted to have been ‘very ill’.
 Accounts of Rebel Prisoners in the Several Goals of England, SPD.36/81/69-71, 73-81, 88; P45 (i), p. 64. See 157
also TNA TS.11/1080/5516, 5533. See Appendix XVI: Prisoners on Suspicion 1745-7, fig. 1.
 See Appendix XVI: Prisoners on Suspicion 1745-7, fig. 2.158
 P45 (i), pp. 66, 85-88.159
201
sufficient evidence against them were not yet in custody by late October 1746, and 
he also mentioned the 255 suspected ‘low people’ reported by the sheriffs of eight 
counties but without enough evidence to secure a conviction. In order to conduct 
further enquiry, he cautioned, the government would have to ‘send proper Agents 
into the Several Countys for that purpose’, which Albemarle and Fletcher indeed 
would do.   160
The value of precognitions and pre-trial examinations to help designate 
degrees of guilt should be obvious when considering the scale of judicial 
administration that faced government officials. Getting through the extensive 
backlog of detainees was always going to be an exercise in futility, but the dire state 
of the prisons and the great costs associated with keeping them subsisted meant that 
time was of the essence. While not as inclined as in 1715 to release large numbers 
of prisoners in hopes they would simply behave, there was no possible way that 
everyone could be comprehensively processed – and the Justices of the Peace knew 
it.  Before judging his stable of cases, George Miller queried the Lord Justice 161
Clerk about how to deal with ‘those commoners’ who showed no indication of 
voluntarily joining the Jacobites. Miller outlines the stipulations clearly, enquiring 
what to do about those who had deserted from the rebel army. He also asks about 
those who claimed never to carry arms (as so many did) and those who surrendered 
their arms as per Cumberland’s invitation to do so. Notably and on behalf of the 
Bailie of the Regality of Atholl, Thomas Bissett, Miller specifically mentions the 
great number of Atholl commoners who were forced out, and asks if they, too, 
should be shown clemency as per General Wade’s declaration of indemnity.  162
Wade’s published notice, distributed on 30 October 1745 from his camp at 
Newcastle, is an essential reflection of the government’s acknowledgement of the 
many Jacobites who were compelled by force.  This document makes it clear that 163
impressment was known to be widespread enough to address head-on, inviting 
those in such a position to surrender their arms before 12 September in return for a 
full pardon from any charges. This date is referenced by notes within numerous 
lists of prisoners and examinations, signifying that many captured rebels knew 
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about Wade’s offer of indemnity and attempted to use it as a validation of their 
submission.  164
For those that did not surrender before that date, the threat of due process 
was explicit. But there were still other considerations to be weighed. What if the 
prisoners had surrendered their arms but were taken again by Jacobite recruiters? 
What if they were kept on the march through the rising but had not been present at 
Culloden? These questions were asked by Miller and Bissett, but we must look to 
the outcome of the examinations and trials themselves to find suitable answers.  165
TRIALS AND SENTENCING 
In late July 1746, the Lord Justice Clerk identified three categories of rebels 
based upon the types of prisoners that had been taken up to that point: women, the 
French, and natives of Britain.  All three presented their own obstacles to 166
indictment, whether it be how they could be accurately identified or in what 
manner the process of justice could be legally carried out once they were captured. 
By that time, only two prominent women were really on Fletcher’s radar (Margaret 
Drummond, Lady Strathallan and Margaret, Lady Ogilvy), both of whose husbands 
were also engaged in the rebellion.  Rupert Jarvis notes that the eighteen elite 167
women who took ‘a more or less prominent part’ in rebel activities, as well as the 
fifty-six who were attached to the Jacobite regiments in some manner, might have 
been apprehended, but he maintains none were tried for treason nor included in the 
drawing of lots for transportation.  Rather, at least twenty-nine captured women 168
instead chose to accompany their male family members during their banishment to 
the colonies. Thirty-six others were released, while a further three appear to have 
escaped from prison. The rest show no records of their fates after imprisonment.  169
As described in Chapter IV, troops in French service who specifically ‘never 
resided in Brittain before the Rebellion’ were to be granted the status of prisoners 
 For examples across sources, see the examinations of Michael Steel in PKA B59.30/72/2; Robert Mill in NLS 164
MS.3730 ff. 4-5; John McWarish in SPS.54/32/41c; and Robert Randal in SPD.36/88/51.
 NLS MS.17526 f. 204.165
 NLS MS.17523 ff. 1-2.166
 Fletcher was also aware of the Lady Dowager of Nairn’s involvement, but as a Peer she would be more 167
difficult to try than the wives of landed gentlemen.
 Jarvis, Collected Papers (i), p. 273. See Chapter III: Constituency for updated numbers of Jacobite women, 168
pp. 117-119.
 JDB1745 search queries on females and their disposals.169
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of war, which brought certain immunities from sentencing and usually meant they 
would be returned to France. The majority of these ‘foreign’ soldiers, however, 
were born within the British Isles and simply appropriated foreign nationalities. 
They were accordingly considered subjects of the crown, which qualified them to 
face prosecution just like native Jacobite prisoners.  On more than one occasion, 170
therefore, did Scottish- and Irish-born rebels masquerade as soldiers hailing from 
foreign soil in attempts of easing their predicaments. Thomas Gould, held at 
Carlisle, claimed to be a Frenchman and befuddled the government justices who 
took some time figuring out how to handle the case. Similarly, a prisoner named 
Levy pretended to be a French officer, but was revealed as an Irishman by a 
dragoon with whom he was familiar.  It was certainly in the government’s best 171
interests to find out as much as possible about the foreign troops that had been 
captured, owing to their effectiveness on the Continent and the chance that British 
army deserters were lurking amidst their ranks.  Despite all of this, the majority 172
(67.6%) of troops in foreign service were eventually either discharged or sent back 
to France, with 17% made to give oaths not to set foot on British soil ever again. 
Around 5% were transported to the colonies, and only a few (1.5%) were allowed 
to enlist into King George’s army.  This last point is especially intriguing, as it 173
might be expected that securing the services of trained and tenured soldiers from 
France, like Guillaume Cordier, who for six years served in the host of Louis XV, 
would be desirable additions to the British army.  Whether this on account of a 174
diplomatic contract or whether it simply speaks to the xenophobia of the time is 
open to debate.  
The greatest number of prisoners by far that the government had to address 
were native Scots, English, and Irish who stood against charges of high treason. 
Fletcher separated these into two categories: those who carried and those who did 
not carry arms, including all soldiers and supporters who 
did not personally join [the Jacobite army] but otherwise aided and assisted them 
by corresponding with them or supplying them with money provisions or other 
necessarys or by harbouring or concealing them or assisting them to make their 
 Fletcher also made the distinction in his notes that those born abroad should be answerable to charges of 170
high treason if they ever ‘had Residence in the King’s Dominions before the Rebellion’, NLS MS.17523 ff. 1-2; 
Jarvis, Collected Papers (i), p. 263.
 Notes on Rebel Prisoners Held in England, SPS.54/26/178.171
 McDonnell, ‘Irish Brigade Documents’, p. 3.172
 See Appendix XIII: Prisoners in French Service 1745-7, fig. 1.173
 Testimony of Guillaume Cordier (10 February, 1746), PKA B59.30/72/1. Others also applied, as seen in SPD.174
36/84; 36/88; 36/89, for example.
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escape.  175
The soldiers in arms were then further separated into either officers or private men, 
with all ‘Heritors of land or in the Rank of Gentlemen’ marked for capture or 
attainder ‘so as once to bring them under the power of the Crown’.  The problem, 176
as stated earlier, was that there were far too many prisoners to effectively move 
through the judicial system. This was also an issue in 1715, and the government of 
George I responded by instituting representative punishments upon a ‘trivial 
fraction’ of the plebeian rank-and-file, especially in Scotland.  The beam of 177
‘victory and clemency’ balanced by the Whigs after the Great Rebellion was not 
effective enough to put down the threat of Jacobitism, as evidenced by the situation 
in which Britain found itself thirty years later. Despite the limited campaign of 
attainders carried out after 1715, reconciliation with influential Scots Jacobites was 
just a matter of time, thereby keeping the seed of Jacobite ideology alive.  Echoes 178
of this judicial polarity were also audible in the wake of the Forty-five, when 
Fletcher noted that it might be prudent to make examples of some so that the much 
greater whole was aware of ‘what acts do amount to Treason’, while ‘at the same 
time the leniety of the Government may appear in punishing so few of so great a 
multitude of Criminals’.  179
As was done in 1715, a system of lotting prisoners was established for all 
those held in England, which was essentially akin to drawing tickets out of a hat to 
decide who was punished and in what manner. The general rule was held as 
representative punishment for each one-in-twenty prisoners, with the unlucky one 
going to trial and the rest relegated to some measure of mercy ‘on such Conditions 
as His Majesty shall think proper’.  How strictly these parameters were followed is 180
difficult to discern, as there were many exceptions to the lotting rules. Those of 
high station were ‘debarred from the privilege’ of using this system, as were the 
most notorious of Jacobites, including those who committed specific acts of 
barbarity. These persons were sent to different prisons in London to await the 
 NLS MS.17523 ff. 1-2.175
 Ibid.176
 Sankey notes that only thirty-three rebels were executed and 638 were transported to America, Jacobite 177
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accumulation of evidence and a date for trial.  Other plebeians, like most women 181
and those who were extremely ill, were also excepted from drawing lots. Of 430 
prisoners held in Tilbury and on the prison hulks in London, Stratford Eyre 
reported that 355 were ‘Lotted fairly’ and seventy-five others were held aside either 
for direct trial, further examination, or were those appointed as witnesses. Of the 
355 who drew lots, only seventeen were marked for ‘justice’, which meant they 
would be moved to trial and most likely executed.  Many of those who drew 182
‘mercy’ in their lots were subsequently transported or banished from the realm, 
though some were also dismissed. 
It was of course the native Jacobite officers that the government really 
wanted, and duly there was more emphasis placed on identifying those known to be 
of rank in the rebel army. In addition to being seen as the catalysts and propagators 
of disaffection, officers were more likely to be of a higher station and therefore 
would have more stake in the cause. It was not lost on government officials that the 
officers generally also had more to lose.  Fletcher reinforced to Philip Carteret 183
Webb the importance of convicting a known elite like Buchanan of Arnprior, 
noting 
it is of more consequence to his Majesty’s Service, and for the peace and quiet of 
the Country, to get rid of such a person of rank, and Ability, as Arnpryor, who is 
artful and able to poison a whole County, than to convict ninty & nine of the 
lowest rank of Rebels.  184
The prevalence of the names of officers mentioned in Jacobite trials highlights their 
value as cautionary specimens of which to be made examples. But their widespread 
presence in these records also indicates that they were more well-known to 
witnesses than the common soldiers would be. Eighteen-year-old Edward Gibson, 
an Edinburgh fan-maker who served in Balmerino’s Life Guards, provides a useful 
example of this within his examination. Of the nineteen individuals whom Gibson 
could positively identify through personal familiarity, eighteen were of the rank of 
ensign or above. Of those, eight were captains and five were colonels or lieutenant-
colonels. The one non-officer pointed out was a high-profile surgeon to the Prince 
 Fletcher to Newcastle (15 March, 1746), SPS.54/29/18; P45 (i), pp. 11-23.181
 SPD.36/88/60.182
 Seton and Arnot make the argument that Jacobite officers were spread throughout both class and profession, 183
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ranking officers were almost invariably either landed gentry or heritable chiefs, even in Seton and Arnot’s stated 
example of Lord Ogilvy’s regiment.
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himself.  William McIntosh likewise wrote up a list of twenty-one colleagues he 185
had ‘See’d in Arms and would know a greate many if I See’d them’. Only five of 
these persons did not hold a commission in the army.  A similar ratio is evident in 186
the examination briefs of the prisoners at Newgate; of the thirty-four persons 
deponed against by 132 witnesses, only four were non-officers.  It is likely that the 187
Jacobites of rank identified in these examinations were simply more familiar to their 
witnesses, the very nature of their stations requiring substantial interaction with the 
private men and logistical operations of the army. After all, the officers were largely 
responsible for collecting public monies, requisitioning supplies, billeting soldiers 
upon the homes of civilians, leading men in battle, enforcing discipline, and 
bringing recruits into the army – willingly or not. In addition to being the focus of 
the government’s energies, though, it is not difficult to imagine that the showcasing 
of officers in this manner was also an opportunity for prisoners who turned King’s 
evidence to either defer blame or even retributively implicate those seen as being 
responsible for their unfortunate situations. 
Analysis of all cases across trial locations in Carlisle, Southwark, and York 
illustrates the representational nature of sentencing: only 54.7% of prisoners were 
actually indicted from those who were initially arraigned.  Likewise, those sent to 188
England consisted of a much-diminished number of all prisoners captured and 
charged with treason, though a percentage for that figure is difficult to calculate. 
Seton and Arnot’s study of Jacobite trials indicates that only 37% of nearly 3500 
prisoners in Britain were definitively sentenced, with the majority (70%) of those 
being transported with or without indentures.  Less than 10% of the indicted were 189
executed, though many more were originally given sentences of death before being 
reprieved or recommended to mercy by the jury or justices.  Thirty-one of those 190
executed were officers, fourteen of which were from the Manchester Regiment 
alone. Also amongst those hanged and beheaded were four peers, two spies, two 
Episcopal ministers serving in Jacobite regiments, and the British army deserters 
 Examination of Edward Gibson (6 October, 1746), SPD.36/88/48.185
 List of Rebels from William McIntosh, SPD.36/88/57.186
 TNA TS.11/760/2363.187
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mentioned in Chapter IV.  Whereas the brunt of reparations in 1715 were 191
focussed on the English Jacobite constituency, the far greater number of sentences 
were carried out on Scots after 1745. This is not surprising simply due to the scant 
turnout of English support and the focus of the British government on the 
‘civilising’ of Scotland, as well as the development of government policies that 
allowed more effective processing of prisoners who were sentenced to be 
transported.  While overall number of sentences handed out after the Forty-five 192
was significantly greater than in the wake of the rising before it, only a little more 
than a third of the total mass of prisoners taken was punished by the state. There 
were nearly four times as many executions and almost twice as many transportations 
as after the Fifteen. But the real punishment would soon be suffered by politically-
ambivalent communities mostly, but not only, in the Highlands of Scotland and by 
non-juring congregations, especially in the recalcitrant north-east. 
  
THE COSTS OF REBELLION 
Despite the economic benefits of revolution and its impending rescue to the 
‘decaying trades’ explicitly proposed by Stuart declarations, it was in fact the 
Jacobite appearance in Scotland that played havoc upon trade throughout Britain.  193
The disruptions to commerce occasioned by such a threat were felt strongly enough 
that numerous burgh officers and estate factors expressed their concern to the 
government in writing. Nicol Graham of Gartmore informed Patrick Haldane of 
the ‘miserable situation of this Country’ due to the ravages of the Macgregors 
through Montrose’s lands: 
the Inhabitants are not only greatly discouraged from all manner of Industry & 
Labour, by reason of the precariousness of their Property, but are even ready to 
abandon their homes, did they know where to settle, or how to get hence.  194
 Chapter IV: Recruitment, pp. 157-159. Seton and Arnot work from the figure of thirty-eight deserters 191
executed, but at least five others can be be added to that number. See Appendix XXII: Jacobite Executions 
1746-53, figs. 1-2.
 Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 172; Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, pp. 48-52, 192
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Likewise, President Forbes expressed to Tweeddale his need for money to defend 
the Inverness area, stating that bank notes were devalued, coin was locked up, 
‘trade is at a stand and no one will part with the little money he is possessed of’.  195
In London, the Royal Exchange ceased operations and many shops were boarded 
up for fear of being pillaged even though the Jacobite army never made it nearer 
than Derby.  Aberdeen’s harbour was closed despite fervent pleas from the 196
council, as were those in Montrose and Banff, and trade in the north-east was 
consequently strangled.  Andrew Cochrane, the provost of Glasgow in November 197
1745, confided to an MP in London that even the suggestion of the rebels invading 
was enough to economically hold the burgh hostage: 
Our case in this place and county is most deplorable. For eight weeks there has 
been no business; our custom-house shut up, though we have 4000 hds. tobacco 
lying in the river undischarged; our manufactures at a stand for want of sales and 
money; no payments of any kind, no execution; our country robbed, plundered, 
and harassed by partys.  198
Glasgow was especially vulnerable during the early months of the rising, an 
extremely prosperous urban centre with no walls, no trained military, and few arms 
with which to defend itself. Frantic requests for government assistance in the form 
of troops or guns were repeatedly rebuffed, the few available soldiers instead sent 
out to defend Stirling and the contribution of arms thought more a temptation for 
rebel looting than of any effective use by the untrained mob.  The ‘absolute 199
interruption of business’ that Cochrane describes informs a greatly-disturbed status 
quo, and resulted in significant stores of valuable goods lying untended as 
inadvertent enticement for the needy Jacobite army.  A frustrated Glasgow citizen 200
could not envision the rebels avoiding the looting of these commodities  
unless they are absolutely an Army of mad-Men […] for we have so many 
different sorts of goods here, in great Plenty, that are the fittest plunder in the 
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World for Highlanders, such as Tobaco, Iron, Leather, Sugar & Aquavitae.  201
Defensive restrictions upon the passage into harbours of goods-laden ships were 
imposed by the Lord Justice Clerk which, similarly to Glasgow’s tobacco industry, 
had the effect of putting ‘a stop to that trade’ of corn in Berwick and Eyemouth. In 
Aberdeen, perishable commodities spoiled in storage and ‘all Trading people have 
suffered greatly’.  Unsurprisingly, the interruption of business-as-usual likewise 202
affected rural economies on Jacobite home turf. Numerous Highland estates that 
lost precious numbers of subsistence tenants to rebel recruiters also suffered from 
the disruption to the vital farming cycle. From Bredalbane to Lochaber, fallow 
years followed their departure.  In Argyll, there was ‘not a Shilling of Rents 203
recover’d since the Rebellion broke out, and no idea of what the future might 
bring.  With perhaps the exception of Edinburgh’s marked financial distress, 204
which was thought to be largely a product of a corrupt and Jacobite-leaning provost 
and self-perpetuating burgh council, industry and trade in many normally-
prosperous centres were strongly affected by the threat of internal conflict. 
Rather than the benevolent jostle given to Edinburgh’s mercantile sector by 
the influx of new Jacobite punters that Blaikie blithely describes, those invested in 
commerce throughout Britain complained of business screeching to a halt, borne 
out by existing impost and excise records.  While examinations of select receipts in 205
certain sectors might show marginal upticks in personal purchases by those elites 
with money to spare, the Jacobite army was never known for its rude solvency.  206
The pennilessness of numerous individuals described in Chapter II has been 
identified as a relevant incentive for their participation in the rising. For those in 
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this position who voluntarily came out, their poverty was rarely solved by signing 
up for service; for those pressured into recruitment, many would also bear the 
burden of being removed from their regular subsistence.  The destitution of the 207
Jacobite military is often mentioned during the retreat northward, and even with 
large-scale desertions hampering the number of dependents, Charles Edward had 
great difficulty paying his troops as promised. During the final months of the rising, 
some of the common soldiers were given an allowance of oatmeal instead of their 
regular pay, and numerous accounts mention rampant hunger throughout all 
ranks.  This of course became even worse after Culloden when the army had 208
scattered, and Lord Balmerino surrendered the day after the battle reportedly to 
keep from starving, having been heard to say that it had ‘been too long already’.  209
As evidenced by the inability of the Jacobites to establish effective logistics and 
supply centres in the burghs through which they passed, the resources of the army 
were perpetually stretched thin.  The lack of personnel to spare necessarily made 210
forage and requisition difficult, and further sharply highlights the cyclical problem 
of recruiting without a broad base of effective recruitment officers and a largely 
ambivalent recruitment pool.   211
Collecting the cess or ‘public monies’ was therefore an absolute necessity for 
Jacobite officials. As they could not depend upon a steady stream of income from 
any one party and were totally reliant on French contributions to keep on the 
march, they did what was needed to extract it from the public.  Paying enlisted 212
soldiers was crucial to keeping them from deserting, and Lewis Gordon commented 
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that the troops he had painstakingly assembled in the autumn and winter of 1745 
simply would not join the main body of the army without a timely collection of the 
cess.  As touched upon in Chapter III, the importance of obtaining this fund is 213
borne out by the no less than sixty-five identifiable persons who were noted to have 
contributed in the raising of these taxes in an official capacity.  McCann also 214
insists that successful extortion of public monies was made possible by two factors: 
the ability to impose such collection with the presence of military force and either 
the voluntary or involuntary assistance of local officials.  215
The costly demands that Charles Edward foisted upon the burghs in which 
the army billeted were frustrating talking points in the correspondence of many of 
these victimised officials. Jacobite messengers first requisitioned the magistrates of 
Glasgow just days before Edinburgh was taken, demanding £15,000 and all 
available arms to be delivered up, otherwise ‘threatening the greatest severitys in 
case of disobedience’.  Receiving no payment, John Hay delivered a second 216
demand less than two weeks later promising that this money would be paid back to 
the burgh in full ‘so soon as the nation shall be in a state of tranquillity’, but the 
council was able to whittle down the premium to a mix of money and goods worth 
the value of £5500. This was partly paid forth with 6000 coats, bonnets, pairs of 
shoes and hose, and twice that number of linen shirts for the supply-starved 
rebels.  217
The levying of similar demands was commonplace during the Jacobite 
offensive, and nearly identical requisitions were made repeatedly in Dumfries, 
Kirkcudbright, Stirling, Edinburgh, Inverness, Stonehaven, Kirkwall, Easter Ross, 
and in many other towns and burghs as well as in rural counties. Some, as noted 
above, required ‘contributions for his Highness’s use’ in the form of land tax 
proportional to a town’s standard rents, and with these requisitions often came 
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insistence on viewing the administrative books in order to prove accurate values.  218
Other directives from the rebels demanded horses, food pans, canteens, targes, 
broadswords, tents, and shoes.  In Newbigging, Charles Edward called for bolls of 219
hay and oats, under penalty of burning down the town clerk’s house, with similar 
threats repeated throughout virtually all extant requisitions.  Notably, meal was 220
scarce and requisitions for food seldom were filled, as ‘the country could not afford 
subsistance’.  A rare exception to this was during the siege of Carlisle, when the 221
Duke of Perth sent an order to ‘all ye Villages in the Neighbourhood’ to 
bring hither daily Wheat, Rye, Oats, Barley, Beans, Butter, Cheese, Poultry, Eggs, 
Black Cattle, Sheep, hoggs, and such other provisions & merchandizes as they 
may have, for which they shall be paid.  222
It is not known whether these items were actually gathered up or if the army’s 
reserves could have feasibly paid for them, but the promises of such reimbursement 
are less common than threats of military execution to encourage citizens into 
action. Despite this, according to an Edinburgh citizen whose friend’s horse was 
taken by Lord Elcho himself, he seemed to think there was a good chance of 
getting remunerated for it.  223
Multiple witnesses claimed to have seen stent-collector John Carmichael 
issue receipts for the value of goods or contributions taken at Perth. This included 
£45 sterling from the 2000 marks Scots requisitioned on 3 February 1746, as 
witnessed by John Clerk and Robert Young. Four days later, Nunan Balmain 
likewise claimed to have paid 21 shillings as his part of ‘the Task Duty’ owed to the 
army during its occupation of Perth. Receipts or not, Robert Gardiner claimed that 
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Mounsey, Carlisle in 1745, p. 64. See also Craigie to Tweeddale (1 October, 1745), SPS.54/26/47.
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Affairs of Scotland, p. 282.
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Carmichael threatened him ‘with military execution unless he paid’ his requested 
portion.  Thomas Richardson deponed that the Jacobite sheriff of Angus, James 224
Carnegie Arbuthnot, demanded and consequently took a measure of bread from his 
wife, leaving her with an order for payment. Richardson went on to acknowledge 
that the order was subsequently paid by John Wedderburn, a collector of excise for 
the Jacobite army.  225
The ‘loan’ requisitioned by John Hay at Glasgow in September of 1745, 
however, was never going to be paid back by a shattered and destitute Jacobite 
administration, so it fell to government coffers to provide recompense. Provost 
Cochrane approached the Lord Justice Clerk with the same tenacity he displayed 
when under threat of invasion, lobbying for repayment and offering suggestions on 
how to collect such monies from particular forfeited estates: 
The Severe and rigorous Contributions exacted by the Rebells from the Town of 
Glasgow on account of their Zeall and attachment to his Majestys Person and 
Government, the great Expense they were at in raising and maintaining a Body of 
men in order to Suppress the said Rebellion, and the great Shock the Trade and 
Manufacturers of that place has received by the Interruption and Stop to its Trade 
and Business for so long time are such heavy Losses that neither the Community 
itself, whose funds are not very Considerable, nor the private fortunes of the 
Inhabitants are well able to bear it.  226
Between the six months of dead trade, lost contribution money, and ‘free quarters’ 
exacted by the Jacobite occupation there in December, the magistrates were feeling 
quite bereft. They informed the government that the value of rebel contributions 
raised in Glasgow was a sum greater than all of the other levies ‘in all of the 
burroughs of Scotland, and possibly even all of Britain’. Glasgow, they repeatedly 
stressed, was ‘the most universally loyal town in his Majesty’s dominions’, but it 
would not survive without financial assistance from the crown.  That much of 227
Glasgow was loyal was not in doubt, but its council still conceded to fuel the 
Jacobite demands, however diminished they were after negotiation. This highlights 
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the difficult position in which the government found itself, attempting to reconcile 
whether the locales which provided troops and materiel for the rebellion, either 
voluntarily or otherwise, were then deserving of government subsidy. Similarly in 
Aberdeen, the £1000 given to the Jacobites ‘in order to preserve their persons from 
military execution’ was also petitioned for reimbursement in July 1746. It was 
repaid over time with a combination of private funds from office-bearers and a 
prolonged stent of Aberdeen’s inhabitants, all secured by the town council.   228
The Forfeited Estates Papers for Laurence Oliphant contain a petition 
signed by ninety Gask tenants in 1753 who also sought financial clemency due to 
the ‘arts of the Rebells and the many hardships we suffered from them […] 
sufferings and losses […] both in our persons and Effects’.  The aim of their 229
petition was the retention of two years of rent in lieu of the harmful disruptions 
from Jacobite activity on the estate eight years prior. Reduced to poverty, this was 
seen by the tenants as the only way to lessen their arrears. The estate factor 
subsequently investigated their conduct during the rising, which was partially 
undertaken by speaking with parish ministers about the tenants’ loyalty. It was 
finally acknowledged that they were indeed given ‘a good deal of trouble from the 
Rebels’, and were allowed retention of the two years they had claimed.  230
If the government was successful in collecting evidence and witnesses against 
its treasonous enemies, it was most certainly due to the extensive networks of 
informants in which the Hanoverian justices invested. While George II and his 
prominent justices might have liked to think that loyalty was a gift to be freely 
offered to one’s lawful sovereign, for many it was no less of a business than any 
other professional service. Rhetorically, there was no expense too great to bring the 
nation back from the brink of revolution, but the long delays in repayment and 
letters from frustrated creditors speak to the reality of a morass of paperwork that 
needed sorting out.  Evidence for privatised Hanoverian intelligence networks 231
being deployed into the field were explicitly evident well after Culloden. Writing to 
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the Duke of Newcastle in November of 1746, Albemarle conveys to him the 
successes of his spies, who were then  
in the heart of the Rebels Country, let into all their secrets, & faithfull in 
communicating to me what they can pick up. I do not think the money ill 
bestowed, that is laid out upon them, & if Your Grace approves of it, I shall still 
continue them in this Service.  232
As early as 21 August 1745, however, John Cope expressed his frustration to 
Tweeddale that he had to ‘pay and promise great reward’ to the local inhabitants of 
Perthshire to obtain intermittent reports.  A week later, Cope offered similar 233
sentiments to General Guest: ‘Intelligence is difficult to get. I have sent many at 
great Expence, & none or few return, and those that do have given false 
accounts’.  Munro of Culcairn found the same trouble in Gairloch.  The Lord 234 235
Justice Clerk counselled Newcastle that the best way to get ‘regular and certain’ 
information was by keeping his agents secret and paying them well.  Though he 236
mentions no amount for the funds dedicated to procuring this intelligence, 
construction of a rough model is possible through other means.  
Accounts show that liberal amounts of money were paid to agents who were 
tasked with information-gathering, many of whom would tack on any expense that 
might be allowed. General Huske, for example, handed in a warrant for £300 to 
hire a wherry that patrolled the north-west coast of Scotland in April 1747, the 
master of which also charged £5.5 for his travel expenses to Edinburgh and ‘waiting 
there for Instructions untill he got an order’.  Donald Campbell of Airds’ personal 237
account in return for intelligence by Albemarle’s order stood at £48.14, which was 
paid by 27 February of the same year.  In the years after the rising was quashed, 238
numerous sheriff officers and private hires attempted to collect their dues, 
including the agents who employed others in these services. Sheriff Gabriel Napier 
of Stirling was given £5 ‘to Deburse for Intelligence’ as well as £1.17 for numerous 
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expresses containing information valuable to the government.  Archibald 239
Campbell of Stonefield requested reimbursement in the amount of £14.7.2 for the 
subsistence of ten French prisoners captured on Barra.  Hugh Fraser, customs 240
officer at Leven, helpfully apprehended two fleeing rebels and brought them to 
Edinburgh, handing Fletcher a detailed invoice for out-of-pocket expenses from the 
previous nine days, all of which were spent away from home.  Francis Wilson, also 241
from Leven, begged payment for his part in the matter to the sum of £1.19.  The 242
sheriff-deputy of Ross likewise claimed £28.11.6 for a litany of expenses, including 
the writing and delivery of Cumberland’s summons for surrender to the ministers 
of Gairloch, Dingwall, Tain, Rosemarkie, and to the Isle of Lewis. Notably, 
amongst the most expensive of the sheriff’s services was paid to the procurator fiscal 
for his help in locking up any non-juring meeting houses within a 36-mile radius.  243
While it is outside the scope of this study to estimate the defence budget of 
the British army, a few detailed cases are noteworthy and demonstrate the mundane 
costs associated with caring for Jacobite soldiers wounded in combat. After the 
Battle of Prestonpans, for example, Lieut-Colonel Peter Halket provided £45.3.1 
sterling toward assisting the soldiers and prisoners hurt in the engagement. This 
was mostly for care of the injured brought to Edinburgh’s Royal Infirmary or 
triaged on the field at Colonel Gardiner’s home, but also extended to sheets and 
linens (6s) and coaches to bring surgeons from Edinburgh to their patients near 
Tranent (23s). Notably, Halket also paid subsistence in the form of bread and ale 
for over fifty Jacobite prisoners in the Edinburgh and Canongate tolbooths at a 
total of £11.14.1, which appears to be unusual for an army officer to furnish.  The 244
managers of the Royal Infirmary in Edinburgh were vexed by the influx of seventy 
wounded Jacobites shortly after Prestonpans, which they ‘were in no condition to 
resist’. In addition to displacing the injured soldiers of the King’s army, the rebels 
took possession of all of the best wards and medicines, which ‘the funds of the 
Royal Infirmary are neither able, nor can they be applied to the Maintenance of 
 Napier to Fletcher (27 October, 1747), NLS MS.17530 f. 96; 17527 ff. 165-166; 17529 f. 27; Papers of 239
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these people’. Left with fourteen Jacobite soldiers in their beds through the rising 
and even after Culloden, the managers appealed to Fletcher to see if they could be 
arrested as they lay, being ‘indispensably bound to gett rid of them as soon as 
possible’.  245
MANIA AND OPPORTUNITY 
In an event with so many differing motives and distinctly personal situations, 
it can be challenging to identify who had stakes in what goals and to what lengths 
they were willing to go in order to see those goals realised. In civil war, identifying 
a clear enemy is often problematic and opportunities for obfuscating the truth are 
perhaps riper for those who would do so. Likewise, it is sometimes difficult to 
separate the loyal citizens giving honest recollections of their observations from the 
less principled opportunists seeking revenge or advantage. Add to this the great 
tumult and insecurity felt by those who experienced the Forty-five firsthand, and it 
only makes sense that the conditions in Britain during the rising were primed for a 
different kind of campaign of fear and treachery. As Macinnes aptly states, ‘In such 
a climate of terror, informing became a growth industry within Scottish Gaeldom’, 
and was also plentifully evident outwith the Highlands, including England.  Not 246
all false accusations were made with nefarious intention; records also show 
‘misattributions’ foisted on seemingly innocent citizens, some of which had 
demonstrated decidedly questionable judgement. 
Bearing in mind that deferring blame under threat of serious punishment 
was very much the norm, the testimonies and personal letters of the accused divulge 
some provocative vignettes. As summed up by J. Macbeth Forbes, ‘a good 
opportunity was offered to any man who bore a grudge against his neighbour’.  247
Alexander McKenzie from Coull sent in a petition from prison in Inverness 
claiming he was arrested solely ‘due to the ill-will’ of one Lewis Rae, insisting he 
had nothing to do with Jacobite interests.  Gilbert Gray was arrested in Perth by 248
two soldiers who claimed that he had hired out horses to serve the rebels. After 
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spending multiple nights in jail and insisting that he only tried to recover his 
mounts from Jacobite hands, he was exonerated by the testimonies of several loyal 
burgesses and set at liberty.  After John Petrie, keeper of an alehouse in 249
Edinburgh’s Cowgate, was captured by government troops while slinking around 
near the Prestonpans battlefield, he wrote to his former employer asking for some 
assistance in setting the record straight. Petrie was found wearing a soldier’s 
uniform ‘besmear’d with blood’ and several horses of the King’s dragoons in his 
possession, but the most damning morsel of evidence against him was that he had a 
white cockade in his hat. This, he claimed, was donned for no other reason but than 
for protection against any lingering rebels, and he swore that he was informed 
against by ‘bad Neighbours Whose malice cannot enough be exprest’ due to their 
envy of his business. Perhaps surprisingly given the circumstances of his arrest, he 
was acquitted and released.  Of the hundreds of petitions sent to the Lord Justice 250
Clerk providing information against suspected rebels, many were apparently 
suspected to have been sent by ‘over-suspicious or malignant persons’ and were 
found unopened in Fletcher’s papers upon his death.  251
 Whig politicians were also witness to some of these misattributions, and 
sometimes exercised their networks to assist others in difficult positions. William 
Duff of Braco penned a memorandum to Fletcher in May 1746 – just as prisoners 
from Culloden were streaming into town – in favour of an Aberdonian merchant 
imprisoned on Cumberland’s orders. The merchant, John Elphinstone, was 
evidently accused of working for the Jacobites, but according to Duff he was ‘very 
willing & capable to oblidge, and is a very good friend to Mr John Maule & able & 
fit to do him Service’.  Conversely, other politicians helped to perpetuate the 252
dissonance by slinging doubts on their opponents or defending them against such 
malicious whispers. Nicholas Rogers notes that in England, accusations of 
Jacobitism were ‘used to embarrass opponents, to topple office-holders and to 
strengthen one’s credentials within the ministry’.  Likewise, a list of candidates up 253
for election as Justices of the Peace in Kincardine circulated through Perth and 
Montrose late in 1746, eventually landing in Albemarle’s office. Opinions varied on 
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who was Jacobite and who was loyal, but plenty of speculation was raised as to their 
appearance in non-juring congregations and about their level of encouragement 
toward the King’s interest.  Rumours about incumbent trade councillors in 254
Edinburgh made their way across Fletcher’s desk in late November 1746, assessing 
each candidate’s Whiggish and Presbyterian credentials while questioning any 
connections to Jacobitism they might have had. One of these men apparently had a 
brother who was a rebel, and another was reputed to regularly drink with known 
Jacobites, drawing Fletcher’s seemingly unconcerned commentary: ‘as he loves 
drink the thing may be true But when he attends worship it is in the Presbeterian 
Kirk’.    255
Even the greatly-valued clergy of the Church of Scotland were affected by 
the atmosphere of suspicion. Alyth parish precentor James Warden was accused by 
several witnesses of attempting to solicit Jacobite recruits, but a closer look at some 
favourable depositions reveals how the fire of hearsay can be spread. Though he 
was served with a number of incriminations, Warden’s charge of helping to bring in 
soldiers for the army went some way toward him being looked upon ‘as a most 
Disloyal person by every body’ during the entire length of the rising.  Yet 256
seventeen citizens would not speak against him, and four others who did had 
divulged that his recruiting efforts were not much more than showing them a list 
from Lord Ogilvy of the people in the area to be forced out. While it could easily 
be taken that Warden encouraged these witnesses to join the Jacobites, all of them 
also deponed that his encouragement was predicated on the fact that it might be 
safer to join, since they would either be forced or thrown in jail if they did not go.  257
It is obviously difficult to judge context and intention from such conflicting 
documentation, but these cases highlight the grey area of blame faced by those 
involved on both sides. 
The financial situation in Edinburgh was dire for many; perhaps dire 
enough to drive them to leverage disruption caused by the Jacobite occupation in 
order to ease some of the mercantile competition within the capital. Alexander 
Shaw described that while the rebels held the town ‘the shops were all shut; and the 
youths having to go about idle mingled with the rebels […] and that the 
 List of Candidates for Kincardineshire J.P., SPS.54/34/56c; PKA B59.30/80/1-2; James Bate to James Cant (7 254
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shopkeepers removed their merchandise from their places of business’.  The 258
communities in the Canongate and Leith, like many others throughout the country, 
were called upon to provide funds to the tune of 2s 6d per pound of rent in answer 
to the Jacobite army’s demands for subsistence, putting more pressure upon an 
already beleaguered populace.  Business had already been slow before the 259
Jacobites arrived, and merchants had been finding it difficult to get by:  
The City is at present under a vast Load of Debt; every Branch of Trade is 
overdone, and great Numbers are reduced to Straits, and even to Want itself. The 
Poor increase daily, and the Poors’ Funds sink a-pace, while the Citizens become 
daily less able to support them.  260
It is therefore possible that conspiratorial behaviour was carried out by those 
extremely frustrated with the state of things, as evidenced by the strange web of 
intrigue woven by Edinburgh’s goldsmith population. According to the published 
records of the Commissioners of Excise, as many as eleven of the capital’s 
‘hammermen’ and their servants and apprentices were reported to the authorities 
for being connected with Jacobite schemes by eight others within the same 
profession.  Little to no information exists regarding their specific charges, 261
however, and none can be traced via prison records, depositions against them, or 
evidence of sentencing. Though the excise officers were not the the only source 
(nor the final word) that reported suspected Jacobites to the government, the 
implicated goldsmiths do not appear in statements from any other means.  No 262
other region nor sector was as rife with intra-occupational conflict as this matrix of 
accusation shows, and the circumstances surrounding it are decidedly suspicious. 
Further investigation using Edinburgh’s guild records may provide assistance, but 
the Burgess Rolls appear to end in 1700.  263
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THE NATURE OF BLAME 
Even before the congratulatory memorials following the victory at Culloden 
stopped funnelling in from around the nation, Hanoverian officials set to work at 
retaining effective control of ‘North Britain’. After failing to do so in the Highlands 
following 1715 due to a tepid programme limited by the fear of being perceived as 
too drastic, they endeavoured not to make the same mistake again.  Seeking 264
regulation of recalcitrant areas largely through a combination of military presence 
and pacification, the government was now open to any ideas that might contribute 
to what Macinnes calls the ‘exemplary civilising’ of the lawless regions thought to 
have generated and sustained the rebellion.  Many of the works cited in this 265
chapter have competently demonstrated the long-term regeneration of disaffected 
regions through economic and social reform, military reintegration, and the 
annexation of Jacobite estates.  Others describe how the British state supervised 266
the process of disarming and pacifying known areas of hostility, and how during 
that process it committed injurious depredations upon Scottish communities that 
were equally as damaging as those of the Jacobite army.  While the multi-pronged 267
campaign of reconstruction, focussed on the Highlands, gave rise to numerous 
legislative processes with an eye toward ‘civilisation’, the atmosphere of fear and 
mistrust throughout much of Scotland and parts of England permeated British 
military doctrine there.  The feelings of exasperation toward yet another rebellion 268
ushered in a prevailing attitude of indifference to the welfare of disaffected 
Jacobites and the communities in which they sheltered. 
The results of Patrick Campbell’s 483-mile intelligence-gathering journey 
around the Highlands in the autumn of 1746 greatly spooked the government, 
which was already sure that dissension still lay within every glen. Campbell had 
found that, despite the twenty villages burned to the ground by the King’s troops in 
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Morvern and Appin, there was an indefatigable spirit of disaffection still present in 
that part of the Western Highlands, which steeled Fletcher’s resolve that it 
validated ‘the necessity of doing something to purpose there’.  According to 269
Campbell, locals were concentrating on rebuilding their homes and preparing for 
another impending rising, with clans including MacLeans, Camerons, Macdonalds, 
Stewarts all furnished with plenty of cattle, meal, and arms.  Recalcitrant 270
behaviour was not confined to that of the rural Highlands; just before Christmas of 
that year, the Lord Justice Clerk got wind of a Jacobite cell in Leith planning to 
gather in order to celebrate Charles Edward’s birthday, and non-juring clergy in 
the north-east were thought to be whipping up the winds of dissension beneath the 
Church of Scotland’s nose.  271
Rewards were offered for bringing in arms: one half-crown per musket and 
one shilling for every broadsword. Regimental standards, the golden prize of battle, 
could fetch up to sixteen guineas.  Disarmament had been a hot topic since 272
immediately after 1715, and the campaign of Highland pacification was extended 
with vigour by George Wade through the 1720s.  The importance of obtaining 273
arms from the hands of rebels during and after the Forty-five was paramount in 
government policy, and attempts were made to account for every gun in the 
country.  An account of 221 British army patients lodged in Edinburgh’s Royal 274
Infirmary in April 1746 provides information regarding the whereabouts of their 
own weapons; whether they were lost and where, safely with the wounded soldiers’ 
regiments, or held in the Infirmary’s stores.  Conversely, intelligence from Appin 275
in October 1745 claimed that £5 Sterling was offered by Macpherson of Cluny as a 
reward for each private man who refused to deliver up his arms. Whether Cluny 
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was able to make good on this bounty is unknown, but Albemarle was led to believe 
that the Appin men had ‘Cash in Abundance, & in very high Spirits, in expectation 
of great things from France’.  Great things from France never did arrive. 276
If there was any doubt that the north-east was considered a threatening 
bastion of Jacobitism even after the trials and corresponding punishments were well 
in-process, a letter between British officers in Edinburgh is illustrative. In early 
December 1747, Lieut-Colonel David Watson, commander of the Tarland 
barracks near Aberdeen, wrote to a Lieut Forbes of his concern that several enemies 
of the government were still meeting in public, holding ‘Traiterous Caballs, and all 
manner of Artifices to keep up a Spirit of Rebellion and Sedition’.  In addition to 277
naming some of the luminaries of Jacobite command still lurking outwith the reach 
of government troops, Watson desired the soldiers stay vigilant for the 
identification of any non-juring meeting houses in the area, including the names of 
the clergy. Loyalist magistrates in Aberdeen made a list of every parish church in 
the areas of  Fraserburgh and Peterhead, also including the name of its minister and 
how far away from those respective towns it lay. Clearly local officials wanted to 
draw out a firm picture of their networks of friends and foes upon wresting the 
burgh from Jacobite control at the end of February 1746.  278
Beyond the significant revenue generated by the forfeited estates of 
convicted rebels, much of which was used for the public welfare, there were also 
instances of certain properties coming available for purchase.  John Macdonald of 279
Glengarry, who himself managed to stay out of the affair, nonetheless suffered ‘as if 
[he] had been concerned’ due to the pressure applied by his disgruntled tenants and 
neighbours. Locked up in Edinburgh Castle on suspicion of treason (though no 
evidence could be found against him), he must have wondered if he had any friends 
at all. Rightly feeling his life was in danger, Glengarry offered up his estate for sale 
to the government at ‘a reasonable price’, of which the Lord Justice Clerk was 
strongly in favour.  Whereas the annexation of forfeited estates assured income for 280
the government, outright purchase would allow the crown to dispose of any 
 SPS.54/34/15b. See also Albemarle to Newcastle (6 December, 1746), SPS.54/34/42c, 37a.276
 Watson to Forbes (1 December, 1747) reprinted in Allardyce, Historical Papers (i), p. 298.277
 ACA Parcel L/S/3; Speck, The Butcher, p. 164.278
 Millar, ed., Forfeited Estates Papers, pp. xii-xiii, 360-364. See also Annette Smith’s Jacobite Estates of the ’45 279
(Edinburgh, 2003). 
 McDonnell of Glengarry to Anon. (14 November, 1746), SPS.54/34/22b; Fletcher to Newcastle (15 280
November, 1746) SPS.54/34/22a. There is no further evidence to show that Glengarry’s estate was purchased by 
the crown.
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unwanted inhabitants from that property, or at the very least transform the estates 
into something ‘properly organised’.  As occurred after the Fifteen, the valuation 281
of leases on annexed estates was largely incomprehensible to anyone but the tenants 
and landlords, which tempted corruption and was all but impossible to determine 
precisely.  Any large purchases like this obviously would incur considerable 282
investment, but it was thought that the generosity shown by the government in 
doing so would eventually cause the improvements to be ‘received with Universal 
Applause and with deep conviction of the Goodness of the present Royal Family’.     283
The balance between harshness and clemency within government policy 
after the Forty-five was most assuredly weighted differently than that in response to 
the Fifteen, but was punishment for rebellion in its later years exponentially more 
ghastly given the tenure and threat of Jacobitism by that time? Perhaps expectedly, 
it is a two-sided issue. The militarily-actuated retributions in Scotland, according to 
Lenman, were indeed unprecedented: ‘for the first time the Highlands and Islands 
were at the mercy of the British government’.  He and other scholars have lain the 284
onus for this squarely at the feet of the Duke of Cumberland, noting that the 
recalcitrance of Highland communities who refused to surrender upon the Duke’s 
proclamations awakened a pronounced barbarity with an anti-Scottish cast which 
was meted out to both the disaffected and disobedient British army troops under 
Cumberland’s command.  The policies of influential statesmen, however, had 285
likely counselled the Duke’s actions. Even the level-headed Lord President Duncan 
Forbes had conceded to him that ‘the abuse of lenity shown in the prosecution of 
the last rebellion’ furthered the necessity of severely punishing the leaders of the 
Forty-five. Yet Forbes was also concerned that overt action against the plebeians 
would only strengthen the Jacobite cause.  The relatively small number of 286
executions, which were mostly carried out on Scots of high station, Englishmen, 
 Smith, ‘The Forfeited Estates Papers’, p. 4-5. See also the 1752 Annexing Act (25 George II c. 41). Note the 281
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and deserters from the King’s army, bear out this concern. Instead, the vast 
majority of sentences that were administered removed common rebels from the 
realm so they could not again rise in arms, and most of those who were captured 
were subsequently released rather than punished. It can therefore be considered 
that the ‘official’ legal policies directly related to justice, viewable in the public eye 
and printed in the newspapers of the time, were decidedly restrained. Meanwhile, 
the brutal acts of retribution upon rural communities in Scotland – whether 
disaffected or not – went unnoticed by the majority of the public, covered up by 
reports of Cumberland’s ‘paternal way, with soft admonitions, and a promise of 
pardon and protection to all common people that at would bring in their arms, and 
submit to mercy’.  287
Bob Harris suggests that commerce was ‘the principal vehicle’ for expressing 
British patriotism in the middle of the century. Taken to a logical conclusion, the 
serious interruptions to trade occasioned by the Jacobites throughout most areas of 
the nation were likely perceived by many as a direct threat to the welfare of Britain 
and even to the core of British identity.  Together with the menace of rampant 288
confessional corruption occasioned by Jacobite-inclined Catholics and non-juring 
Episcopalians, the Jacobites were seen by Hanoverian loyalists and devout 
Presbyterian church-goers as not just rebels but as the incarnation of everything 
that could unseat the security and prosperity of the norm. In that sense, the wide 
scope of Jacobite ‘cause’ by 1745 actually worked against the movement itself by 
casting its varied sources of support as incurable strains of disaffection. As William 
Speck observes, however, it was not only the government’s retributive measures 
after Culloden that prevented another Jacobite attempt from occurring. Rather, in 
addition to the lack of further dedicated martial support from France, it was the 
thin appeal of the tenets of Jacobitism, however broadly spread, that failed to again 
take hold of the practical plebeian mindset.  Especially when it meant that even 289
more suffering would follow yet another rising – whether officially or unofficially. 
 The History of the Rebellion in 1745 and 1746 Extracted from the Scots Magazine (Aberdeen, 1755), p. 232. 287
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 Speck, The Butcher, pp. 183, 188; McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745, p. 232. Zimmerman 289
argues that Jacobitism survived in good health (in exile) until 1759, but this was surely not reflected in the 
plebeian communities in Britain, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, passim.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
By choosing to explore concerns about the popular constituency of late Jacobitism, 
this study bucks the trend set forth by much of the movement’s historical 
scholarship. That trend became established partly because the contribution of the 
commoners was arguably less influential and nowhere near as dynamic as that of the 
political elites. Jacobitism was of course sustained and transmitted by the 
ideologically-minded aristocracy who used the plebeian masses as expendable 
footmen for the cause. Risings, rebellions, and revolutions almost always employ 
this model, as do sovereign nations with stable governments and large armies to 
enforce and defend their policies. While state armies are more or less composed of 
paid volunteers and revolutions are embodied by a populace seeking comprehensive 
change from within, they usually share the characteristics of somewhat competent 
leadership and a system of material support.  This does not, however, preclude the 1
common people from being politically aware or otherwise educated to the larger 
goals of the polity. In the case of the Jacobites, this means that some surely 
understood the implications of a Stuart revival, whether desirable or not. Paul 
Monod has shown irrefutably that Jacobite-inspired sentiment was on public 
display in lower- and middle-class protests across England as late as 1760.  But we 2
must ask whether the ‘trickle’ of Jacobite rhetoric and symbolism in those locales 
was an effective gauge of the Stuart cause’s appeal or rather a broader expression of 
anti-Hanoverianism used to provoke the established government.  Though they 3
were likely related or developed from similar disappointments, limited protests and 
riots throughout the eighteenth century did not equate to armed insurrection. The 
Forty-five most certainly did. 
As evidenced by the ruthlessness employed by Cumberland in suppressing 
targeted areas of resistance from 1746, it is obvious that the administration was very 
concerned about the propensity of its subjects to once again rise in arms. But 
 The Covenanters, for example, had both while the Jacobites in 1745 had neither.1
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, pp. 195-232.2
 Ibid., p. 48, 195; Rogers, ‘Riot and Popular Jacobitism’, pp. 83-85; Whatley, Scottish Society, pp. 187-188.3
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officials repeatedly demonstrated that they were much less worried about the 
effectiveness of the common people without the influential elites to organise them.  4
The fact that Wade’s and Cumberland’s indemnities gave plebeians numerous 
chances to surrender their arms and return home relatively unscathed, while those 
of high status were precluded from the same, speaks to this. Schemes to garrison 
the Highlands with government troops were drawn up with the express purposes of 
obliging recalcitrant communities into compliance with proscription laws and 
apprehending ‘such Rebel Gentlemen as are yet lurking’.  Leo Gooch goes so far as 5
to say that the total absence of Northumbrian Jacobites in 1745 was due to the fact 
that no peers or men of station there were committed to the cause, as they had been 
in 1715.  6
So why focus on the commoners? For one, few others seem to be interested 
in doing so. Through its historiography, the maxims of Jacobitism are comfortably 
represented by the ideologies of the ‘movers and shakers’, but there is often 
interpretive conflict between the beliefs of these elites and those of the 
mythologised ‘patriots’ that marched to war behind them. Daniel Szechi rightfully 
points out the arrogance of the risings, in which a ‘section of the community 
convinced of their own superior righteousness’ imposed themselves on a far less 
committed but far larger populace.  Commitment is the critical term here. Thanks 7
to generations of romanticisation, the army under Charles Edward is generally 
considered by the public to have been a committed force of volunteers fighting for 
a singular cause infused by the clear moral high ground. It is certain that Charles 
himself also saw it that way, as evidenced by his pained response to his council of 
war after the chiefs insisted on a retreat from Derby:  
I am often hit in the teeth, that this is an army of volunteers, and consequently 
very different from one composed of mercenaries. What one would naturally 
expect from an army whose chief officers consist of gentlemen of rank and 
fortune, and who came into it merely upon motives of duty and honour, is more 
zeal, more resolution, and more good manners, than in those that fight merely for 
pay. [...] Every one knew before he engaged in this cause what he was to expect 
in case it miscarried, and should have stayed at home if he could not face death in 
 SPS.54/32/55; 54/33/23b; List of Gentlemen in Rebellion from Argyll, NLS MS.17522 f. 65; Report on the 4
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‘Cam Ye O’er Frae France?’, p. 364.
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any shape.  8
The Prince may have been convinced of his cause, but the developed ideologies of 
one man and one dynasty were not convincing enough to carry the commitment of 
his constituency past a most terrible defeat at Culloden. There were supporters and 
sycophants from the start, of course, and their devotion and sacrifice through it all 
are impressive, if somewhat lacking in self-preservation. The previous chapters have 
shown, however, that well before the last battle, the bulk of Charles Edward’s 
‘adherents’ were not so inclined to lay down their lives for the cause unless 
compelled to do so. Many did indeed attempt to stay home – elites and commoners 
alike – regardless of whether they knew what to expect if things went awry. 
This does not have to be only interpreted as a failure of the general populace 
to grasp its place within the machinations of statecraft, nor does it mean that there 
were not principled folks brought up in a tradition of loyalty to the exiled kings. It 
is likewise not a confirmation that all of Britain was content under Union, or that 
the suffocating prejudice against the Episcopal Church in Scotland might not find 
relief and toleration from a Stuart once again upon the throne. Rather, as evidenced 
by examinations of motivation, constituency, recruitment, and consequences, there 
were myriad influences that determined plebeian commitment to Jacobitism during 
the Forty-five, whether fleeting or sustained. Against this must be held the fact that 
later Jacobitism represented a scale of differing goals to different people, and could 
be expressed in a variety of manners that did not always have to include violence. 
For those goals to succeed in any meaningful way, however, a military coup was the 
only one that really mattered. 
In any era, the willingness of common people to wage war is predicated 
upon their balance of comfort versus discomfort, as well as weighing the 
consequences of such actions against the actions themselves.  While the last 9
Jacobite rising was in many ways a threat – to the established government, to the 
fortunes of the committed elites, to the welfare of British citizens, and to the legacy 
of the Stuarts – it was just as threatening to those who were called to fight within it. 
As described in Chapter IV, it is therefore a contention of this study that the 
popular constituency within the army was shaped by a number of disparate factors, 
many of which included some measure of compulsion. Whether that was played out 
in the relationships between contracted tenants and their landlords or physically 
 Charles Edward’s Response to Committee of Chiefs (7 January, 1746) reprinted in Blaikie, Itinerary, pp. 74-75.8
 As noted in Szechi, 1715, p. 3.9
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imposed by armed recruiters upon those unable to resist, evidence shows that 
sacrificing its lives and welfare in the rising was not always in the public’s interests. 
Many tried to contest such situations even while they were happening, as well as 
afterward in court, and both Jacobite recruiters and government intelligence prove 
this was far more common than allowed by most modern scholars. It is really no 
surprise that untrained, unprepared, and arguably unconcerned civilians would balk 
at picking up arms for either side in a civil war. In the sage words of Leah Leneman 
when describing the ambivalence of the Atholl tenants who were courted by both 
rebel and government recruiters, many plebeians likely thought ‘a plague on both 
your houses and did their best just to survive’.  10
A FAREWELL TO ARMS 
On 8 November 1747, Charles Edward Stuart received a letter from 
Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, expressing a measured blend of sorrow and 
admiration for the Prince’s efforts in Britain: 
All Europe was astonished at the greatness of your Enterprise for tho’ Alexr the 
Great and other Heroe’s have Conquer’d Kingdoms with Inferior Arms you are the 
only one who ever engaged in such an Attempt without any.  11
This was exaggeration, of course, but nonetheless indicative of how the Forty-five 
was perceived from the Continent, in this particular case by an accomplished 
monarch and military mind with numerous successful wars already under his belt. 
The fact remains that on the scale of popular conflicts in eighteenth-century 
Europe, this one was an irritation rather than a laceration. Numerically, including 
endorsement from both the civilian and martial sectors, it was significantly smaller 
than earlier Jacobite efforts in 1689 and 1715 and minuscule compared to other 
revolutionary movements in France and America just a few decades later. Very little 
material support was conjured either in Britain or from rebel allies in France, and a 
proper apparatus of government was not implemented that could ensure a smooth 
transition for the people who would be governed. Edward Furgol describes how the 
Covenanters ‘pulled Scotland from military incoherence into the military 
revolution’, but the Jacobites in 1745 thoroughly failed to do so.  Perhaps this is 12
 Leneman, Living in Atholl, pp. 221-225.10
 Frederick II to Charles Edward (8 November, 1747), NLS MS.20774, ff. 176-177.11
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not a fair comparison, however, as the leaders of the Covenanting movement had 
all of these issues and more accounted for. With three times as many soldiers, 
organised provincial governments, support from the established church, and proper 
armaments and training gathered both domestically and from abroad, it is 
perchance no wonder this earlier revolution succeeded. Yet even without these 
resources, the final Jacobite rising managed to vex the established church and state 
and dominate Whig policy even as Britain fought a larger, more costly war in 
Europe.  The scale of government response after the hostilities ceased, however 13
tempered with superficial leniency, speaks to the seriousness of the crisis even as 
some scholars take for granted that the Forty-five was from the beginning bound to 
fail.  14
On the front lines of this crisis, as well as in the cross-hairs of government 
depredations, were the plebeians who were considered to be Jacobites, despite what 
they considered themselves. Some 12-14,000 marched with rebel regiments, many 
of which subsequently broke ranks to return home to attend more pressing 
responsibilities than fomenting revolution. Thousands more supported the army in 
any way they could by using their occupational skill where it was needed, while 
countless others secretly met behind closed doors and talked of better times for the 
nation, the church, and the homestead. Hundreds were killed in battle, suffered 
through terrible illness in prison, or were shipped to far-away colonies where the 
rigours of servitude might foster an early death. Still more were released after being 
seized by the authorities and subjected to stringent examination, allowed to return 
to homes either acquired by the government or still smouldering from the torches 
of British army soldiers. 
Despite the rebellion’s enduring association with the Highlands, these 
commoners came from all parts of Scotland and beyond, including England, 
Ireland, France, and Spain, and they represented a wide array of backgrounds 
distributed across class divides. Some joined voluntarily because they passionately 
believed in the feasibility of Scotland outwith the Union, and others went along 
because they believed what they had been told. More yet found no real common 
ground between the struggle of the Stuarts and their own, but identified with the 
 Whatley, Scottish Society, p. 5; Macinnes, ‘Scottish Jacobitism’, p. 72; Rogers, ‘Riot and Popular Jacobitism’, 13
pp. 70-71; Wells and Wills, ‘Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation’, pp. 425-427.
 As posited by Black, Culloden and the ’45, p. 201. See Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, pp. 250-259, for 14
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231
inextricable political connections of their faith.  As has been shown, a great many 15
joined because they had no other choice in the matter. For all the drawing power of 
these many principles during the rising, however, ironically it was not ideological 
Jacobitism that died at Culloden or during the suppression of the Forty-five in the 
months afterward. Rather, what perished in full on 16 April 1746 was the 
practicality of Jacobitism, and the option to express it as a vehicle for challenging 
the status quo. Without the plebeian constituents to support yet another attempt, 
together with the rapid integration of the modern within traditionally disaffected 
regions, the resisting of Hanoverian policy by Jacobite elites would take a back seat 
to imperial aspirations and rampant commercialism facilitated by and within the 
British state.  16
 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, p. 323; Speck, The Butcher, p. 198.15
 Macinnes, Clanship, pp. 203-205, 233-234.16
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APPENDIX I 
NOTES ON TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY 
  
The database used as the tool of consolidation and reference in this study differs in 
a number of ways from many of those currently available for academic and public 
use online.  Rather than being simply a holding-place for transcribed, interpreted 1
data that is comprehensively taken as the authority on its subject properties, the 
model that has been built to study Jacobite prosopography, this iteration of which is 
called The Jacobite Database of 1745 (JDB1745), is based upon a distributed authority 
source-persona premise. In such a model, data from all sources within the scope of 
the study are entered, even if they are conflicting sources, without authoritative 
judgments made upon the properties themselves as they are entered, within reason. 
In this sense, the distributed authority model is a method of studying Jacobitism in 
context as opposed to simply being a mechanised tool used to compile and crunch 
altered data. What emerges from this model is an objective meta-resource that 
allows contrast and comparison of information relative to each particular 
researcher’s query methods.  In this case, these research methods focus on the 2
topics and themes explored by this thesis. 
In order to populate the database with enough property information to 
present a cohesive and topical study, a three-tiered methodology was devised to 
gather and enter the data chosen for inclusion.  First, numerous printed lists of 3
persons connected with Jacobitism were digitally catalogued, beginning with the 
most relevant and referenced sources used by scholars of the subject. These first 
sources are the most efficient for building up a core of data to work with, as they 
contain large numbers of alleged Jacobites with numerous personal factoids spread 
over a wide breadth of categories. Second, both manuscript and published sources 
 For some prominent examples of historical databases currently in use, see the following: The Medieval and 1
Renaissance Italy Prosopographical Data Project <http://www.slu.edu/department-of-history/departmental-
projects>; Prosopography of the Byzantine World <http://blog.pbw.cch.kcl.ac.uk>; People of Medieval Scotland 
1093-1314 <http://www.poms.ac.uk]>; Open Domesday <http://domesdaymap.co.uk>; Scotland, Scandinavia 
and Northern European Biographical Database <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/>; Irish in Europe 
Project <http://www.irishineurope.ie>, Bomb Sight: Mapping the WW2 Bomb Census <http://bombsight.org>.
 As with every well-defined taxonomy, authority records can be provided based upon the consensus of the 2
sources, but not at the expense of any of the sources’ informational integrity.
 For the purposes of this database methodology, the terms properties, elements, and fields refer to the record’s 3
characteristic metadata while the values are the characteristics and information relative to a particular record. For 
more on this classification scheme, see Miller, Metadata for Digital Collections (New York, 2011), p. 28-29.
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known to contain a significant number of named Jacobite participants were entered, 
regardless of overlap with the previous sources or with each other. Third, a vast 
selection of diverse primary sources were scanned for Jacobite-related names not 
only to add further persons to the corpus of data, but also as a sort of control for 
the first two tiers of entry. This tertiary entry scheme includes, for example, trial 
records, prison receipts, burgh and council minute books, personal correspondence, 
and other items from various archives.   4
A few words should be stated about the normalisation of the data contained 
within this study, as the methodology of organisation and analysis are central to the 
nature of this particular database and, therefore, of the results that it offers. It 
would be most efficient to describe this normalisation in terms of structure/
taxonomy, interpretation, and data functionality. A much more detailed evaluation 
of this could be described, but a brief encapsulation must suffice for the purposes of 
this thesis. The taxonomical organisation of the included data was created to feature 
all elements of information that are given in any of the sources that were used. 
Rather than submit to a ‘square-peg/round-hole’ methodology that pre-determines 
the type of information included from the sources, JDB1745 is built upon a survey 
of extant categories of information present across all sources. For instance, because 
at least one manuscript list used in the study approximates estate values of 
prominent Jacobite personalities, a field for measuring estate values will be present 
for all all entries within the database, even if that information is currently 
unknown.  This ensures the most comprehensive survey possible of the included 5
data with the broadest number of categories of information, regardless of whether it 
is being used at this stage of the project. 
As well, the specific data drawn from the sources in this study are done so 
with as little modification as possible, preserving the context for analysis rather than 
skewing the data through interpretation during the entry process. This concept of 
‘clean’ data is central to the creation of JDB1745 and reinforces a need for the 
historical database to present information in a contextually-appropriate manner. To 
this end, data fields are entered without correcting the misspellings and 
informational errors made by the original recorder. Marginalia are preserved and 
 All three tiers are outlined in detail in Chapter I: Introduction, pp. 20-26.4
 For example, Estimates of Yearly Rents of Persons Concerned in the Rebellion (28 February, 1746), SPS.5
54/28/47d.
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abbreviations are retained throughout.  Fields for research notes and interpretation 6
are present within the database’s interface, but not at the cost of the integrity of the 
original sources. A fundamental part of the normalisation process, then, is coding 
authority structures for names, place-names, and occupations, just to name a few 
operable categories. As an example for our purposes, all occurrences of shoemaker 
must be able to be accessed, regardless of spelling or abbreviation, and also must 
include all instances and variations of cobbler, cordwainer, and bootmaker. To address 
this, a customised variation of the Booth-Armstrong occupational classification 
matrix was adopted, with relevant additions and subtractions due to our period of 
study being a century earlier than that of the model.  Name thesauri were created 7
for equating the dozens of forms of similar surnames as they have been written, and 
demographic analysis would be biased or inaccurate without doing the same using 
standardised onomastic conventions, when possible, to determine locale.  In the 8
case of place-names, granularity is limited by comprehension of the places in 
question. Therefore, while there are known quantities of counties and parishes, 
smaller steadings like estates and farms might not be able to be positively identified. 
Lastly with regard to methodology, the target functionality of the data 
becomes vital as part of the normalisation schema. The first and most important 
part of developing a historical database is having a firm grasp on its scope and 
eventual aims.  Ensuring that the included data is functional to these aims by 9
providing relevant information in a manner that is useful to the researcher was 
paramount even as the sources were being gathered and entered. Very little 
information present in these particular sources was left out from entry, as virtually 
all of it is usable in some manner for historical study and has found some way to be 
included in this analysis of the Jacobite constituency. It is important to note, 
however, that the project’s intention and its implementation of data functionality is 
not limited by this particular thesis. JDB1745 is designed to be an objective 
database instead of an interpretive one; rather than being created with a particular 
thesis in mind, it is a device available to discover and challenge limitless theses. 
 The exception to this is the practice of notating ‘dittos’ within lists of information, usually written as do. As the 6
database entries do not necessarily follow the same hierarchical positioning as found in the original source, this 
would make searching such entries impossible. Instead, an exact copy of the data that was repeated is used in its 
stead.
 W.A. Armstrong, ‘The Use of Information about Occupation’ in E.A. Wrigley, ed., Nineteenth-Century Society: 7
Essays in the Use of Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data, (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 191–310.
 See sections on coding occupational and nominal data in Charles Harvey and Jon Press, Databases in Historical 8
Research (Basingstoke, 1996) pp. 226-231.
 Ibid., p. 105.9
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APPENDIX II 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY BY NATION 1745-6 
 
FIGURE 1: BY NATION 
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*Taken from a sample size that consists of 62.6% of existing data. 
*
APPENDIX III 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY IN SCOTLAND 1745-6 
FIGURE 1: BY REGION 
FIGURE 2: BY COUNTY 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*Figures taken from both martial and civilian records from 92.7% of location data. Only counties above .6% are shown.
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APPENDIX IV 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY IN ANGUS AND INVERNESS-SHIRE 1745-6 
 
FIGURE 1: BY PARISH, ANGUS* 
 
FIGURE 2: BY PARISH, INVERNESS-SHIRE* 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*Taken from a sample size of 2087 records. Only parishes above 1% are shown.
*Taken from a sample size of 360 records. Only parishes above 1.5% are shown.
APPENDIX V 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY BY FAITH 1745-6 
FIGURE 1: FROM THE CARLISLE LIST* 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8%Other 
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68.2%
Church of England 
22.4%
*Source: Gildart to Sharpe (26 October 1746), SPD.36/88/33d.
It should be explicitly stated that the figures above reflect those from a single list of prisoners captured at Carlisle in the 
winter of 1745. It should not be interpreted as a proportionate measure of faith within the Jacobite constituency. Rather, 
it is a rare tally of self-described confessional allegiance from a small cross-section of Jacobite martial support as recorded 
by government officials in October 1746. In this case, ‘Church of England’ probably refers to both Anglicans and non-
juring Scots Episcopalians. It is possible that some persons simultaneously belonged to both an official and a dissenting 
congregation, thereby inflating the percentage of Church of Scotland citations. Total sample size is 170.
APPENDIX VI 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY, FAITH BY COUNTY 1745-6 
 
FIGURE 1: FROM THE CARLISLE LIST, FAITH BY COUNTY 
 
FIGURE 2: FROM THE CARLISLE LIST, CHURCH OF SCOTLAND BY COUNTY 
 
FIGURE 3: FROM THE CARLISLE LIST, CHURCH OF ENGLAND BY COUNTY 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*Source: Gildart to Sharpe (26 October 1746), SPD.36/88/33d, cross-referenced with likely location data from JDB1745. 
Total sample size is 170.
*
APPENDIX VII 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY BY OCCUPATION 1745-6 
FIGURE 1: OCCUPATION BY GENERAL SECTOR* 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*Taken from a sample size that consists of 63% of existing data. Sectors are based upon a custom variation of the 
Booth-Armstrong classification scheme. See Appendix I: Notes on Technical Methodology for more. 
†This includes the sectors of Transportation, Government, etc., and also non-occupations, such as Beggar and Gentry.
APPENDIX VIII 
JACOBITE OCCUPATION BY SECTOR 1745-6 
 
FIGURE 1: OCCUPATION BY SECTOR, AGRICULTURAL 
 
FIGURE 2: OCCUPATION BY SECTOR, MANUFACTURING 
 
FIGURE 3: OCCUPATION BY SECTOR, TRADING & DEALING 
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*Only identifiable occupation counts of four or higher are included in these figures.
*
APPENDIX IX 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY BY REGIMENT 1745-6 
 
FIGURE 1: CONSTITUENCY BY REGIMENT* 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF REGIMENTAL STRENGTHS AND RECORDS† 
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*Taken from a sample size that consists of 40% of existing data. Only regimental representation above 2% is shown.
†Source: Alastair Livingstone, Christian W.H. Aikman, and Betty Stuart Hart, eds., No Quarter Given: The Muster Roll 
of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army 1745-56 (4th Edition, Aberdeen, 2001). Stated Regiment Sizes are taken 
either at the time of the Battle of Falkirk or otherwise are the highest maximum number noted. A representative 
sample of fifteen regiments is shown.
Regiment Name Stated Regiment Sizes Records Provided Representative %
Atholl Brigade 900 444 49.3%
Cameron of Lochiel’s 900 116 12.8%
Duke of Perth’s 750 362 48.2%
Earl of Cromartie’s 200 281 140%
Fraser of Lovat’s (with Chisholms) 500 182 36.4%
Gordon of Glenbucket’s 400 109 27.2%
Lady Mackintosh’s 300 232 77.3%
Lord Lewis Gordon’s 800 202 25.2%
Lord Ogilvy’s 900 751 83.4%
Macdonald of Clanranald 350 178 50.8%
Macdonell of Glengarry’s 900 373 41.4%
Macdonell of Keppoch’s 400 214 53.5%
Macpherson of Cluny’s 400 290 72.5%
Manchester Regiment 300 166 55.3%
Stewarts of Appin 300 193 64.3%
FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF REGIMENTAL RECORDS, JDB1745 
 
FIGURE 4: COMPARISON OF REGIMENTAL RECORDS, HISTORIOGRAPHICAL* 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*630 records are added with the inclusion of Mackintosh’s Muster Roll of Forfarshire.
*Added sources: Seton and Arnot, The Prisoners of the ’45 (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1928); Jean McCann, ‘The 
Organisation of the Jacobite Army, 1745-1746’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1963); Stuart Reid, 
1745: A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising (Kent, 1996); Christopher Duffy, The ’45: Bonnie Prince Charlie 
and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising (London, 2003).
†Note that McCann combines the numbers of Lewis Gordon and Glenbucket. She does not include any figure for the 
Manchester Regiment.
Regiment Name Records (No Quarter Given) Records (JDB1745)
Atholl Brigade 444 54
Cameron of Lochiel’s 116 50
Duke of Perth’s 362 179
Earl of Cromartie’s 281 213
Fraser of Lovat’s (with Chisholms) 182 83
Gordon of Glenbucket’s 109 87
Lady Mackintosh’s 232 25
Lord Lewis Gordon’s 202 119
Lord Ogilvy’s 751 288 (+630)*
Macdonald of Clanranald 178 86
Macdonell of Glengarry’s 373 210
Macdonell of Keppoch’s 214 30
Macpherson of Cluny’s 290 2
Manchester Regiment 166 163
Stewarts of Appin 193 27
Regiment Name No Quarter Given Prisoners of the ’45 McCann Reid Duffy
Atholl Brigade 900 600 2690 600 900
Cameron of Lochiel’s 900 800 1000-1200 800 900
Duke of Perth’s 750 750 300 750 750
Earl of Cromartie’s 200 200 420-460 200 200
Fraser of Lovat’s (with Chisholms) 500 400-700 700-800 300 500
Gordon of Glenbucket’s 400 300-400 1000-1480† 300 400
Lady Mackintosh’s 300 400-600 200 200 300
Lord Lewis Gordon’s 800 800 1000-1480† 550 550
Lord Ogilvy’s 900 700 900 500 900
Macdonald of Clanranald 350 350 400-450 350 350
Macdonell of Glengarry’s 900 800-1200 860 800 900
Macdonell of Keppoch’s 400 500 600 400 400
Macpherson of Cluny’s 400 300-400 400 300 400
Manchester Regiment 300 300 - 200 250
Stewarts of Appin 300 300 310 300 300
APPENDIX X 
JACOBITE CONSTITUENCY BY AGE 1745-6 
FIGURE 1: CONSTITUENCY BY AGE BRACKET* 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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 3017 records. As stated in Chapter III: Constituency, 86.7% of the total 
falls within the bounds of what can be considered ‘fighting age’ according to Alexander Webster. The average age 
of all included records is thirty-two.
APPENDIX XI 
LIST OF JACOBITES IN FRASERBURGH 
FIGURE 1: FLETCHER OF SALTOUN PAPERS MS.17522 F. 55* 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*Source: NLS MS.17522 f. 55. This list illustrates how government administrators used specific terms of description 
for alleged Jacobite rebels. The above list clearly distinguishes between those who participated in recruitment (at least 
ten), recruits themselves (at least eight), and those termed ‘volunteers’ (three). Presumably many of the others were 
also voluntarily aiding the Jacobites, though it is not quite clear how these terms were used. Curiously, only one 
person is specifically noted to have been explicitly forced, leaving the definitions of ‘recruit’ versus ‘volunteer’ unclear. 
Cross-referencing these names with trial results is not conclusive at this time.
A List of those that Recruited Men & took upp Arms In Our Districk of Frasersburgh for the Rebellion done by way of 
Alphabet In the Surnames  
Frasersburgh 27th of May 1746
Persons Names Designation Places of Abode The Circumstances Relating to each of ye Rebells
Robert Anderson A sayler Frasersburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
Alexander Craig *** to the Lord Pitsligo Rosarty A Volunteer Among the Rebells 
John Cruckshank Phisian Fraserburgh A Volunteer Among the Rebells 
John Carno A Wright Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
James Catto A Wright Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
William Chalmers A Baxter Fraserburgh A Principall Ringleader that took Capt Grant at Philorth 
George Chein A Sailor Fraserburgh Assisting the taking of Capt Grant 
William Crystie A Sailor Fraserburgh On the Gaird wt those that took Capt Grant 
William Cummine A Saylor Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
John Colly A Porter Fraserburgh A Carrier to the Rebells with Letters 
–– Forbes Lord Pitsligo att Pitsligo A Principall Officer Among the Rebells 
William Fraser Brother to Inveralachy att Inveralachy A Recruiting Officer Among the Rebells 
Alexr Falconer A Porter Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
John Gordon Son to Kinellen Fraserburgh A Volunteer Among the Rebells 
–– Gordon of Loggie att Loggie A Recruiting Officer Among the Rebells 
Alexander Gill Shipp Master Fraserburgh A Principall Ring Leader that took Captain Grant 
John Mathison A Carier Fraserburgh Assisting the taking of Captain Grant 
Alexr Morsion Sailor Fraserburgh Assisting the taking of Captain Grant 
John Meders Black Smith Fraserburgh Being prest Against his Will by the Rebells 
James Mackloud A Sailor Fraserburgh Ane Assistant to a Recruiting Officer here 
James Murray A Merchant Fraserburgh Went wt Provisions to the Rebells 
James Mathew A Shoe Maker Fraserburgh A Drumer to the Rebells at Recruiting 
Robert Midleton A Porter Fraserburgh A Carrier to the Rebells with Letters 
Andrew Nedrie Eldr A Wiver Fraserburgh Assisting the taking of Captain Grant 
Andrew Nedrie Ygr A Wiver Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
–– Ogilvie of Achiris att Achiris A Recruiting Officer Among the Rebells 
–– Ogilvies two Brothers of Achiris - Recruiting Officers Among the Rebells 
Lachlan Ogilvie Butcher att Boynly Ane Assistant to the Recruiting Officers here 
William Pirie A Porter Fraserburgh One of the Gaird on Captain Grant 
John Pennie A Wright Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
Alexander Ramsay A Merchant att Rosarty A Recruiting Officer Among the Rebells 
George Sim A Whyt Fisher Fraserburgh A Recruit Among the Rebells 
Alexander Sarris A Merchant Fraserburgh Aiding & Assisting to all the Recruiting Officers here 
Alexr Whyt Younger Wedsetter of Ardlyhill A Recruiting Officer here Among the Rebells 
George Watson Shoe Maker Fraserburgh A Principall Ring Leader that took Captain Grant 
James Ferrier A Sailor Fraserburgh A Principall Ring Leader that took Captain Grant 
APPENDIX XII 
JACOBITE IMPRESSMENT 1745-6 
FIGURE 1: IMPRESSMENT BY PARISH* 
 
FIGURE 2: COMPARATIVE IMPRESSMENT RATIOS* 
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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 423 records from The Prisoners of the ’45 and Rosebery’s List.
*Sources: SPD.36/83/105-106; NLS MS.3730 f. 69; Mackay, Urquhart and Glenmoriston, pp. 494-498; NRS GD.
220/6/1661/1-4, 11-19. Compare with Pittock’s assertion that ‘individual records largely bear out’ that impressment 
ratios are extremely low across Scotland, Myth, pp.88-89. 
Parish/Property County Attested By Total Joined Total Forced %
Alvie Inverness-shire William Gordon, Minister 43 40 93%
Morvern Argyll Unknown 37 10 27%
Urquhart Inverness-shire John Grant, Minister 19 13 68.4%
Glenmoriston Inverness-shire William Grant, Minister 68 45 66.2%
Buchanan Stirlingshire 16 Unique Witnesses 20 20 100%
FIGURE 3: IMPRESSMENT BY INDICTMENT* 
 
 
FIGURE 4: RELEASE CRITERIA FOR IMPRESSMENT* 
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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 423 records from The Prisoners of the ’45 and Rosebery’s List.
*Taken from a sample size consisting of 81 records from The Prisoners of the ’45 and Rosebery’s List. There is little 
definition of variance between specific terms of release; ‘liberated’, ‘acquitted’, ‘discharged’, and ‘released’ all 
appear to have similar connotations. For the purposes of this study they are combined into Released & Acquitted. 
One unfortunate forced man (Alexander Buchanan) is not represented in this graph, having been acquitted but 
mistakenly transported, P45 (ii), pp. 58-59.
APPENDIX XIII 
PRISONERS IN FRENCH SERVICE 1745-7 
FIGURE 1: PRISONERS IN FRENCH SERVICE BY INDICTMENT* 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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 553 records. Discharged includes those released on pardon and those 
returned to France. Banished, in this case, likely meant permanently from Britain, but some records show banishment 
to the Americas, which are in this graph classified as transportations. ‘Other’ includes those handed over to British 
authorities (deserters), escaped, and one prisoner released on bail, which was unusual for a prisoner of war.
APPENDIX XIV 
BRITISH ARMY DESERTERS IN JACOBITE SERVICE 1745-7 
FIGURE 1: BRITISH DESERTERS BY REGIMENT* 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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 203 records. Other contains soldiers from numerous regiments in quantities of 
under four. Those from the Royal Navy are estimated as such from their trial records.
FIGURE 2: BRITISH DESERTERS BY INDICTMENT* 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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 203 records.
APPENDIX XV 
WITNESSES FOR PRISONERS AT NEWGATE 1746 
 
FIGURE 1: WITNESSES BROUGHT BY REGION* 
 
FIGURE 2: WITNESSES BY OCCUPATIONAL SECTOR 
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*Taken from a sample size consisting of 132 unique witnesses. Source: TNA TS.11/760/2363.
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APPENDIX XVI 
PRISONERS ON SUSPICION 1745-7 
 
FIGURE 1: PRISONERS ON SUSPICION BY REGION* 
 
FIGURE 2: PRISONERS ON SUSPICION BY INDICTMENT 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*Taken from a sample size of 317 records. Disparity in numbers held on suspicion in England between fig. 1 and the 
text of Chapter V: Consequences (pp. 200-201) can be explained by conflict between calculations of named records 
versus general numbers supplied by governmental jail tallies.
APPENDIX XVII 
WADE’S DECLARATION OF INDEMNITY, OCTOBER 30 1745 
Whereas it has been represented to his Majesty, that several of his subjects, 
inhabiting the highlands of Scotland, and others, have been seduced by menaces 
and threatenings of their chiefs and superiors, to take arms, and enter into a most 
unnatural rebellion; his Majesty has authorised me to assure all such, who shall 
return to their habitations, on or before the 12th day of November next, and 
become faithfull to his Majesty and his government, that they shall be objects of his 
Majesty’s clemency: but if, after this his most gracious intention being signified, 
they shall continue in their rebellion, they will be proceeded against with rigour 
suitible to the nature of their crime. Given at the camp of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
this 30th day of October 1745.  
[signed] George Wade. 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*Printed in Scots Magazine, 7 (1745), pp. 537-538.
*
APPENDIX XVIII 
JACOBITE TRIALS AT CARLISLE, 9-27 SEPTEMBER 1746 
FIGURE 1: PRISONERS AT CARLISLE BY ARRAIGNMENT 
 
FIGURE 2: PRISONERS AT CARLISLE BY INDICTMENT 
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*Arraignment total of 315 prisoners; indictment total of 91 prisoners. Sources: P45 (i), pp. 104-108; Jarvis, Collected 
Papers (i), pp. 255-276.
*
APPENDIX XIX 
JACOBITE TRIALS AT SOUTHWARK, 23 JUNE 1746-DECEMBER 1747 
FIGURE 1: PRISONERS AT SOUTHWARK BY ARRAIGNMENT 
 
FIGURE 2: PRISONERS AT SOUTHWARK BY INDICTMENT  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*Arraignment total of 71 prisoners; indictment total of 49 prisoners. Source: P45 (i), pp. 94-103. Note the absence of 
enlistments at Southwark due to the large number of Manchester Regiment trials that happened here.
*
APPENDIX XX 
JACOBITE TRIALS AT YORK, 2-7 OCTOBER 1746 
FIGURE 1: PRISONERS AT YORK BY ARRAIGNMENT 
 
FIGURE 2: PRISONERS AT YORK BY INDICTMENT  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*Arraignment total of 113 prisoners; indictment total of 75 prisoners. Source: P45 (i), pp. 108-110.
*
APPENDIX XXI 
JACOBITE INDICTMENTS 1746-8 
FIGURE 1: TOTAL PRISONERS BY ARRAIGNMENT 
 
FIGURE 2: TOTAL PRISONERS BY INDICTMENT 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*Arraignment total of 3471 prisoners; indictment total of 1284 prisoners. Source: P45 (i), pp. 40, 145, 152-156. 
According to Seton and Arnot’s figures, only 36.8% of the total number of prisoners included in their study were given 
sentences, including the 15 that were formally pardoned.
*
APPENDIX XXII 
JACOBITE EXECUTIONS 1746-53 
FIGURE 1: EXECUTIONS BY RANK 
FIGURE 2: EXECUTIONS BY REGION 
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*Includes a total of 120 executions as tallied in P45 (i), pp. 147-151. Locales were determined by cross-referencing 
those records with searches in JDB1745. The majority of unknown regions are for British army deserters.
*
APPENDIX XXIII 
GOLDSMITH ACCUSATIONS, EDINBURGH 1746 
 
   
 FIGURE 1: ACCUSATIONS OF AND BY GOLDSMITHS 
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*Source: Rosebery’s List, passim. As noted in footnote #259, Thomas Robertson, accused by his own master, is the 
only one who shows signs of actually being confined, but there are no witnesses nor further evidence against him.
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